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I.1. Electoral politics and the rise of the fiscal state 
 
 
The uneasy co-existence of capitalist economies and democratic politics has inspired 
some of the best-known works in political economy since the discipline’s inception. 
Periodic crises in the classical era followed by the near-collapse of the international 
capitalist system in the interwar period generated a loud chorus of pessimistic 
predictions on the system’s viability. While the direst predictions on capitalism’s 
demise inspired by the Marxist tradition were not fulfilled, re-embedding laissez-faire 
capitalism in a democratic society (Polanyi, 1944) by the state taking on a pro-active, 
stabilizing role (Keynes, 1937) was one of the most lasting transformations in modern 
economic history (Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1989; Kurth, 2011). Nowhere is such 
transformation more manifest than in the expanding role of the public economy 
(Cameron, 1978) during the post-war era. Defying early warnings on the tax-state’s 
limited capacity to expand (Schumpeter, 1918), developed economies today tax and 
redistribute around half of national income. Fiscal policy and public budgeting have 
thus become one of the central roles of the modern state.   
 
Beyond its systemic function in responding to economic shocks, fiscal policy has been 
one of the most studied areas in political economy because of its highly political nature. 
As Wagner (1890) already correctly predicted in the 19th century, growing affluence has 
been associated with a growing provision of goods, services and welfare because the 
public demand for them is income-elastic. Moreover, the agents of the pro-active state, 
national bureaucracies have simultaneously vied for increased funding because of what 
Niskanen (1971) somewhat pejoratively described as the self-aggrandizing incentive of 
the bureaucrat in his budget-maximizing model. The modern state’s budgeting 
procedures also contributed to these trends as incremental budgeting (Wildavsky, 1964) 
builds on last year’s budget as a benchmark; as cutting funds for certain state activities 
is more difficult than adding to them, incrementalism further adds to the secular 
expansion of the public economy. To the extent that the government is not a unitary 
actor but composed of various parties and spending ministers, the competition between 
these actors for a limited fiscal pool can create a common pool resource problem (von 
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Hagen and Harden, 1995; Hallerberg et al, 2009) further putting an upward pressure on 
government expenditures and taxation. 
 
Of the various sources of political influences on the state’s fiscal activity, however, 
electoral pressure has perhaps been the most relevant one in the last three to four 
decades. As the Keynesian era gave way to a much diminished role in activist fiscal 
policy-making starting from the late 1970s (Iversen and Soskice, 2006), electoral 
constituencies and organized groups with vested interests in public programmes 
continued to shape the discourse on public budgeting; in the new era of “permanent 
austerity” (Pierson, 1994; 2001) redistributive conflicts between competing claims on 
the public budget (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) made electoral trade-offs even more 
pertinent for re-election seeking incumbents. Such trade-offs will be especially relevant 
in today’s fiscal environment as the Western world is simultaneously experiencing low 
growth, strains on public budgets and popular discontent with austerity politics. It is 
likely, therefore that the electoral arena will continue to be of paramount importance in 
mediating conflicting interests and claims on the limited fiscal resources of the state 
(Streeck, 2011).   
 
However, contrary to the post-war “democratic class struggle” (Korpi, 1983) that led to 
the crystallization of today’s welfare states, the current European debt-crisis risks 
pitting electoral demands on competing political parties against the imperatives of fiscal 
sustainability and debt-reduction. While mature welfare states have already proven to 
be unexpectedly resilient in the face of economic shocks and ideological offensives 
(Pierson, 1994), much of what Castles (2007, p.5) coined as “core expenditure” – 
essentially non-social expenditure – have already been squeezed under fiscal pressure 
from the past. Today’s fiscal dynamics, however, are unlikely to be reversed by such 
measures as cutting defence spending or limiting waste in public administration. To the 
extent that much of what the public economy provides to its beneficiaries is under 
attack, understanding the electoral dynamics behind fiscal policy is essential for a 
broader account of the future of the democracy-capitalism nexus. More specifically, in 
times of fiscal strain, can incumbent governments employ the public budget for 
electoral purposes? How do they distribute the pains of austerity when cuts must be 
made? Does the electoral response to fiscal decisions follow from a straightforward 
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characterization of voters’ exogenous preferences or are such preferences contingent 
and varying over time? 
 
These are the broad questions that the essays in this thesis engage with. Building on a 
large body of literature on the broad relationship between fiscal policy and electoral 
politics, they enter various scholarly debates by simultaneously building on and 
challenging a number of past findings and theoretical propositions. Adopting a rational 
choice framework, the thesis will be built upon two major, overarching themes that 
travel across the essays. First, not only did the post-Golden Age era of advanced 
economies starting from the 1970s result in radical changes in the dominant economic 
paradigms of the day (Hall, 1989), it also implied a significant transformation in the 
way policy-makers (governments and political parties in office) and voters interact.  
Second, a number of important and seemingly straightforward propositions in political 
economy will be refined by introducing context-conditionalities (Franzese, 2007) in the 
way of such interaction. Fiscal policy decisions and fiscal considerations of the vote 
choice will be argued to depend on a number of conditions that vary over space and 
time. 
 
The rest of the introduction to this thesis will run as follows. In section 2 I will discuss 
three separate research areas in political economy that my contributions build upon. 
Section 3 will motivate these contributions and outline their main arguments by 
highlighting some of the gaps, shortcomings or inconsistencies in existing research. 
Section 4 will discuss the common theoretical framework of the essays and their 
respective empirical research designs as well as data-related considerations in more 
detail. The final section of this introduction will provide some descriptive statistics on 
fiscal and electoral data to contextualize the essays that follow. 
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I.2. Three worlds of research on the budgeting-electoral politics nexus 
 
 
Political budget cycles 
 
Ever since fiscal policy’s role in stabilizing economic activity by influencing aggregate 
demand gained traction among policy-makers during the post-war Keynesian era, 
political economists have suspected that governments are unlikely to follow the 
“Keynesian textbook” by consistently conducting counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The 
discovery of the Phillips Curve (Phillips, 1958) and the unemployment-inflation trade-
off gave Keynesian-minded governments an all too tempting tool to exploit for political 
purposes. Following the stagflationary period of the 1970s and the rational expectations 
revolution in economics, discretionary fiscal policy fell out of favour; lags in fiscal 
policy (Friedman, 1953; Creel and Sawyer, 2008) the primacy of monetary policy – 
especially after the spread of independent central banks across the developed world 
eliminated the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 
1977) – and the general suspicion of government in the neoliberal era elevated 
automatic stabilization to the forefront of the new policy paradigm (Schelkle and 
Hassel, 2011). Yet, given the real rigidities in economies that new-Keynesian models 
have captured, governments still often departed from the passive role that Barro’s tax-
smoothing model (1979) relying on automatic stabilization ascribed to them. Fiscal 
policy remained a highly politicized tool in the hands of government to employ for re-
election purposes. 
 
During the Keynesian golden-age paradigm, these insights of opportunistic politicians 
employing fiscal policy to boost their re-election chances were first captured by 
political business cycle theory. Early theorists – Nordhaus (1975);Lindbeck (1976) – 
postulated adaptive expectations on the part of economic agents and opportunistic 
incentives on the part of incumbent governments. By engineering fiscal stimuli prior to 
the elections, the inflation surprise allowed governments to lower unemployment and 
increase growth that the electorate would presumably reward at the polls. While 
theoretically compelling and empirically plausible based on early evidence mainly from 
the US (Tufte, 1978) political business cycle theory suffered from an obvious 
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limitation: to the extent that fiscal illusion is ascribed to an electorate that fails to fully 
understand the future fiscal implication of current deficits (Alesina and Perotti, 1994, 
p.9), one was left wondering how long it would take before electorates start to decipher 
the rules of the game. Moreover, to the extent that expectations on inflationary policies 
get built in wage bargainers’ and other economic agents’ behaviour (Lucas, 1972), it 
would seem highly dubious that incumbents can systematically engineer economic 
expansions before elections. 
 
Especially this second critique prompted the next generation of scholars to build 
political business cycle models that are consistent with rational expectations. 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1990) put forward competence models in which asymmetric information 
between the electorate and incumbents on the latter’s competence in running the 
economy/limiting waste in the budget process prompts incumbents to run expansionary 
fiscal policies in the pre-electoral period as a signalling device. The theoretical 
innovation of these second generation models is that they do not rely on a rather 
extreme form of voters’ naivety to give rise to political business cycles. That said, the 
subsequent empirical scrutiny of political business cycle models produced far from 
conclusive results: the evidence provided by Alesina et al (1992; 1997) suggests that 
there is only weak, if any, link between real economic variables – GDP, disposable 
income, unemployment etc. – and the electoral timetable. 
 
The weak empirical underpinnings of political business cycles did not distract scholarly 
attention from opportunistic motives of incumbent governments, however. As Alesina 
et al (1997) summarized the next empirical turn in political business cycle scholarship: 
 
“Some policies, such as a tax cut or an increase in transfers may have a direct 
beneficial effect for the incumbent government at the polls. Thus, electoral 
manipulations of policy instruments could be observed even without any effect on the 
aggregate economy” (p.185) 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the role of demand-management that had been assigned to 
fiscal policy in the Keynesian era was largely side-lined in the new economic paradigm, 
policy-makers gained a somewhat paradoxical leverage in employing fiscal policy for 
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re-election purposes. Freed from the task of stabilizing aggregate demand according to 
the turns of the business cycle, they could focus on the redistributive allocation of 
public goods and services for important electoral blocs.  
 
Accordingly, the idea that the business cycle may or may not follow the electoral 
timetable hand in hand with fiscal aggregates gave rise to the notion of political budget 
cycles. Instead of focusing on economic aggregates, fiscal policy variables – 
government spending, taxation, deficits, change in debt levels etc. – became the key 
dependent variables in these works. Moreover, more attention was directed towards the 
“right-hand side” of the equation:  which country groups (Brender and Drazen, 2005, 
Shi and Svensson, 2002, Block, 2002), what constitutional/electoral rules (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003; Chang, 2008) what budgetary rules and institutions (Alt and Lassan, 
2006, Rose, 2006; Wehner, 2010; Hallerberg et al; 2009) and what exchange regimes 
(Hallerberg et al, 2002) may give rise to larger/smaller political budget cycles. The vast 
array of context-conditionalities (Franzese and Jusko, 2005; Franzese, 2007) that this 
literature engaged with indicates that political budget cycles are far from universal, 
regularly occurring in some contexts but not in others. Most fundamentally, political 
budget cycles require a responsive electorate that reward politicians when they deliver 
the desired redistributive or economic outcomes. This is the next topic that I turn to. 
 
 
Economic voting and the electoral response to fiscal policy 
 
Just as government’s opportunistic motives in economic policy-making inspired a large 
body of literature in political economy, the electoral consequences of economic 
outcomes have been studied at depth in the last 40 years. Since the early 1970s, political 
business cycles and economic voting have come into some sort of symbiosis under an 
apparently straightforward formulation. On the one hand, voters, beyond other 
admittedly important motives, such as class-identity (Evans, 2000; Evans and Tilly 
2012), partisanship (Green et al, 1998; Pickup, 2010), post-material values (Inglehart, 
1977) etc., systematically reward good economic performance at the polls. On the other 
hand, incumbents who recognize this electoral mechanism attempt to engineer 
favourable economic performance in the run-up to elections. Moreover, just as political 
budget cycle research resonated well with the reduced responsibility of governments for 
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economic performance in the post-Golden Age economic paradigm, scholars of 
economic voting came to realize that the electoral response to economics is more 
complicated than it may first appear. 
 
The seemingly uncontroversial insight that a favourable economic landscape helps 
incumbents’ re-election chances has long masked a number of controversies. Perhaps 
most fundamentally, the level at which economic voting should be studied marked a 
clear separation across contributions to the field. Initially, macro-level data relying on 
the vote share or the popularity rating of incumbent governments gave rise to the so-
called vote-popularity function (see Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for an older and 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam  (2000) for a more recent review) wherein economic voting 
was assessed. Numerous country-case studies (see Mueller (1970); Goodhart and 
Bhansali (1970); Lafay (1977); Kirchgassner (1985); Amor Bravo (1987) for a non-
exhaustive list) followed by cross-national pooled studies (Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 
2011) investigated whether macroeconomic data (GDP growth, income growth, 
unemployment and inflation in particular) predict incumbents’ electoral fortune 
accurately. The results were overall supportive of the notion that voters, on the 
aggregate, do reward politicians that deliver favourable economic outcomes. Which 
specific aspects of the macro-economy voters care about and the strength of the results 
across contexts (countries), however, differed a lot between the findings, giving rise to 
what Nannestad and Paldam (1994, p. 214) referred to as the “predicament of 
instability”. In other words, the electoral response to economics seemed to be more 
complex than the simple reward-punishment hypothesis that motivated the earliest 
empirical studies (Key, 1966; Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Kramer, 1971). 
 
In an attempt to disentangle the micro-logic between voting decisions and the economy, 
beginning from the 1980s scholars turned to the burgeoning collection of electoral 
surveys that asked voters their economic perceptions/evaluations and their vote choice. 
The turn towards the micro-level allowed scholars to address criticism referring to the 
ecological fallacy, whereby macro-level findings may erroneously suggest micro-level 
implications (Kramer, 1983). Similar to their macro-level counterparts, single-country 
studies (e.g. Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983) followed by cross-national survey research 
(e.g. Lewis-Beck, 1988; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Nadeau et al, 2012) confirmed that 
voters do indeed care about the state of the economy when casting their vote. More 
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specifically, retrospective evaluations of socio-tropic economic performance1 proved 
rather strong predictors of the vote choice in most contexts. The differences in the 
strength of the link across national electoral contexts, however, remained. 
 
The first seminal contribution that purported to address this instability is generally 
credited to Powell and Whitten’s (1993) clarity of responsibility hypothesis. 
Constructing an additive index of institutional policy-making fragmentation for 
different governments2, the authors find that where policy-making power is more 
concentrated and therefore the responsibility for economic outcomes is presumably 
higher, economic voting is stronger than in weak clarity of responsibility contexts. The 
underlying clarity of responsibility model was furthered developed by other authors 
(Whitten and Palmer, 1999 and Duch and Stevenson, 2008) who provided further 
evidence for the notion that voters do seem to distinguish between governments with 
different degrees of responsibility for economic outcomes. The apparent instability of 
economic voting across nations, therefore, appears to partly result from the fact that 
different electorates assign credit/blame differently depending on the 
institutional/political complexity of their political elites. That said, the clarity of 
responsibility model failed to address other important aspects of responsibility: even 
when they have a high degree of concentration in policy-making power, to what extent 
can governments steer the economy on its desired path? 
 
This omission presented an inconvenient disjuncture between political budget cycle 
theory and economic voting research.  While the shift in the former literature from 
economic outcomes to tools of demand management – fiscal policy in particular – 
reflected the diminishing influence of governments over the macro-economy, economic 
voting research continues to use macroeconomic indicators as the key dependent 
variable. Specifically, to the extent that the rise of non-electorally accountable decision-
makers, such as independent central banks (Duch and Stevenson, 2008), the spread of 
globalization (Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007) and a general emphasis on a 
non-activist government with regards to business cycle fluctuations have weakened the 
                                                 
1
 The retrospective vs. prospective and the ego-tropic vs. socio-tropic distinctions refer to the much-
debated questions whether voters primarily assess past or future (expected) performance and whether 
they primarily care about their personal finances or the wider health of the economy , respectively.  
2
 Specifically, the authors included the following aspects of policy-making fragmentation: bicameralism, 
minority status in legislature and coalition governments. 
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link between governments’ domestic economic policies and economic outcomes, the 
economic voter should have less and less interest in the macro-economy per se when 
assessing incumbents’ performance in office. 
 
This recognition prompted a number of scholars outside the traditional economic voting 
literature to turn to fiscal variables’ explanatory power over electoral fortunes. The 
default expectation given political budget cycles’ continued relevance has been that the 
electorate, in the aggregate, rewards governments for expansionary fiscal policies. Most 
empirical findings3, however, fail to validate this expectation. If anything, voters appear 
to be “fiscal conservative” to the extent that they punish incumbents for high deficits. 
Moreover, related studies on fiscal consolidation episodes where electoral punishment 
would appear to be the most likely have found no systematic punishment effects. By 
using large changes in the cyclically adjusted primary budgetary balance to identify 
adjustment episodes, Alesina et al (1998; 2011) find no systematic relationship between 
adjustment episodes and re-election prospects. The least evidence for any punishment 
effect is found exactly for those adjustments where the “most politically sensitive 
budget items” are tackled: transfers and the public wage bill (Alesina et al, 1998, p. 
198). This finding is confirmed by Van Hagen et al’s (2002) duration analysis on fiscal 
adjustments:  episodes relying on spending cuts in these items tend to last longer than 
other types of adjustment, highlighting their relative political viability. 
 
In a related manner, social policy research has undertaken similar investigations on the 
electoral consequences of welfare retrenchment. Since Paul Pierson’s seminal works on 
the new politics of the welfare state (1994; 1996; 2001), social policy scholars have 
often highlighted the electoral dangers that welfare retrenchment may entail: 
 
“Retrenchment entails a delicate effort either to transform programmatic change into 
an electorally attractive proposition, or, at the least, to minimize the political costs 
involved.  Advocates of retrenchment must persuade wavering supporters that the price 
of reform is manageable – a task that a substantial public outcry makes almost 
impossible” (Pierson, 1996, p. 145) 
 
                                                 
3
 see Eslava, 2006 for an extensive  review on single-case studies and cross-national empirical works as 
well as Brender and Drazen (2008) and Sattler et al (2010) for more recent contributions. 
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 Yet, empirical research on this question reveals that only under certain circumstances 
do voters actually penalize welfare cutbacks. Armingeon and Giger (2008) and Giger 
(2010) show that retrenchment becomes electorally hazardous only if the opposition 
manage to increase its salience in the campaign. Schumacher et al (2013) find that only 
parties with a positive welfare-image lose votes when implementing welfare 
retrenchment in office. Giger and Nelson (2011) demonstrate that some parties (liberal 
and religious parties in particular) even gain votes after welfare retrenchment. The 
overall thrust of the welfare retrenchment literature thus complement empirical findings 
from the fiscal adjustment debate: contrary to what one would expect from the 
perspective of the economic voter, reining in deficits and public expenditure seems to 
have no clear implications for electoral fortunes. 
 
As highlighted by some of the aforementioned works, partisanship is a highly relevant 
aspect of incumbents’ electoral incentives. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in 
times of austerity when different socioeconomic groups’ may have diametrically 
opposite interests towards the welfare state; to the extent that a trade-off must be found 
between fiscal sustainability, the tax burden and welfare generosity, welfare 
retrenchment, by its very nature, will be highly politicized, pitting different groups’ 
welfare-related interests against each other. Since incumbent governments generally 
owe their governing mandate to and therefore represent different socioeconomic 
groups, the partisan identity of retrenching governments surely matters. This insight 
inspired the partisanship literature in welfare state studies, to which I will now turn. 
 
 
The partisanship-welfare state nexus in times of austerity 
 
Even before fiscal pressures on the welfare state started to dominate the academic 
agenda, partisan dynamics underlying fiscal policy-making had emerged as an 
important research paradigm. Douglas Hibb’s seminal contribution (1977) on partisan 
macroeconomic cycles was the first complement – or one might say alternative – to the 
emerging political business cycle literature at the time. Recognizing that different 
partisan governments rely on different constituencies, Hibbs suggested that they should 
be preoccupied with fundamentally different policy goals. In particular, left-wing voters 
tend to be of lower socioeconomic status hence job security (ie. low unemployment) 
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should be their primary policy concern. By contrast, right-wing voters tend to be of 
higher socioeconomic status with relatively safe job-prospects and high savings; their 
major concern is thus price stability so that the real value of their savings is not eroded 
by inflation. Accordingly, Hibbs showed that during Democratic presidencies in the US, 
unemployment was lower than average, whereas Republican presidencies appeared to 
prioritize inflation control. Similar to the underlying inflation-unemployment trade-off 
in opportunistic political business cycle models, Hibb’s formulation assumed that the 
US executive can easily choose its optimal point on the Phillips curve. In response to 
objections deriving from rational expectations, Alesina (1987) followed up with his 
rational partisan model where uncertainty regarding the partisan identity of the next 
administration – ie. the competitiveness of the electoral race – generates short-lived 
partisan cycles in macroeconomic outcomes. 
 
Empirical evidence on significant partisan differences between macroeconomic 
outcomes has not been overwhelming, however (Alesina et al, 1997). That said, just 
like the political budget cycle literature recognized that regardless of its impact on the 
macro-economy the electoral timetable could still exert a sizeable impact on budgetary 
outcomes, partisan theory remained relevant as far as fiscal policy was concerned. 
Cusack (2001), for instance, shows that the left continued to attach priority to high-
unemployment by conducting more aggressive counter-cyclical measures to fight it than 
the right. Moreover, as the accumulating debt burden in rich economies over the 1980s 
became a policy concern for all governments across the partisan spectrum, a number of 
scholars began to look at the partisan determinants of government response to this 
challenge. Specifically, the primary focus narrowed down on the largest and in many 
places the institutionally most resistant4 part of the government budget: social security, 
or what we conventionally refer to as the welfare state. As mature welfare states entered 
the post-Golden Age era where public deficits were seen with increasing suspicion, the 
dominant scholarly expectation at a time was one of welfare state retrenchment; 
scholarly attention accordingly shifted towards whether partisan differences would play 
in a consistent way with partisan theory: would the political left (social democrats, 
labour and to some extent Christian democrats as well) remain the defender of the 
                                                 
4
 As many welfare programmes, such as public pensions, sick pay, unemployment benefits etc. take the 
form of legislated entitlements often under the control of the social partners, they are more resistant to 
change than discretionary fiscal measures that governments can employ at will. 
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welfare state even as the right (conservatives and liberals) are trying to shrink it down 
to size? 
 
The partisan roots of the welfare state were first captured by the power resource 
approach. Power resource theory (Korpi, 1983; 2006) argued that the historical and 
organizational dominance of the labour movement through trade unions and social-
democratic parties endowed it with sufficient power resources to impose their 
preferences on employers by extending social insurance to the socially vulnerable 
groups of the population5. Variation in labour strength gave rise to distinct worlds of 
welfare-capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) with varying degrees of 
decommodification of the labour force. To the extent that welfare retrenchment aims at 
partially reversing these trends, left-wing partisanship, according to this “old-
politics”/power-resource approach should be conducive to higher resistance to welfare 
cuts. Empirical evidence for this perspective has been provided by a voluminous 
literature including such seminal contributions as Korpi and Palme (2003), Allan and 
Scruggs (2004), Swank (2005), among others. Relying on direct measures of 
retrenchment efforts by looking at changes in the program parameters as opposed to 
social security spending6, the overall message of these works is that the left, on the 
balance, has been relatively successful at halting welfare retrenchment compared to the 
right. 
 
A number of other welfare state studies challenged these findings, however. Inspired by 
the surprising resilience of the welfare-state during conservative ascendency in a 
number of important countries during the 1980s – notably, the US, the UK and 
Germany – Paul Pierson (1994; 1996; 2001) argued that the politics of retrenchment is 
qualitatively different from the era of welfare expansion. In particular, welfare 
programmes have created their own clienteles who are prepared to defend the welfare 
state; as dismantling welfare programmes imposes concentrated costs in exchange for 
dispersed and uncertain benefits in the future, no partisan government should have an 
electoral incentive to launch radical attacks on them. This prediction on diminishing 
partisan differences in the era of “permanent austerity” was confirmed by the empirical 
works of Huber and Stephens (2001) and Kittel and Obinger (2003). According to this 
                                                 
5
 However, see Swenson (1991) and Hall and Soskice (2001) for an alternative, firm-centred account. 
6
 See Green-Pedersen (2004) for a detailed discussion of the “dependent variable problem”. 
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New Politics perspective, therefore, the conventional understanding of partisanship with 
regards to welfare outcomes needs profound reconsideration. 
 
One particular source of such reconsideration has been offered by yet another school of 
welfare state studies. Formal modellers have been long interested in unexpected 
partisan dynamics in various policy domains. Inspired by Richard Nixon’s unexpected 
overture towards Maoist China in a historical turn of US foreign policy, these models 
(Cukierman and Tomassi, 1998; Cowen and Sutter, 1998) provide theoretical intuitions 
why these unexpected political actions may occur. The underlying idea of welfare 
credibility and trust prompted Ross (2000) to apply these insights in the welfare state 
domain by arguing that left-wing governments are better situated to inflict pain on their 
“natural” constituencies through welfare reform. In a related argument, Levy (1999) 
shows how left-wing governments managed to undertake welfare reform in Christian-
democratic welfare regimes by highlighting some of the inequities that the regime had 
produced over several decades. Moreover, in his comparative work on social policy 
reform, Kitschelt (2001) likewise emphasized welfare-credibility of opposition parties 
as an important condition for the political viability of welfare retrenchment. These 
perspectives share the notion that welfare retrenchment is more than a static policy-
choice that incumbent governments choose either voluntarily or under serious problem 
pressures on the welfare state7. Whether they are able to do so may largely depend on 
their welfare credibility that they had accumulated over the past.  
 
This plethora of perspectives on the partisanship-welfare state debate has greatly 
enriched our understanding of a number of issues relevant for welfare state research. 
Amidst the cacophony of often conflicting empirical evidence, however, we still lack a 
coherent account of the partisan dynamics driving welfare state retrenchment. Just like 
important issues remained unsettled on the political budget cycle-economic voting 
relationship, the partisanship-welfare state nexus needs further refinement. The 
following section will provide a summary of my essays that contribute to these debates. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Various sources of these pressures include globalization (Swank and Steinmo, 2002), deindustrialization 
(Iversen and Cusack, 2000) and demographic changes (Huber and Stephens, 2001) 
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I.3. Summary of main findings 
 
 
Even as the role of fiscal policy in dampening business cycles has diminished in the 
post-Golden Age paradigm, its politicization for redistributive means has arguably 
increased. In fact, as the discussion above has shown, various constituencies’ demands 
on fiscal redistribution have been widely acknowledged to push governments to spend 
beyond their means, resulting in debt accumulation over time. These demands lie at the 
heart of political budget cycle theory in that the proximity of elections increases the 
pressure on governments to run higher deficits in an attempt to cater for different 
constituencies. The political economy of fiscal policy has accordingly established a 
broad link between the electoral influence of these constituencies and debt. In 
fragmented political settings where multiple parties in government represent a large 
number of constituencies, the common pool of fiscal resources is likely to result in 
higher debt accumulation over time (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Von Hagen, 1992; 
Kontopoulous and Perotti, 2002; Wehner 2010) and delays in fiscal adjustment (Alesina 
and Drazen, 1991). To the extent that this pressure is expected to increase with the 
proximity to elections, such multiple settings are expected to increase political budget 
cycles as well; not only do governments want to open up the purse in their bid for re-
election, but they also have to satisfy multiple constituencies’ demands at the same time 
to do so. 
 
While theoretically compelling, this perspective ignores another important aspect of 
intra-governmental dynamics. Coalition partners in multi-party governments – who 
often represent distinct constituencies with specific programmatic demands on the 
public budget – are not merely additional actors who vie for the common pool of fiscal 
resources failing to internalize the cost it entails for the whole community, as the 
common pool approach suggests. They are also veto players in the budget process 
(Tsebelis, 2002; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004) with whom other coalition members need to 
bargain to agree on the aggregate budget. Moreover, their electoral incentives may run 
counter to other coalition partners’ incentives, especially if the latter are seen to derive 
disproportionate electoral benefits from a proposed budget plan. The electoral 
competition between these coalition partners could thus moderate, rather than increase 
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political budget cycles, contrary to what a common pool-based perspective would 
predict. 
 
The first essay in this thesis explicitly incorporates the bargaining power of coalition 
partners in a political budget cycle framework. In line with previous findings that have 
shown that electoral systems are important conditioning factors of political budget 
cycles (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, Chang, 2008), I will argue that it is the government 
structures that different electoral systems are bound to give rise to that are the primary 
determinants of the magnitude of the cycle. In particular, single-party governments that 
are unhindered by coalition members to draft their pre-electoral budgets will be shown 
to display higher propensities to electioneer. Moreover, power-distribution in coalition 
settings is another important determinant of political budget cycles. The essay will 
show that in contexts where the two most important cabinet players in the budget 
process – the prime minister and the finance minister -  are delegated by the same party 
still experience budget cycles, albeit smaller ones that single-party settings. However, 
when one of the coalition members is strong enough to delegate one of the two 
important actors to government, intra-governmental bargaining will eliminate budget 
cycles. 
 
The second essay is motivated by the “demand-side” of the budgeting-electoral politics 
nexus. As highlighted above, economic voting has been an important complement to 
political budget cycles in this regard; the major motivation for election-induced fiscal 
expansion is a responsive electorate that rewards favourable economic outcomes and 
distributional benefits – public goods, social insurance, public employment etc. – 
delivered by governments. However, a major shortcoming of economic voting research 
is that it continues to assume an electorate which attributes a high degree of 
responsibility to governments for domestic economic outcomes. While it is ultimately 
an empirical issue what aspect of the economy voters credit/blame governments for, it 
is theoretically compelling to assume that rational voters would come to recognize the 
diminishing importance of domestic economic policies over macroeconomic outcomes 
in an era of international interdependence (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007), central bank 
independence and a generally non-activist fiscal-policy paradigm. Although varying 
degrees of responsibility attribution depending on institutional and partisan 
fragmentation have been noted, the underlying link in economic voting research is still 
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the one between macroeconomic outcomes and the micro-level vote choice. In other 
words, economic voting failed to reflect on the theoretical turn in political budget cycle 
theory from macroeconomic to budgetary outcomes as the chief object of investigation. 
 
To the extent that the aggregate electoral response to fiscal decisions has been studied, 
the findings, summarized above, have been inconclusive. What my second essay aims 
to achieve is to bring the study of the electoral response to fiscal policy closer to the 
economic voting paradigm whereby fiscal variables will be added to the “usual 
suspects” in the vote-popularity function: macroeconomic variables and 
political/partisan controls. In particular, I will theorize that “fiscal voting” and 
economic voting interact to give rise to a systematic electoral pattern on the aggregate 
level. More precisely, I will show that the changing state of the business cycle re-aligns 
the redistributive preferences of the electoral space, which makes the electoral response 
to fiscal decisions conditional on the economy. In other words, as will be empirically 
illustrated in a high clarity of responsibility context such as the United Kingdom, it is 
neither macroeconomic outcomes per se, nor fiscal variables by themselves that explain 
aggregate-level electoral results; rather it is the interaction between policy choices and 
economic conditions that predict the electoral fate of incumbent governments. 
 
The main contribution of this essay will be an extension of the clarity of responsibility 
thesis. While governments’ responsibility for delivering economic benefits has surely 
weakened in recent decades, fiscal policy continues to be an important tool in the hands 
of incumbents to provide public or private goods to their constituencies. Redistributive 
benefits in particular are expected to have a high political salience as they pit different 
income groups’ interest against each other. High salience coupled with the 
governments’ continued influence over the delivery of these benefits and the tax 
burden/ debt issuance to finance them is thus likely to generate intense debates over 
government policy. Consequently, putting the emphasis on fiscal policy choices rather 
than macroeconomic variables as the chief target of responsibility attribution is an 
important contribution to economic voting research. 
 
While the previous contributions rely only implicitly on different constituencies as the 
main driving forces of budgetary outcomes and voting decisions, the third and final 
essay will address constituencies’ heterogeneity explicitly from the perspective of 
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partisan theory. The main motivation behind this contribution is the welfare 
retrenchment-partisanship debate which has produced a number of often conflicting 
predictions and empirical results over the last decades (see previous discussion). My 
starting point will be the New Politics literature’s notion of “permanent austerity” 
(Pierson, 1994, 1996, 1998) which has created intense pressures on governments to 
prioritize cost-containment in their welfare reform agenda (Pierson, 2001). I will 
theorize that in contrast to cross-class alliances (Swenson, 2002) that characterized the 
era of welfare state expansion, “permanent austerity” implies a zero-sum game where 
the preservation (or further expansion) of certain social programmes must imply 
significant cuts in other programmes. Consequently, different constituencies’ interest 
regarding specific welfare programmes will be polarized, presenting governments with 
an unprecedented electoral challenge to balance between the opposing interests. 
 
Incorporating the notion of credibility and trust of different political parties vis-à-vis 
their commitment to different constituencies and welfare programmes, the main 
argument of the third essay can be summarized as follows. To the extent that some 
parties enjoy higher credibility among certain social groups, they have an electoral 
advantage to reform (cut) the very programmes that these groups – what I will refer to 
as their core constituencies – are most prepared to defend. Following a vote-
maximization strategy, these parties will therefore attempt to shift the burden of 
“permanent austerity” on their core constituencies and pursue a relatively pro-welfare 
strategy vis-à-vis other programmes whose beneficiaries they need to sway over to 
preserve/increase their vote share. My empirical results will show that such strategy is 
especially pronounced for two important voting blocs that are the main beneficiaries of 
the welfare state: the pensioner population and low-skilled workers. During the sample 
period, on average, parties that are relatively well-positioned among the pensioners and 
low-skilled workers have systematically cut public pensions and programmes catering 
for the working-age – unemployment programmes, active labour market policies, sick 
pay etc. – respectively. In times of less budgetary stress, however, this pattern reverses 
and parties reward their core constituencies. This is consistent with the notion that it is 
the electoral perception of austerity that allows governments to embark on a Nixon-
goes-to-China strategy (Ross, 2000) when distributing the pain of austerity. 
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In addition to providing the first systematic quantitative evidence on Nixon-goes-to-
China strategies, my essay will be an important contribution to partisan theory because 
of another consideration as well. The traditional partisanship literature, as a rule, has 
relied on party families to identify which parties represent which constituencies among 
the electorate. I will argue, by contrast, that the analytical value of party families has 
been losing relevance in an era of electoral de-alignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 
2002) so it is important to look at the specific constellation of constituencies around 
different political parties. The main measure I will employ in this study (see the next 
section for more detailed discussion) relies on group-specific voting patterns assembled 
from a vast number of electoral surveys. I will argue that such an approach would be a 
welcome improvement in future partisanship research as well. 
 
 
I.4. Research design, methodology, data and measurement 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the general conceptual framework I adopt for my thesis is one of 
rational choice. Differently put, my implicit assumption that runs through the essays is 
that actors (political parties in essay I and III and voters in essay II) make decisions that 
maximize their utility. For political parties in office, utility-maximization will be 
understood by vote-maximization which also maximizes incumbents’ chances to remain 
in office after the next general elections. Other motives, such as policy-seeking 
behaviour (Benoit and Laver, 2006) will thus be relegated to a secondary role in this 
framework. For voters, in turn, utility-maximization will imply the support of policies 
which best conform to voters’ material/redistributive interest. Again, alternative voting 
motivations will be only implicitly addressed. For instance, the notion of welfare-
credibility that essay III builds upon implies that groups of voters react to welfare 
decisions differently under different partisan governments. That said, the underlying 
motive is still one of utility-maximization in terms of expected welfare outcomes. My 
rational choice framework thus situates my thesis among Peter Hall’s “three i’s” (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996) in a straightforward manner. While economic and political 
institutions and the evolution of ideas have been surely important determinants of 
budgetary outcomes and electoral dynamics, my thesis favours an interest-based 
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explanation. These interests are material/redistributive interests for voters and power 
(being and staying in office) for political parties. These interests will be captured by 
formal utility/vote-functions for political parties (essay I and III) and a stylized mapping 
of cost-benefit calculation of the British electorate in response to government spending 
decisions (essay II). 
 
Turning to my empirical design, I largely followed the comparative political economy 
literature by adopting a cross-national, quantitative framework. The main motivation 
was to allow for the greatest possible degree of generalization given the scope 
conditions of the respective theories. Specifically, electoral considerations of budgeting 
presuppose democratic accountability, electoral competition and significant risks for 
incumbents to lose office. The scope conditions are thus delimited by what one 
normally considers as the universe of “established” electoral democracies. The EU 
sample in essay I can thus be regarded as representative of this universe with an 
important caveat: to the extent that coalition dynamics in the executive branch are 
unique features of parliamentary forms of government, sample restriction to EU 
member states is justified by the parliamentary form of government that predominates 
in this country group (unlike Latin-American democracies for instance). Essay III, by 
contrast, incorporates a wider universe of OECD countries where periodic fiscal 
adjustment efforts had to be implemented over the last four decades. Finally, essay II is 
somewhat of an exception in my empirical design in that it focuses on a single case, 
albeit still in a quantitative framework.  A single-case study as opposed to a cross-
national design allows me to situate the essay in the clarity of responsibility thesis: my 
case selection was driven by the highest possible degree of institutional clarity of 
responsibility where voters have a clear view on whom to credit/blame for 
redistributive/fiscal outcomes (a more detailed discussion of case selection will be 
offered in essay II) 
 
With these general considerations in mind, a brief discussion of my quantitative 
empirical design is in order. As it has become a sort of standard in comparative political 
economy/comparative politics, I will largely rely on the toolkit of time-series and time-
series cross-section (TSCS) analysis for my three essays. More specifically, essay I and 
III will test the theoretical arguments in a TSCS framework with EU (essay I) and 
OECD (essay III) member states being the units of analysis, measured over two to four 
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decades yielding an unbalanced panel of 400-600 country-year observations. While the 
specifics of estimation issues will be discussed at more length in each respective paper, 
the general strategy was to rely on the Beck and Katz standard (Beck and Katz, 1995, 
Beck, 2001) by running OLS regressions on the panels and addressing the violations of 
the Gauss-Markov assumptions (Kittel, 1999) in various ways. More specifically, where 
serial correlation has been detected, lagged dependent variables were introduced which 
also allowed me to pick up dynamics in the dependent variables’ response to changes in 
the main independent variables of interest. Panel-heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation were corrected by panel-corrected standard errors. Unit- and time-specific 
dummies (fixed effects) to account for unobserved unit- or time-specific variables were 
introduced when needed. Essay II’s aggregate-level analysis was conducted in a time-
series framework relying on the Box-Jenkins (ARIMA) methodology (Enders, 2004). 
As all three main arguments in the essays put forward conditional hypotheses, most of 
the estimated models relied on interaction effects; beyond the standard tools of 
regression output tables, I will also exploit the visual power of marginal effects plots as 
convincingly recommended by Brambor et al (2006). 
 
The main data sources for my empirical analysis are fairly standard for cross-national 
research. For essay I, fiscal variables were obtained from the European Commission’s 
general government database which collects annual budgetary data according to the 
standardized Maastricht (ESA 95) methodology. Political data – government types – 
were obtained from the European Journal of Political Research’s annual data yearbook 
and its corresponding parlgov database. Electoral indicators (date and circumstances of 
elections) were drawn from the Interparliamentary Union’s parline database. Finally, 
macroeconomic and structural control variables were primarily obtained from the 
OECD i.library’s database, complemented by IMF and Eurostat when needed. 
 
For essay II, which uses quarterly vote intention data among the British electorate as the 
main dependent variable, I relied on Ipsos-Mori’s monthly survey which provides one 
of the longest publicly available time-series among British polling firms. Instead of 
general government data, the main fiscal variable I used here was discretionary 
spending, obtained from the Treasury’s online databases on a quarterly basis. The 
second part of essay II which analyses the changing tax-spending preferences of 
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different income groups among the British electorate, I relied on post-election surveys 
conducted by the British Election Studies series. 
 
For essay III, the main dependent variable of interest was welfare spending on pre-
specified constituencies. These were obtained from the OECD’s social expenditure 
dataset which disaggregates welfare spending into various categories. Parties’ support 
base among the constituencies were calculated from moving averages of group-specific 
support for different political parties, estimated by the Eurobarometer ‘s and the 
International Social Survey Program’s  (ISSP) annual surveys. Fiscal adjustment 
episodes were identified by changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of the 
general government. These figures were obtained from the OECD’s economic outlook 
database. Finally, control variables were obtained similarly to essay I: OECD i.library 
being the primary source, complemented by other cross-national databases (IMF, 
Eurostat etc.) when necessary. 
 
 
I.5. Setting the scene: fiscal outcomes and electoral competition over 
the study period 
 
 
The final section of this introduction will lay out the broad context for the underlying 
fiscal and electoral developments during the period under study for this thesis: 
beginning from the early 1970s until the time of writing. In particular, I will select 
seven OECD countries that are representative of the “universe of cases” that the essays 
engage with. The first criterion for this selection was size or “importance” in terms of 
economic power; the second criterion was variation with regards to size of government 
and production/welfare regime-type (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Post-communist OECD countries were excluded from this descriptive analysis for their 
lack of data availability prior to regime change. Accordingly, the following descriptive 
statistics will trace fiscal and electoral developments in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and the US. 
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As argued before, political considerations behind fiscal decisions are of paramount 
importance for understanding budgetary developments in recent decades. As a first 
tentative illustration of these political influences, it is informative to compare fiscal 
developments to a pure “Keynesian” benchmark where the fiscal balance is broadly 
stable around the business cycle: governments react to downturns by running deficits 
but make up for the fiscal shortfall during economic booms (Barro, 1979). Under this 
benchmark, debt-levels as a ratio of GDP should be more or less stable over a long-
enough window of analysis. A secular rise in the debt ratio, by contrast, should indicate 
that governments conduct fiscal policy under a deficit bias (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1990; Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2010), failing to fully correct deficits in the long-run. 
Figure I.1 depicts the long-run evolution of the gross general government debt ratio 
since the beginning of the Keynesian era8. 
 
Figure I.1:  
The evolution of debt ratios (5-year moving average of gross outstanding 
debt/GDP, %) in 7 OECD economies in the post-war period. 
 
Source: IMF Historical Public Debt database 
                                                 
8
 To obtain comparable and long time series on debt ratios, I used the IMF’s recently published historical 
public debt database. I smoothed annual fluctuations of debt ratios due to business cycle effects by 
calculating 5-year moving averages for all series. 
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As evident from the chart, debt ratios have been anything but stable over the post-war 
decades.  The Keynesian era saw a gradual reduction of average debt levels, which had 
been historically at their peak in various countries over the war years, notably in the US 
and especially in the UK. High growth in the Keynesian golden age allowed 
governments to reduce debt levels even as the scope of government continued to 
expand. By the late 1970s, however, the tide began to turn and debt levels began their 
secular rise, interspersed with periodic consolidations efforts (for example in Sweden  
Italy, Spain and the UK in the late 1990s and early 2000s etc.) Rising debt in the post-
Golden Age period thus presented governments with periodic pressures to put their 
public finances in order, making this era qualitatively distinct from the previous golden-
age boom years where debt-reduction almost automatically followed from the proceeds 
of high growth rates. Most importantly, however, the thick black line indicates the 
average evolution of public debt ratios, clearly pointing towards an increasing trend 
since the late 1970s, the period that this thesis focuses on. It appears therefore that as 
fiscal policy fell out of favour as a powerful tool of counter-cyclical demand 
management, political pressures have been pushing debt levels up in the last four 
decades. 
 
An alternative way to evaluate the extent to which governments have conformed to 
counter-cyclicality is to compare the cyclically adjusted primary balance to the output 
gap (the deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP). The cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (capb) allows one to gauge governments’ discretionary actions because this 
measure filters out the automatic effects of the business cycle (falling tax revenues and 
increasing social outlays during recessions). A pure “Keynesian” government would 
run deficits in the capb when actual output is temporarily below its potential and 
compensate by surpluses when output is above potential to avert overheating and 
inflationary pressures. Figure I.2 depicts the relative evolution of the capb and the 
output gap in the selected economies.9 
                                                 
9
 Updated data for cyclical adjustment are available only from the mid-1980s (and early 1990s for 
Germany). Instead of the output gap, defined by actual GDP minus potential GDP, I use the ratio between 
the two. Therefore, when the ratio is 1, it indicates an economy that is running at its full potential; when it 
is below, the economy is in a cyclical downturn; when it is above 1, the economy is running into supply-
side constraints and inflationary pressures. 
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Figure I.2  
The evolution of the cyclically adjusted balance and the actual GDP/potential GDP 
ratio over the study period 
 
 
 
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
France
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of potential GDP (right axis)
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Germany
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of potential GDP (right axis)
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Italy
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of potential GDP (right axis)
31 
 
 
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Spain
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of GDP (right axis)
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Sweden
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of potential GDP (right axis)
-10
-5
0
5
10
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
UK
actual/potential gdp capb, as a % of potential GDP (right axis)
32 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database no. 93 
 
The picture, in this regard, is somewhat mixed. There are many instances in which the 
relative evolution of the two measures conforms to the “Keynesian recipe”. For 
instance, the parallel movement between the output gap and the capb in the late 
1980s/early 1990s in Sweden or since the recession in the early 2000s in the US 
indicate such counter-cyclical policy-making. However, there are clear instances for the 
opposite as well. During much of the last decade, for instance, the UK economy has 
been running above its potential thanks to the housing and credit boom and the 
government did little to lean against the wind: the capb has been constantly in the 
negative territory. There are a number of other instances for opposite movement 
between the output gap and the capb in Italy, Spain and France. It seems therefore that 
considerations other than counter-cyclical discretionary policy have been on the minds 
of policy-makers. The first essay will investigate whether electoral considerations can 
partly account for these developments across different government types in the EU. 
 
 Electoral motivations for budgeting presuppose a competitive electoral scene, however. 
To the extent that governments feel relatively secure in their seats, electoral pressure is 
unlikely to account for the deviation of fiscal policy-making from its optimum path. 
Two aspects of electoral outcomes are important determinants for the competitiveness 
of the electoral scene: relative proximity of competing parties/blocs in terms of electoral 
support and regular turnover in power. Figure I.3 provides a snapshot of whether the 
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selected countries satisfy these criteria and hence governments are likely to use fiscal 
policy-making for electoral purposes.10 
 
Figure I.3  
Electoral outcomes in terms of national vote share (in %) in the selected countries 
Source: Parlgov database 
                                                 
10
 Italy was omitted from this comparison because of the radical transformation of its party-scene in the 
middle of the study period, making the identification of the two main competing parties/blocs difficult; 
for the US, only presidential elections were considered as the focus of this thesis is the government, i.e. 
the executive branch. 
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In all six countries, the vote share of the main left-wing, social-democratic party (black 
column) is compared to its right-wing rival – or block of rivals if they regularly form 
coalitions together as in Sweden – (grey column). The relative power between the two 
camps, over the study period, is roughly equal. The average left-right margin over 10-
12 elections ranges between -4.17 % in Germany to 3.83% in Spain. While the study 
period witnessed some landslides, such as the Spanish PSOE’s – led by Felipe Gonzalez 
– two consecutive victories over its conservative rival in 1982 and 1986, extremely tight 
elections outnumber these landslides. Some of these neck-and-neck elections are well-
known (such as George Bush Jr’s victory over Al Gore in 2000), others are less so: the 
vote share of the German SPD and the CDU/CSU list in 2002, for example, were 
almost identical; the margin of victory of the French Gaullists over the left-wing 
socialists in 1978 was below 1% of the national vote, just like the Swedish social-
democrats victory over the bourgeois coalition in 1982 and the British Conservative 
Party’s victory over Labour in 1974. Surely, the translation of national vote shares to 
parliamentary seat shares (or Electoral College votes in the US) is less than 
straightforward in many electoral systems but the overall pattern is clear: the electoral 
race in these selected countries have been very competitive with frequent alternation in 
power between the two camps. The fate of incumbent governments can thus hinge on as 
little or less than 1% of the national vote, which implies that they are likely to attempt 
to sway over undecided voters by providing redistributive benefits. How the electorate 
responds to these attempts will be the subject of the second essay in the context of the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Amidst such competitive electoral landscape, painful budgeting decisions have been 
taken, however. In particular, the welfare state, often considered as the most popular 
spending item in the overall government budget, has long been subject to debates on 
affordability and cost-containment (Pierson, 2002). To the extent that welfare 
programmes typically target different constituencies, the partisan colour of incumbent 
governments is expected to be an important determinant of retrenchment efforts. Essay 
III will take up this task by distinguishing between welfare programmes that primarily 
cater for the elderly and those that target (low-status) working-age individuals. Figure 
I.4 below shows the evolution of welfare spending (as a % of GDP) for the two types of 
35 
 
welfare programmes. In particular, programmes targeting the elderly are old-age 
pension programmes, survivor benefits and health expenditure11. Programmes that 
target working-age individuals in turn comprise unemployment insurance, active-labour 
market policies, incapacity benefits and family benefits. Although many of the 
beneficiaries of these programmes are high-skilled/high-status individuals, low-
skilled/low-status individuals are expected to be the core constituencies behind such 
programmes as they bear a smaller share of the tax-burden to ensure their financial 
sustainability. 
 
Figure I.4  
The evolution of social spending in the selected OECD economies (as a % of GDP) 
 
 
                                                 
11
 While public health provision covers the entire population, the elderly are typically the most frequent 
users of health benefits and facilities. Moreover, several programmes exist that provide extensive public 
coverage for the elderly separately from the rest of the population, Medicare in the US being the most 
famous example. 
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Source: OECD Social Expenditure Statistics 
 
The overall trend, across this subsample of OECD universe, is not one of retrenchment. 
Social spending continuously rose throughout the study period with the notable 
exception of Sweden which witnessed a protracted retrenchment period after its 
banking crisis in the early 1990s. Remarkably, however, this rise in social spending has 
been predominantly driven by old-age spending, in particular by the rise in pension 
liabilities and healthcare costs. Spending for working-age individuals, in most cases, 
remained stable by contrast with periodic retrenchment efforts (such as in Sweden, 
Spain, Italy and the UK). While the size of the welfare state – measured by social 
spending – has indeed been remarkably resilient to problem pressures as the New 
Politics predicted, programme-specific retrenchment efforts have been quite common 
during the period under study nevertheless. Which partisan governments had more 
political ammunition to undertake retrenchment will be the subject of the third essay in 
this thesis. 
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With these overall patterns in mind, I will now turn to the three essays that constitute 
this thesis, starting with conditional political budget cycles in the European Union, then 
proceeding to the electoral response to fiscal policy in the United Kingdom and ending 
with the partisan determinants of welfare retrenchment across the OECD universe. 
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Essay I 
 
Intra-Governmental Dynamics in a Political 
Budget Cycle Setting 
 
 
The moderating effects of coalition government 
 
 
Abstract: 
Political fragmentation has been widely recognized by political economists as an 
important cause for fiscal profligacy in democratic market economies because of the 
common pool nature of fiscal resources. These predictions, however, sit uneasily with 
the notion of governmental veto players’ ability to block each other’s spending plans 
for electoral purposes. Applying the logic of a bargaining-game between veto players in 
a political budget cycle framework, I first model that multiple players in the budget 
game are in fact likely to moderate pre-electoral budget outcomes. Empirical results 
from a cross-section time-series analysis in EU member states provide corroborative 
evidence that fiscal electioneering is indeed more prevalent among cohesive, single-
party settings. The findings are robust to alternative identification of elections, fiscal 
changes and sample selection. 
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II.1. Introduction 
 
 
Just as the explosion of government expenditure and debt during the 1970s and 1980s 
shaped early theories on the political economy of budgeting12 the subsequent 
consolidation period defined the new context in theory building. In fact, current 
members of the European Union, old and new member states alike, faced considerable 
pressure to squeeze government expenditures, moderate deficit finance and reduce their 
debt levels inherited from earlier periods. While the sources13 of these pressures were 
largely observable and obvious, the political and institutional capacity of the affected 
countries to deliver change was much less so.  
 
Explanations on cross-country and temporal differences in budgetary outcomes have 
largely converged around two theoretical approaches. Suboptimal fiscal performance 
was predicted to result from fragmentation in government, whereby competing claims 
on budgetary resources would give rise to a common pool problem. The dynamic 
dimension of budgeting, on the other hand, invited scholars to look into the changing 
political pressure that incumbents are under as a function of the electoral timetable. 
Originating from earlier works on political business cycles, the latter theories predicted 
that budgetary discipline would suffer as incumbents approached general elections. 
 
The implications that follow from these two themes in the literature point to a 
theoretical paradox, however. If the root of the common pool problem lies in electoral 
pressure in a fragmented political context, one would expect the pressure to increase 
with the proximity to elections.  However, fragmented governments are also likely to be 
hindered by veto players (coalition partners, opposition parties under minority 
governments etc.) in the budget process to deliver quick and large policy-change that 
suits their re-election purposes (Tsebelis, 2002). Insofar as these political veto-players 
                                                 
12
 These early theories provided the first systematic account of the growth of government during the post-
war period by highlighting bureaucratic incentives (Niskanen, 1971) and incremental budgeting 
(Wildavsky, 1986). 
13
 Beyond ideational impacts of the rational expectations revolution in economics, two simultaneous 
political projects shaped these trends: EMU and economic transition in the West and the East, 
respectively. 
53 
 
exercise – or threaten to exercise – their power to constrain the government, 
opportunistic budgeting in a fragmented setting is thus less likely to occur. 
 
This article will offer a critical evaluation of the common-pool paradigm by taking into 
account the influence of coalition partners in the bargaining game for pre-electoral 
budgets. I first model how this bargaining game plays out in a coalition setting vis-à-vis 
a single-party incumbent government. Secondly, in contrast to the common-pool 
literature, I will empirically show that political fragmentation is associated with smaller 
and sometimes opposite swings in the budgetary stance to what political budget cycle 
theory would predict. This article will demonstrate that the differences in the fiscal 
swings across the electoral cycle between cohesive and fragmented government settings 
are statistically significant and substantively important, often in the excess of 1 % of 
GDP.  
 
The next section will offer a brief literature review and lay out my theoretical model in 
detail. In the third section, the key concepts and variables for empirical analysis will be 
introduced. Section four will provide descriptive statistics on the cyclical behaviour of 
fiscal aggregates followed by an econometric analysis to test my hypotheses. The final 
section concludes. 
 
 
II.2: Literature review and theory: government fragmentation and 
fiscal profligacy 
 
 
Relating fiscal outcomes to government structures has a long tradition in the political 
economy of fiscal policy. During the great fiscal upheavals of the 1980s, changing 
macroeconomic circumstances alone were clearly incapable to explain away large 
cross-country differences in the evolution of government expenditures and debt 
accumulation, prompting scholars to turn towards politics in the quest for an answer. 
 
A number of scholars, starting from Von Hagen (1992), culminating in the most 
extensive quantitative work by Hallerberg et al (2009), attributed cross-country and 
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temporal variation in fiscal performance to the institutional choice that different 
countries have adopted. Fiscal institutions, properly designed, were presumed to 
address the underlying problem that led to overspending and excessive deficits: the 
common pool resource problem (Von Hagen and Harden, 1995). The budgetary process 
was modelled as a complex web of fragmented and mutually inconsistent interests 
where each participant wants to slice their share from the common pool of fiscal 
resources without internalizing the aggregate costs it would entail for the community. 
Specifically, spending appropriations benefit only a fraction 1/N of the community with 
the cost in terms of tax or debt finance being diffused across all N participants14. As 
fragmentation, proxied by N, grows the common resource pool problem would sharpen. 
 
The detrimental effect of political fragmentation chimed in well with earlier accounts of 
fiscal consolidation (or the lack thereof). In their seminal work, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) proposed a weak government account of budgetary explosion: in fragmented 
governments, coalition partners would attempt to shift the burden of adjustment onto 
each other’s constituencies, resulting in a stand-off and status quo bias. Alesina and 
Drazen (1991) formally modelled this idea by a war of attrition game, wherein veto 
players (i.e. coalition parties) in the government veto the other’s adjustment plan to 
shelter its own constituents from the burden of consolidation. What these accounts and 
the common pool theory share is the notion of fiscal discipline loosening up with 
fragmentation: strong, single-party governments are expected to run smaller deficits 
over time than multi-party coalitions and/or minority governments. 
 
In addition to long-run, average outcomes analysed by the aforementioned approaches, 
the dynamic dimension of budgeting was best encapsulated by political budget cycle 
theory (PBC hereafter). Opportunistic politicians were hypothesized to depart from the 
social optimum view of fiscal policy making (Barro, 1979)15 by relaxing the purse in 
the run-up to general elections to increase their re-election chances. The origins of PBC 
theory reach back to the political business cycle literature (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 
1978). Extending these early insights on re-election seeking incumbents’ behaviour in a 
                                                 
14
 In the empirical literature the notion of N had different meanings. The most commonly used measure is 
size-fragmentation (Kontopoulos and Perotti 2002; Wehner, 2010) where N stands for the number of 
actors (parties, legislators or cabinet members) participating in the budget process. 
15
 Commonly known as automatic stabilization, Barro’s (1979) model described the optimal behaviour of 
fiscal policy in the face of economic shocks resulting in temporarily higher (lower) revenues  - and hence 
deficits - than in the long-run equilibrium. 
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world of rational expectations, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) present a model in which 
asymmetric information between voters and governments on incumbent competence 
prompts incumbents to engineer economic expansions in election years. Yet, the 
empirical record of such pre-electoral economic booms is far from overwhelming 
(Alesina and Roubini 1992; Alesina et al, 1997). Therefore, the scholarly focus has 
since shifted towards tools of demand management (fiscal policy, in particular), with 
the implicit assumption of fiscal illusion and myopia on the part of the electorate 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1994). Opportunistic incumbents, therefore, were predicted to 
relax fiscal policy in the run-up to general elections with or without any real effects on 
economic activity. The partisan hypothesis of political business cycles (Hibbs, 1977) 
was also pursued in the post-rational expectations world (Alesina, 1987) but generally 
received weaker support than its opportunistic counterparts. Left parties, it seemed, 
were no more prone to engage in expansionary fiscal policy than their right-wing 
counterparts. 
 
 That said, electioneering is far from universal, regularly occurring in some contexts but 
hardly ever in others. The recognition of this non-universality prompted different 
scholars to look for the context-conditionalities (Franzese and Jusko, 2005) that best 
predict where and when the cycle is more or less likely to occur. Alt and Lassen (2006) 
show that more transparent budgetary contexts dampen the cycle. In a related a manner, 
Rose (2006) demonstrates that stringent budget rules in American states have a 
significant moderating effect on PBCs. Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that new 
democracies are more vulnerable to electoral pressure because of voter inexperience 
with the electoral and budgetary process and/or less transparent budgetary 
settings(Benito and Bestida, 2009). Persson and Tabellini (2003) introduce institutional 
conditionalities and conclude that majoritarian electoral systems experience greater and 
more regular cycles. 
 
Most importantly for our present purposes, the implications of the common pool 
resource theory were also extended to the realm of PBCs. Hallerberg et al (2009) in 
particular, show that budgetary institutions that were designed to constrain 
overspending and the deficit bias resulting from the common pool also dampen the 
cycle. However, such an automatic extension of a long-run account to a dynamic 
context overlooks an essential feature of party politics: political parties – including 
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coalition partners – are in competition for a limited number of votes, providing them an 
incentive to constrain each other’s spending plans that are perceived to confer 
disproportionate electoral benefits on political rivals. The following model will 
demonstrate this idea by comparing a single-party setting to one with a two-party 
coalition as incumbents. 
 
 
 Theoretical model 
 
To describe the bargaining game between coalition partners, the following six 
assumptions are made: 
1) Two parties –a large (senior party) and a small (junior party) – are in a 
coalition bargaining context, where they try to decide on additional 
budgetary measures for electoral purposes. These measures can take the 
form of additional spending or tax changes.  
2) The parties have different, albeit possibly overlapping constituencies. 
3) The budgeting process consists of two stages 
• In the first stage: the senior party proposes budget S, a combination 
of the proposed spending and tax plans targeting its own 
constituency. 
• In the second stage: the junior party, knowing S, proposes its own 
budget, J – a combination of its own spending tax plans targeting its 
own constituency – to arrive at a final budget, S+J = B. 
4) Parties’ vote share is linearly increasing in constituency-specific spending 
and tax measures but is decreasing – quadratically – in the overall budget 
deficit. This captures the notion of fiscally conservative voters16 and 
incumbents who also have to internalize the long-term consequences of 
budgetary explosion. The quadratic term is justified by the non-linearity 
associated with fiscal expansion: little deficit spending may pose no threats 
to debt sustainability, but as the fiscal space vanishes, the associated risks 
                                                 
16
 In fact, the notion of fiscally conservative voters has received increasing support in the empirical 
literature (Alesina et al, 1998; Eslava, 2011) 
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(e.g. rising risk premia on government bonds, debt crisis, currency crisis) 
may exponentially increase. 
5) The senior party bears increased responsibility both for the delivery of the 
targeted budget and for the fiscal profligacy it entails. This assumption 
follows from the clarity of responsibility hypothesis (Powell and Whitten, 
1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999) that posits that in contexts of clear 
institutional or partisan responsibility, the electoral response to economic 
outcomes is stronger. 
6) The junior party suffers disutility from budgetary composition overly tilted 
towards the senior party. This assumption captures the notion of electoral 
competition between the coalition partners, prompting the junior party to 
take into account the difference between budget S and J as well as their 
overall levels. Similarly to Assumption 4), the model will introduce this 
“competition factor” by a quadratic term: the disutility increases non-
linearly with the difference between S and J. 
 
Following from Assumption 4), 5) and 6) the following utility functions characterize 
the senior and the junior party, respectively. 
 
 
, 
where for reasons of parsimony, I assumed that the utility functions are symmetric in α 
and γ . In the utility functions, α, between 0 and 1, captures the vote-share elasticity of a 
budget targeted at the coalition partner’s constituency. It can be conceptualized as 
ideological proximity, overlap of the two distinct constituencies or electoral volatility 
among the electorate. A higher α, implies ceteris paribus higher utility for a budget 
targeted at the coalition partner’s constituency. γ, between 0 and 1, can be understood 
as a parameter for “fiscal conservativeness”. A higher γ reflects a higher propensity to 
take into account the fiscal consequences of the budget deficit, or alternatively, longer 
time horizons for incumbents. As this time horizon is expected to vary with the 
electoral timetable, γ is a non-constant term such that			γ = () :as elections are 
approaching γ drops. However, since this model captures a one-period (pre-election 
[ ( ) ]θγα 2)( JSJSSU +−+=
22 )()()( JSJSSJJU −−+−+= βγα
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budget) bargaining game, the dynamic nature of γ poses no difficulties for analytical 
purposes. Finally, θ, greater than 1, captures the extent of perceived responsibility for 
budgetary decisions, whether it is positive (targeted measures) or negative (fiscal 
profligacy).  
 
One additional relationship that characterizes the model concerns the senior- and junior-
specific utility functions, respectively. As stated in Assumption 6), the junior party 
receives negative utility whenever S exceeds J, captured by parameter β. A higher β 
implies a higher “competition factor” in the budget game. I assume that β is an inverse 
function of the responsibility parameter θ for the following reasons. High (low) 
responsibility for the senior party implies low (high) bargaining-power for the junior 
party because of the power asymmetry in the coalition. For instance when a dominant 
senior party is bargaining with a marginal junior party, the former’s responsibility for 
fiscal outcomes is expected to be high. Under such a scenario, the junior party will have 
relatively limited bargaining power in the coalition, hence the weight it will attach to 
disproportionate budgetary composition is expected to be low. In other words, the 
“competition factor”, β, indicates to what extent the junior party suffers disutility when 
it “punches below its weight” in the coalition with regards to outcomes in budgetary 
composition. I thus put forward a third relationship to close the model: 
 
 
 
Assumption 3) provides the key to understand how the model will play out. The game is 
best thought of as a Stackelberg game (Gibbons, 1992) with the senior party being the 
leader (proposer) and the junior party the follower (receiver) First, the senior party 
proposes budget S, which the junior party incorporates into its own utility function and 
maximizes U(J) with respect to J. A rational, forward-looking senior party, of course, 
will anticipate the junior party’s reaction function and, accordingly, proposes S to 
maximize its own utility function, U(S). 
 
Assuming parties have complete information over each other’s utility functions – a 
reasonable working assumption for coalition partners – one obtains a unique Nash-
θ
β 1=
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equilibrium for both the total budget and its composition. By backward induction, one 
first obtains the best-response function of the Junior Party. 
 
 =  
 
Which yields the Junior Party’s best-response function when expressed in terms of J: 
 
Equation 1) J*=  
 
A similar logic is applied to the determination of the initial proposal, S. The senior 
party maximizes its utility function by anticipating the junior party’s best-response. 
Substituting Equation 1) into U(S), the senior party thus maximizes: 
 
 
with respect to S. Rearranging the expression above, one obtains: 
 
	
 + 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To maximize the utility function, the first order condition yields: 
 
 
 
After some simplification and re-arranging, the equation to solve becomes: 
 
2 + 2 − ( − )( + ) = 
 ∗ 82 
 
Separating the quadratic terms on the left-hand side, we obtain: 
J
JU
∆
∆ )( 0)22()22(1 =+−−− JS βγβγ






+
−
−
+ βγ
βγ
βγ S22
1
θβγ
βγ
βγγβγ
βγ
βγα 



















+
−
−
+
+−












+
−
−
+
+
2
22
1
22
1 SSSS
( ) ( ) 02
481)(
)(
22
2
=














+
+
+
∗−





+
−
−=
∆
∆ θβγ
β
βγ
βγβγ
βγ
α S
S
SU
60 
 
2	(1 − ) + 2(1 + ) = 
 ∗ 82 
 
Solving for S, we obtain: 
 
Equation 2) S* = () +	 (!)  
 
Determining the total equilibrium budget deficit, B*, the primary focus of our enquiry, 
follows in two steps. First, J* is determined by plugging Equation 2) back into Equation 
1). Second, summing J* and S* results in the total equilibrium budget deficit of a 
coalition bargaining game. J* + S* can be expressed as: 
 

 (!)+ 
 ∗ "1 − !#	=	  (!)+ 
 "  !#	
 
Which, when expressed in terms of the equilibrium budget solution found for S* 
(Equation 2), becomes: 
 
12( + ) + $(1 − )82 +	(1 + )8 % 2 +  
 
After some simplification, the total equilibrium budget deficit, B* solves to: 
Equation 3) 
 
12( + ) + (1 − )4( + ) + (1 + )4( + ) = 	2 + 
2(1 − ) + 2(1 + )4	( + )  
 
Under complete information sets, the relative budget outcomes of single-party and 
coalition settings follows from comparing Equation 3) to the single-party solution. The 
latter is obtained by reformulating the senior party’s utility function to a single-party 
case: 
 
U(S_SP) = (
 − (
)2) 
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Where all the budget is targeted to constituency S. Again, using the first-order 
condition: 
 
)_( SPSU∆
S∆
=  
 
Results in: 
 
Equation 4) S_SP* =  
 
Note that while it is not necessarily reasonable to assume identical θs in a single-party 
setting and in a coalition, θ is irrelevant for finding the single-party equilibrium as it 
drops out from the equation. To find the conditions for relative budget explosion 
(moderation) in a coalition, our task is, therefore, to solve the inequality: 
 
B*> S_SP*,  
or: 
Equation 3) > Equation 4) 
 
Algebraically, 
 
 
 
Which, after multiplying both sides by the denominator of the right-hand side as well as 
simplifying and re-arranging the resulting fraction on the left-hand side, becomes:   
 
 
 (!)+	(!) (!) +  () (!)> 1 
 
Multiplying through with the common terms in the denominators, ( + ) and re-
arranging the inequality, we obtain: 
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2 (1 − ) > (1 − ) 
 
As  drops out from the inequality, the solution is the conveniently simple: 
 
Inequality 1):
 
 
The verbal interpretation of this simple result is the following. Whenever β – ie. the 
“competition factor” – is sufficiently low, the senior party can rely on the fiscal restraint 
of its junior partner and propose a large budget – spending increases and tax cuts 
targeted at its constituency –, S. In a single-party setting, however, it has to fully 
internalize the adverse fiscal consequences of a large budget deficit.  Conversely, when 
power is evenly dispersed in the coalition and thus β is high, the senior party has to 
moderate its spending proposal to accommodate the junior partner’s increased 
bargaining power. 
 
In practice, as stated above, the relative size of our two key parameters is likely to vary 
across the electoral cycle. In particular, γ, is likely to drop when the coalition is 
approaching general elections so Inequality 1) is less likely to hold. Therefore, in times 
of electoral competition, relative spending moderation is expected to result from a 
coalition setting, especially so under a high “competition factor”. 
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Figure II.1 
Relative spending explosion (moderation) for single-party versus coalition 
governments 
  
  
 
Figure II.1 above illustrates the relative budgetary outcomes between coalition and 
single-party settings as a function of the two key model parameters. For different levels 
of γ (“fiscal conservativeness”), the graphs capture the equilibrium budget deficits for 
both single-party and coalition settings as a function of θ (responsibility, or its inverse, 
“competition factor”). θ* are the levels of θ at which relative spending explosion begins 
for coalitions vis-a-vis single-party governments. Two key conclusions can be drawn 
from the graphical illustration of our results above. First, as γ increases, both the single-
party and the coalition outcomes are lower, consistent with the notion that relatively 
fiscal conservative governments reduce the budget deficit. Insofar as γ varies with the 
electoral timetable, this illustration also serves as an alternative formulation of PBCs. 
Second, for any given level of γ, while the single-party outcome is constant, the 
coalition budget deficit increases in θ. Moreover, for lower levels of γ, the point at 
which the two lines intersect, θ*, is higher, implying a lower likelihood of relative fiscal 
explosion in coalition settings vis-à-vis single-party governments. Note that at 
extremely low levels of γ, a reasonable approximation of the pre-electoral period, this 
intersection point lies beyond the range of possible θs included in the graphs, implying 
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relative fiscal moderation for coalition governments regardless of power-dispersion in 
the coalition. 
 
Two predictions can thus be made for the purposes of our empirical inquiry. First, a 
coalition setting is likely to be more conducive to fiscal restraint in times of electoral 
competition. Second, relative fiscal moderation in a coalition setting is more likely 
when the “competition factor” is high, ie. the junior party has increased bargaining 
power in the coalition. Stated more specifically, the following empirical sections will 
test two formal hypotheses: 
 
H1: Coalition governments display lower political budget cycles compared to single-
party settings. 
 
H2: The average size of political budget cycles within coalition settings is further 
conditioned by the intra-coalition bargaining power of political parties. In particular, 
higher bargaining power of the smaller (junior) party(ies) moderates the effect of 
coalitions on the size of PBCs. 
 
 
 
II.3. Data and variables: Measuring the (conditional) electoral effects 
on fiscal outcomes 
 
 
The empirical literature on fiscal policy uses a wide array of dependent variables to test 
different theories. Examples from the commonly used measures in quantitative studies 
on public budgeting are as follows: General government expenditure as a % of GDP 
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989);Central government expenditure as a % of GDP (Volkering, 
de Haan, 2001); General government deficit (net lending) as a % of GDP (Alesina et al, 
1997); General government primary expenditure/net lending as a % of GDP (Freitag 
and Sciarini, 2001); Change in gross debt as a % of GDP (Franzese, 2002); General 
government social expenditure as a % of GDP (Careja and Emmenegger, 2009).  
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One of the controversies in this and related literature is the appropriate level of 
government to study. It is certainly true that nationally elected officials have more 
direct control over the central budget than over the sub-national ones – particularly in 
federal countries, such as Germany or Spain – or over social security funds managed by 
the social partners in corporatist systems such as France and Germany (Palier 2002; 
Starke, 2006). However, to the extent that the management of these parts of the budget 
are not wholly independent of national politics – in the form of party-political links 
between municipal and national-level politicians for example – electioneering patterns 
may show up in these budgets as well. Following from this consideration, the rest of 
this article will solely focus on general government as it provides a more encompassing 
measure for fiscal aggregates.   
 
Following the underlying premise of the literature according to which voters value 
higher spending as well as lower taxes, I adopt budget deficits as my core dependent 
variable for the analysis. However, my model predicts that government parties attempt 
to target certain constituencies, so it is also important to focus on fiscal variables that 
are better suited for constituency-specific targeting (Chang, 2008). As an alternative 
dependent variable, therefore, I use general government expenditures which allow for 
greater targeting efforts than revenues. While governments can selectively increase 
social transfers for certain socioeconomic groups, undertake investment projects in 
electorally important districts, subsidize loss-making firms to avoid mass layoffs 
(Rickard, 2012) etc., taxes tend to have a broader base with more uniform effects across 
the population. I expect, therefore, that electoral effects as a function of government 
fragmentation are more likely to show up on the expenditure side of public budgets than 
on the revenue side. 
 
Turning to the main independent variable of the study, correctly specifying the electoral 
indicator is far from straightforward due to the timing of elections and the theoretically 
ambiguous fiscal path that leads up to and follows after them. While traditional political 
budget theory relied on election-year dummies to investigate the election-year affect, 
other authors recognized its theoretical limitations by allowing for pre-election year 
effects on the one hand, and post-election consolidation effects on the other. Alt and 
Lassen (2006), in particular, look at the change between the pre-election and the post-
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election period to measure the cyclical behaviour of electioneering. I will expand on 
their approach by distinguishing between pre-election years, election years, within-
cycle years, omitting the post-election/consolidation-year as the benchmark category in 
the analysis. Distinguishing between these year types allows for different electioneering 
patterns without imposing unnecessary temporal restrictions on the data. Figure II. 2 
captures these different patterns, using hypothetical values for government deficits.  
 
 
Figure II.2 
Possible electioneering patterns in hypothetical fiscal aggregates (as a % of GDP) 
 
 
 
Measuring the party-political effects on election-induced fiscal outcomes, I will restrict 
the multidimensional measures used by the empirical literature to ones that directly 
relate to my theory on party-political fragmentation. My first key political variable 
follows from Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) government weakness indicator. In particular, 
I will distinguish between single-party and coalition settings and compare their relative 
propensities to electioneer.  
 
To capture the idea of bargaining power (or “competition factor “) within a coalition 
(H2), I will single out the two key players in the budgetary process: the prime minister, 
whose political leanings set the overall framework for budgetary directions and the 
finance minister, who has a key role in bargaining for fiscal resources (Jochimsen and 
Nuscheler, 2011; Hallerberg et al, 2009). I anticipate that the party-political alignment 
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of these two actors – i.e. when both delegated by the same (senior) party –  will 
substantially reduce the bargaining (and veto-) power of junior parties’ ministers. I will 
thus employ a dummy variable for PM-FM alignment to proxy the junior party(ies)’ 
bargaining (veto-) power in the coalition. The advantage of this simple measure over 
commonly used alternatives of party-fragmentation (e.g. Laakso and Taagapera’s 
(1979) effective number of parties) is that the control of specific ministries has crucial 
implications for policy-making leverage, casting doubt on the validity of pure numeric 
fragmentation measures.  To the extent that the prime minister and finance minister 
have universally influential role over the disbursement of public funds, we can be fairly 
confident that their party-alignment/non-alignment is a powerful proxy for “bargaining 
power” of small coalition partners that our theory derives from. 
 
Finally, a host of macroeconomic and structural developments may influence budgetary 
outcomes which may be necessary to control for to obtain unbiased estimates for the 
main political variables of interest. I will largely follow the literature (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003); (Alesina et al, 1997); (Franzese, 2002) etc. in applying these controls. 
The rationales for their inclusion in the econometric models are as follows. 
 
GDP growth, beyond the automatic denominator effect17, provides a proxy for 
automatic stabilization or occasional counter-cyclical discretionary measures at work. 
Our theoretical priors thus suggest that government expenditures and deficits should 
shrink with the cyclical upswing of the economy. As an extension, unemployment rates 
will also be included to control for their impact on revenues (shrinking tax base) and 
expenditures (more claimants for social programmes). Moreover, long-term real interest 
rates will also be included to control for the interest burden that governments need to 
service. For a similar consideration, debt levels will also be controlled for as a measure 
for sustainability constraint that governments have to face. These last two measures will 
be lagged by one year in the empirical models to reflect their constraining effect at the 
time of budget preparation. I expect higher lagged interest rates and debt levels to have 
a negative sign in the empirical models. Additionally, I will control for economic 
openness because it has been shown to have an important effect on the size of 
government (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Jahn, 2006). Since two 
                                                 
17
 Since fiscal variables are expressed in % of GDP, changes in GDP (the denominator) automatically 
change the fiscal variables of interest. 
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competing hypothesis, the “race-to-the bottom” and the “compensation” hypothesis 
provide two opposite predictions on openness’ effect on changes in government 
spending, I have no clear theoretical expectation with regards to its influence on 
budgetary outcomes. To allow for a multidimensional measure of openness, I will use 
the Dreher index (Dreher, 2006) in my analysis. Finally, I will control for partisanship 
by a percentage measure of cabinet portfolios held by left-wing parties to capture 
power-resource arguments of the welfare-state literature (Korpi 1983; Korpi and Palme, 
2003; Esping-Andersen, 1990) as well as partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). 
The default expectation is thus a positive influence of left-dominated governments over 
spending and deficit outcomes. 
 
 
II.4. Empirical analysis: political budget cycles across government 
types in the EU 
 
 
The following section will proceed in three steps. First, descriptive statistics will be 
provided as an initial evaluation of our hypotheses. Second, I will set up an econometric 
model followed by issues related to the chosen estimation strategy. Third, the results 
will be evaluated and discussed.  
 
To motivate this empirical strategy, a quick summary of the sample characteristics is in 
order. My sample consists of 2518 EU-member states over four decades yielding an 
unbalanced time-series cross-section structure consisting of over 600 country-years. In 
the spatial dimension, following Brender and Drazen (2005), the inclusion of new 
member states broadens most prior research in this area by combining advanced 
capitalist and transitional economies on the one hand, and mature democratic polities 
and new democracies on the other. In the temporal dimension, the sample period 
includes the end of the post-war “golden age”, the consolidation period of the 1980s, 
the Maastricht process, the post-Maastricht period of “fiscal fatigue”19, the post-
communist transition, a number of emerging market crises etc. Such heterogeneity of 
                                                 
18
 Latvia and Lithuania were excluded from the analysis because of data limitation 
19
 As a wide-spread perception, countries qualifying for euro adoption began to backtrack on fiscal 
discipline once the threat of exclusion from EMU was lifted. 
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underlying structural conditions reduces the risk of the findings being driven by 
temporal or spatial idiosyncrasies. 
 
Moreover, as Table II.1 illustrates, my country sample provides sufficient variability in 
the key political variables. The frequency of political contexts are more or less evenly 
spread out between single-party governments, coalition governments with PM-FM 
alignment and coalition governments with PM-FM non alignment20.Regarding the 
summary of the dependent variables in Table II.2, one can observe that the average 
deficit change over the sample period is negative – with negative values indicated larger 
deficits – or in other words, public finances have deteriorated, on average. This has 
been accompanied by a steady growth in government, with the increase in expenditures 
outpacing that of revenues. Finally, the distribution of year-types (not-shown) is again, 
roughly even, with each year type occurring in around 25% of country-years. As a 
coding rule, when pre-election and post-election years coincided (when there is only 
one year between two consecutive elections), I coded these intervening years as pre-
election years. By a similar logic, when a pre-election year and an election year 
coincide – in case of two elections in two consecutive years – both years were coded as 
election years. 
 
Table II.1 
Summary of political variables 
 
PM-FM alignment PM-FM non-alignment 
Single-Party governments 30.3% 2.1% 
Coalition governments 30.6% 36.9% 
Source: Inter-parliamentary Union, Parline Database; European Journal of Political Research, PARLGOV database 
 
 
Table II.2 
Summary of fiscal variables (as a % of GDP) 
Fiscal Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
∆deficit -0.12% 2.32% 
∆expenditure 0.24% 2.36% 
∆revenue 0.12% 1.33% 
Source: European Commission, ECOFIN, author’s calculations 
  
 
                                                 
20
 The low frequency upper-right cell of Table 1 covers country-years where single-party governments 
nominated a non-party member to serve as prime minister or finance minister (typically under caretaker, 
or technocratic governments). 
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Descriptive patterns and discussion 
 
 As discussed in Section 2 above, there is no theoretically prescribed pattern to the 
expected behaviour of fiscal aggregates over the electoral cycle. While some 
governments may decide to undertake expansionary fiscal policy one or two years 
before elections, others may wait out until the election year itself in the hope of last 
minute electoral gains. Likewise, consolidation efforts may be more prolonged under 
some governments compared to others. Hence, the following descriptive summary 
allows for various patterns by distinguishing between the four year-types over the 
electoral cycle: pre-election years, election years, post-election years and years in 
between. 
 
 
Figure II.3 
Average electioneering patterns across the electoral cycle (annual fiscal changes, 
as a % of GDP) 
  
Source: European Commission, ECOFIN, author’s calculations 
 
The left-hand chart of Figure II.3 illustrates the behaviour of fiscal aggregates over the 
electoral cycle. The main patterns fit nicely with political budget cycle theory. Deficits 
increase somewhat in the pre-election year, by a larger margin in the election year and 
stay broadly stable thereafter with a modest consolidation effort in the post-election 
year. Somewhat surprisingly, however, revenues appear more volatile across the cycle 
with large consolidation efforts in the post-election year standing out. Focusing our 
attention to the main dependent variable, the annual change in deficits, the cyclical 
swings across different political contexts are illustrated on the right-hand chart of 
Figure II.3. As a first empirical evidence for our theory, single-party governments and 
to a lesser extent coalition rule with PM-FM alignment appear to electioneer more with 
71 
 
large swings between the electoral period (pre-election and election years) and 
consolidation periods (post-election years and years between elections). 
 
These initial insights, however, must be treated with caution. First, to the extent that the 
electoral cycle is correlated with macroeconomic and structural conditions that may 
impact on fiscal aggregates, differences between year types could result from spurious 
correlation. Second, descriptive analysis tells us little about the significance in 
differences between years21. Whether the observed variation actually reveals a 
statistically significant systematic relationship between the electoral cycle and fiscal 
policy, one needs to test the hypotheses in an econometric framework. 
 
 
Model set-up 
 
The econometric analysis will proceed in the following manner. First I will set up a 
benchmark model by using the electoral indicators and GDP growth as explanatory 
variables for fiscal outcomes. Second, I will test an extended model which introduces 
the control variables discussed in the preceding section that are used by the literature. I 
will test the two hypotheses for three alternative dependent variables: annual change in 
the general government deficit as the core variable of this study and annual changes in 
general government expenditure and general government revenue to allow for different 
degrees of cyclicality on the two sides of public finances. As argued earlier, I expect the 
lion’s share of electioneering to occur on the expenditure side. Using first differences 
(annual changes) for the dependent variables as opposed to levels follows from the 
conceptualization of political budget cycle as a short term phenomenon; we are 
primarily interested in the short-term effects of political structure, namely the annual 
swing in budgetary outcomes as a function of the electoral timetable and government 
types. The time-series-cross section model to test can thus be generalized as follows: 
  
∆Fit = β0 + β1Eit+β2Xit +β3Cit+ β4 (Eit Xit)+ µ i+γt+ εit 
 
                                                 
21
 Given the non-normal distribution of the dependent variables, ANOVA analysis of differences between 
means is inappropriate. Non-parametric, Kruskill-Wallis tests, however, do reveal significant differences 
between subsample medians for different year types across the electoral cycle. These Kruskill-Wallis 
results are shown in Appendix 3. 
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Where Yit are the different fiscal variables for country i at time t, Eit are the electoral 
indicator(s)22, Xit are the two political variables23 (single party governments and PM-
FM alignment) that capture political dispersion, Cit is a vector of macroeconomic and 
structural controls, (Eit*Xit)is the interaction term reflecting the conditional hypotheses, 
µ i is a country-fixed effect γt is the time-fixed effect24 for common shocks and εit is an 
iid (identically and independently distributed) error term25.  To test the first hypothesis, 
a dummy variable for single-party governments was interacted with each year type so 
β4 captures the extent to which single-party governments follow different fiscal policy 
along the electoral cycle compared to coalition governments. To test the moderating 
effect of policy-making dispersion (PM-FM non-alignment) in coalition settings (H2), a 
three way interaction was introduced between the year types, single-party governments 
and the PM-FM alignment dummy. From the three way interactions, marginal effects 
were calculated for each year type under three possible constellations of political 
dispersion: single-party governments, coalition governments with PM-FM alignment 
and coalition governments with PM-FM non-alignment. 
 
As table II.3 indicates below, the hypothesis (H1) that political budget cycles are more 
prevalent under single-party governments receives strong support. In both the extended 
and the baseline models, the estimates for the annual change in deficits are non-
significant under coalition governments in any of the year times compared to the post-
                                                 
22
 In each model, pre-election years, election years and years between elections were included as three 
dummy variables, whereas post-election years were omitted as the reference category. Therefore, the 
estimates measure the average annual fiscal swings in the three year types relative to the annual change in 
the post-election year. 
23
 The political variables for each country-year were coded for governments that occupied office at the 
start of each calendar year. This coding scheme – as opposed to weighing governments by the number of 
days in office in any given year – prioritizes the period when budgets are prepared. 
24
 To test for the inclusion of country- and time-fixed effects, I first ran a set of F-tests for common 
intercepts among countries and years. The null hypothesis of no country- and year-specific effects can be 
strongly rejected in the data (p<0.001). Secondly, I ran Hausman tests to investigate whether the country-
specific influences captured in the error terms that are unaccounted for by the models are correlated with 
the regressors, hence biasing random-effects estimates.  These tests strongly rejected the null hypothesis 
(p<0.001) that the random-effects models are consistent; therefore I estimated the models with both 
country- and time-dummies. Test results for all F-tests and Hausman tests are provided in Appendix 3. 
25
 To test for the violation of the standard Gauss-Markov assumptions in panel data (Kittel and Winner, 
2005) a number of diagnostic tests were carried out (test results available upon request).  A modified 
Wald test and a Pesaran test (Pesaran, 2004) indicate a panel-heteroskedastic, and cross-sectionally 
correlated error structure, respectively. Following Beck and Katz (1995), I thus ran OLS regressions with 
panel-corrected standard errors as a superior alternative to the previously popular feasible-GLS method.  
Since serial correlation, due to the first-difference specification of the dependent variable was not 
detected in the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms based on a Wooldridge (Lagrange 
Multiplier ) test, neither lagged dependent variables nor a Prais-Winsten transformation was necessary to 
yield valid OLS test results. Test results for all diagnostic tests are provided in Appendix 3. 
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election reference category. By contrast, the election-year swing is strongly significant 
under single-party rule, preceded by a weaker but still   marginally significant pre-
election swing. The substantive impact is large: on average, the estimated difference 
between the election-year and the post-election year fiscal swing under single-party 
governments is around 1.3% of GDP, whereas it is non-distinguishable from 0 under 
coalition-rule. As expected, the bulk of this electioneering effect shows up on the 
expenditure side but no conditional effect of single-party settings is found for 
government revenues. Among the control variables, growth26 exerts a strong counter-
cyclical influence on budgetary outcomes in line with expectations. As the tax base 
shrinks, higher unemployment exerts a statistically significant negative impact on the 
government revenues, but not on government expenditures. Among the macroeconomic 
constraint variables, higher debt in the previous period does seem to pressure 
governments into cutting expenditures and raising taxes when drafting their budgets. 
Finally, neither the globalization proxy (Dreher index) nor the cabinet share of left 
parties show up as significant in the models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 To address potential endogeneity concerns between growth and the dependent variables, I re-ran the 
models in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework where growth was instrumented with estimates for 
potential growth and growth rates for the euro-area. (OECD economic outlook database no.84). These 
growth rates are presumably exogenous to fiscal measures in individual countries but are highly 
correlated with individual countries’ growth rates. Because of the data availability, I ran these 2SLS 
models  in a more limited sample but the substantive results of interest of the models did not change. 
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Table II.3 
Political budget cycle models explaining annual changes in fiscal outcomes among 
government types† 
 
 
∆netlending ∆netlending ∆expenditure ∆expenditure ∆revenue ∆revenue 
growth 0.143** 0.151** -0.302** -0.332** -0.147** -0.167** 
 (3.44)  (3.87)  (6.61)  (9.39)  (4.64)  (6.47)  
election -0.298 -0.252 -0.064 -0.097 -0.354* -0.366** 
 (1.29) (1.23) (0.27) (0.53) (2.45)  (2.65)  
pre-election -0.002 0.022 -0.053 -0.059 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.22) (0.31) (0.05) (0.07) 
betweenelections 0.094 0.131 -0.123 -0.143 -0.029 -0.039 
 (0.39) (0.60) (0.51) (0.74) (0.19) (0.26) 
singleparty 0.627 0.645 -0.488 -0.562 0.230 0.140 
 (1.69) (1.95) (1.20) (1.82) (0.88) (0.55) 
election*singleparty -0.884* -1.156** 0.549  1.053** -0.318 -0.058 
 (2.25)  (3.43)  (1.34) (3.52)  (1.09) (0.20) 
pre-election*singleparty -0.550 -0.559 0.235 0.411 -0.333 -0.149 
 (1.39) (1.65) (0.57) (1.27) (1.17) (0.53) 
betweenelections*singleparty -0.386 -0.363 0.188 0.347 -0.165 0.043 
 (0.93) (0.99) (0.44) (1.03) (0.51) (0.14) 
unemployment  -0.024  -0.029  -0.050 
  (0.69)  (1.06)  (1.92) 
dreherindex  0.014  -0.020  -0.013 
  (0.52)  (0.95)  (0.71) 
L.realrates  0.002  -0.007**  -0.005* 
  (1.16)  (2.70)   (2.08  
L.debt  0.031**  -0.023**  0.009* 
  (4.67)   (4.06)   (2.09)  
left  -0.001  0.001  0.000 
  (0.43)  (0.60)  (0.32) 
R2 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.21 0.24 
N 624 608 624 608 624 608 
 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
†Fixed-effect estimates with panel-corrected standard errors 
 
 
Turning to the three-way interaction between the electoral indicators, single-party 
governments and PM-FM alignment, Figure II.4 illustrates the marginal effect of each 
year type under different political constellations from the extended models27. The top 
row includes the calculated effects from models using annual changes of deficits as the 
dependent variable, while the second and third row capture the expenditure and revenue 
models, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The regression output for the three-way interaction model is shown in Appendix 3. Since three-way 
interaction makes reading marginal effects from the coefficient estimates extremely tedious, marginal 
effects plots provide a more convenient summary of the estimated effects (Brambor et al, 2006). 
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Figure II.4 
Point estimates and 95% intervals for the effect of the electoral cycle under 
different political constellations* 
 
 
 
  
 
*  Effects are estimated relative to the benchmark, post-election year 
 
The first row – with the annual change in deficits as the dependent variable – provides 
evidence for the moderating influence of political fragmentation (PM-FM non-
alignment) in coalition settings. As policy-making control is becoming more dispersed 
from single-party governments to coalition settings with PM-FM non-alignment, 
election-induced fiscal swings moderate or even reverse. While single-party 
governments undertake large election-year fiscal expansions, coalitions with PM-FM 
alignment run higher deficits in both the election year and the pre-election year 
compared to the post-election period. Interestingly, in contrast to single-party settings, 
these coalitions focus their electioneering efforts on the pre-election year where the 
annual change in the deficit compared to post-election years exceeding 0.5% of GDP 
and is significant at the 5% level. Finally, in the most fragmented setting, coalitions 
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with PM-FM non-alignment, there is no evidence for election-time fiscal expansions 
whatsoever. On the contrary, these coalitions tighten fiscal policy in the year before 
elections compared to post-election years by a sizeable extent: on average the tightening 
is around 0.8% of GDP and easily achieves statistical significance. 
 
When looking at the composition of these electioneering patterns, the estimated effects 
conform to our expectations: the patterns we observed on deficit changes almost 
exclusively results from the expenditure side of budgeting. While the expenditure 
patterns (second row) across political constellations are almost identical to deficits with 
an opposite sign, there is hardly any evidence for electioneering effects for revenues 
(third row). These results are consistent with our expectations that the scope for 
constituency-specific targeting is greater on the expenditure side. 
 
A visually more convenient way to capture the electoral cycle through these estimates is 
to calculate predicted values on the evolution of fiscal aggregates at selected levels of 
the variables included in the model. I thus set all control variables at their sample means 
and calculated average country- and time-specific affects that resulted from unobserved 
influences on budget outcomes. Moreover, I chose 0 as starting position for the deficit 
(ie. a balanced budget) and 40 for general government expenditure as a % of GDP, 
respectively. Under this hypothetical “average” case, assuming that the levels of control 
variables in the model remain unchanged, I then calculated the predicted electoral cycle 
under the three government types. Figure II.5 illustrates the predicted cycle on annual 
changes in deficits and expenditures. 
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Figure II.5 
The predicted evolution of fiscal aggregates for different government types across 
two electoral cycles 
 
 
 
 
 
The differences between the three government types are noteworthy. The predicted 
evolution of the deficit in single government governments is highly cyclical with a 
general improvement over time, interspersed with election-year fiscal expansions. 
Under coalition governments with PM-FM alignment, by contrast, the fiscal balance 
steadily deteriorates over time, mostly driven by pre-electoral and election-year fiscal 
expansions. Finally, in coalition governments with PM-FM non-alignment, the fiscal 
balance is roughly steady over the cycle with large improvements in the pre-electoral 
period. Turning to general government expenditures, in all three government types 
expenditure shares of GDP increase on average over time. Major differences are found, 
however in the timing of these increases: under single-party governments and coalition 
governments with PM-FM alignment, the increases are largely concentrated on the pre-
electoral/election-year periods, while for coalition governments with PM-FM non-
alignment, the trend is mostly driven by post-election expenditure increases. 
 
 
Robustness checks 
 
One potentially important problem with the findings above is the issue of 
endogenously-timed elections (Reid, 1998). In other words, treating the electoral 
timetable as exogenous assumes that governments can perfectly plan fiscal policy 
several years ahead because they know when the next election will occur. However, in 
countries where election-timing is not fixed (e.g. the United Kingdom) or where no-
General Government Expenditure General Government Net Lending 
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confidence motions often terminate parliamentary terms ahead of schedule (e.g. 
Denmark), this assumption may be heroic. Inconveniently, it is exactly in coalition 
settings – where the theory predicts and the findings have shown dampened budget 
cycles – that such early elections are more likely to occur as a result of intra-coalition 
frictions. To address this possibility, I reran my models with a modified set of electoral 
indicators such that I distinguished between “regular” elections that occurred in the year 
of the constitutionally mandated term limit and “early” elections that occurred any year 
before that. These models thus tested whether moderation under fragmented settings are 
driven by government collapses making opportunistic budgeting difficult to plan. This 
new specification thus introduced six dummy variables in the model instead of the 
original three: regular election years, regular pre-election years, years between regular 
elections, early election years, early pre-election years and years between early 
elections. 
 
Reassuringly, the results indicate that the estimated differences between government 
types are not driven by early elections (marginal effects plot shown in Appendix 3). If 
anything, many of the significant estimates – such as the large election-year swing 
under single-party governments as well as the pre-election year fiscal tightening by 
coalitions with PM-FM non-alignment – actually grow in size when elections are held 
at the constitutionally mandated term limit. Interestingly, while the cyclical patterns of 
single-party governments hold up during early elections as well, the electoral path of 
coalition governments’ budgeting is considerably different between early elections and 
regular elections. It seems therefore, that early elections do hinder coalition 
governments from strategic budgeting. Most importantly, however, the differences 
between government types with regards to election-induced budget outcomes are large 
and significant for both early and regular elections. 
 
A second possible limitation that my robustness checks address is the presence of both 
new and old democracies in the sample.  As Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and 
Svensson (2002) argued, voters’ lack of experience in democratic politics increase 
incumbents’ incentives to undertake opportunistic fiscal policy in new democracies. It 
is therefore possible that the findings are driven by these new democracies. I thus 
excluded from my sample the post-communist countries that only recently 
democratized and tested whether the conditional electioneering effects are muted in this 
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limited sample. Again, the estimated coefficients – results shown in Appendix 3 - are 
very similar to the full-sample models. Importantly, both the election-year fiscal swing 
of single-party governments and the pre-electoral fiscal tightening of coalition 
governments with PM-FM non-alignment are similar in size and significance to our 
earlier estimates. 
 
Finally, a concern that has been evoked by the fiscal policy literature is the discrepancy 
between the change in the consolidated debt figures and official deficit numbers 
highlighting the fact that governments often engage in creative accounting (Von Hagen 
and Wolff, 2006; Alt et al, 2012). I thus reran my models with the deficits calculated 
from the change in the debt levels instead of the official figures (see Appendix 3 for 
marginal effects plot). Under the new measure of this dependent variable, evidence for 
hypothesis 1 is still strong: single-party governments increase their deficits in election 
years by a large and significant margin compared to the post-election period. The size 
of this point estimate is now even larger than in the earlier models. In other words, 
when looking at the change in debt instead of the official reported deficits, 
electioneering under single-party governments is even stronger. By contrast, however, 
no electoral budget cycle has been detected for coalition governments regardless of 
power fragmentation within them, proxied by the PM-FM dummy. The only 
noteworthy finding here is that under PM-FM alignment, a large consolidation effort 
takes place in the middle of the electoral cycle. Under the most divided setting, 
coalition rule with PM-FM non-alignment, no evidence for political budget cycles has 
been found whatsoever, consistent with our second hypothesis. 
 
 
II.5. Conclusions 
 
 
The fact that elections matter for fiscal outcomes comes as no surprise. What this article 
sought to demonstrate, however, is that incentives to undertake pre-electoral fiscal 
expansions largely depend on the political fragmentation of governments. Following the 
predictions from a simple model on a bargaining-game between coalition partners, I 
hypothesized that single-party governments display a higher propensity to electioneer. 
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Furthermore, the power asymmetry in coalitions, proxied by the party-alignment of the 
prime minister and the finance minister, the two most powerful government players in 
the allocation of public funds, has been tested as a further conditioning factor on the 
prevalence and size of political budget cycles. Therefore, my predictions ran counter to 
the common resource pool paradigm’s extension to PBCs, which predicts that 
incentives to overspend are larger in fragmented coalition settings. 
 
The findings from 25 EU member states provided strong and robust empirical evidence 
for my theory. Whether one looks at the full sample of EU member states or a limited 
sample of older democracies where voters are likely to be more familiar with the 
opportunistic incentives of incumbents, political cohesion has been shown to increase 
PBCs. Also, the fact some of the elections in our sample were held ahead of schedule 
did not fundamentally change our main results. Furthermore, whether deficits were 
measured by officially reported figures or by the change in debt levels which are harder 
to manipulate gave rise to the same broad patterns across government types over the 
electoral cycle. In line with expectations, I also found that election-related fiscal swings 
almost entirely come from the expenditure side. 
 
One obvious limitation of this study was a fairly parsimonious account of political 
cohesion/fragmentation. Surely, the control of specific ministries beyond the powerful 
finance portfolio matters for policy-making leverage in budgeting. Furthermore, a 
number of countries in my sample have a tradition of minority (Denmark, Sweden) or 
oversized coalition (Finland) governments which provide theoretically ambiguous 
expectations for propensities to electioneer. While a single-party minority government 
is surely weaker than a single-party majority one (Edin and Ohlsson, 1991), the fact that 
it doesn’t have to abide by the coalition partners’ priorities in budget drafting may 
easily outweigh its minority status in the legislature in terms of its propensity and 
capacity to carry out electorally induced fiscal expansions. Similarly, on the one hand, 
oversized coalitions contain a large number of parties and hence possibly large party-
political division in important portfolios. On the other hand, the fact that some coalition 
partners are disposable without running the risk of calling early elections potentially 
strengthens these governments. More attention to these nuances in policy-making 
dispersion in parliamentary democracies with regards to fiscal outcomes would be a 
most welcome research effort in the future.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table II.4 
Data Sources 
 
 
Fiscal variables (General government net 
lending, expenditures and revenues 
European Commission: ECOFIN 
economic databases 
Electoral year types Interparliamentary Union: Parline database 
Political variables (single-party 
governments, pm-fm alignment) 
European Journal of Political Research 
yearbook: ParlGov database 
Economic control variables (growth, 
unemployment, debt, interest rates) OECD economic outlook no.92 
Other control variables (Dreher index, 
partisanship) 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/, CPDS 
comparative database, University of 
Bern 
 
  
Variables Source 
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Appendix 2a 
 
Table II.5 
Regression output for the three-way interaction models† 
 
 ∆netlending ∆netlending ∆expenditure ∆expenditure ∆revenue ∆revenue 
growth 0.137** 0.142** -0.303** -0.326** -0.153** -0.169** 
 (3.69)  (3.77)  (7.44)  (9.40)  (5.11)  (6.63)  
election -0.002 0.019 -0.393 -0.426 -0.436* -0.460* 
 (0.00) (0.07) (1.18) (1.63) (2.12)  (2.25)  
pre-election 0.702* 0.661* -0.767* -0.717** -0.060 -0.053 
 (2.16)  (2.29)  (2.22)  (2.74)  (0.26) (0.24) 
betweenelections 0.216 0.152 -0.431 -0.329 -0.206 -0.171 
 (0.58) (0.50) (1.09) (1.15) (0.95) (0.81) 
singleparty 0.252 0.845 -1.165 -1.653 -0.822 -0.663 
 (0.19) (0.94) (0.68) (1.78) (0.84) (0.76) 
pmfm 0.349 0.356 -0.514 -0.514 -0.209 -0.205 
 (0.97) (1.15) (1.41) (1.81) (0.91) (0.92) 
pmfm*singleparty 0.231 -0.394 1.005 1.437 1.260 1.013 
 (0.17) (0.42) (0.58) (1.51) (1.26) (1.13) 
election*singleparty 1.506 -1.395 -0.954 2.710* 0.564 1.306 
 (0.94) (1.18) (0.47) (2.56)  (0.48) (1.30) 
election*pmfm -0.540 -0.547 0.574 0.618 0.128 0.181 
 (1.11) (1.27) (1.18) (1.57) (0.44) (0.62) 
election*singleparty*pmfm -2.490 0.482 1.537 -2.035 -0.986 -1.567 
 (1.53) (0.38) (0.75) (1.82) (0.79) (1.47) 
pre-election*singleparty  -2.682 -2.965** 2.487 3.220** -0.255 0.092 
 (1.68) (2.69)  (1.21) (3.25)  (0.20) (0.09) 
pre-election*pmfm -1.350** -1.315** 1.344** 1.323** 0.079 0.103 
 (2.79)  (3.16)  (2.78)  (3.50)  (0.26) (0.35) 
pre-election*singleparty*pmfm 2.934 3.220** -3.036 -3.645** -0.097 -0.326 
 (1.79) (2.76)  (1.44) (3.32)  (0.07) (0.29) 
betweenelections*singleparty -0.849 -1.118 2.197 2.391 1.338 1.250 
 (0.38) (0.64) (0.97) (1.77) (1.01) (0.96) 
betweenelections*pmfm -0.247 -0.177 0.562 0.410 0.301 0.222 
 (0.49) (0.42) (1.10) (1.05) (1.03) (0.78) 
betweenelections*singleparty*pmfm 0.553 0.918 -2.320 -2.366 -1.716 -1.392 
 (0.24) (0.51) (1.01) (1.65) (1.23) (1.03) 
unemployment  -0.022  -0.036  -0.055* 
  (0.64)  (1.34)  (2.13)  
dreherindex  0.018  -0.029  -0.022 
  (0.73)  (1.52)  (1.21) 
L.realrates  0.002  -0.007**  -0.004 
  (1.23)  (2.70)   (1.92) 
L.debt  0.030**  -0.022**  0.010* 
  (4.81)   (4.03)   (2.39)  
left  -0.001  0.001  0.000 
  (0.50)  (0.51)  (0.13) 
R2 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.21 0.24 
N 625 611 625 611 625 611 
 
 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
†Fixed-effect estimates with panel-corrected standard errors 
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Appendix 2b 
 
Figure II.6 
Point estimates and 95% intervals for the effect of the electoral cycle on annual 
deficit change under different political constellations by regular (row 1) and early 
(row 2) elections* 
 
 
 
   
   
 
* Effects are estimated relative to the benchmark, post-election year 
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Appendix 2c 
 
Figure II.7 
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of the electoral cycle on 
annual deficit change under different political constellations in old democracies* 
 
 
 
  
 
* Effects are estimated relative to the benchmark, post-election year 
 
 
Appendix 2d 
 
Figure II.8 
Point estimates and 95% intervals for the effect of the electoral cycle on annual 
deficit change, measured by the change in debt levels* 
 
 
 
  
 
* Effects are estimated relative to the benchmark, post-election year 
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Appendix  3 
 
TableII.6 
Diagnostic test-results* 
 
                Test           Dependent Variable              Test-statistic, p-value 
Kruskill-Wallis test for 
differences between group 
medians 
∆deficits for singleparty 
governments 
∆deficits for coalition 
governments with pm-fm 
alignment 
∆deficits for coalition 
governments with pm-fm non-
alignment 
∆expenditure for singleparty 
governments 
∆expenditure for coalition 
governments with pm-fm 
alignment 
∆expenditure for coalition 
governments with pm-fm non-
alignment 
 
Chi-square statistic:11.838 
p-value: 0.008 
Chi-square statistic: 3.696 
p-value: 0.296 
 
Chi-square statistic: 5.926 
p-value:0.115 
 
Chi-square statistic: 5.93 
p-value: 0.115 
Chi-square statistic:0.663 
p-value: 0.882 
 
Chi-square statistic:1.95 
p-value: 0.58 
F-test for country dummies 
 
 
 
F-test for year dummies 
 
 
 
∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
 
∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
F-statistic: 2.21 
p-value: 0.0013 
F-statistic: 2.88 
p-value<0.0001 
F-statistic: 2.55 
p-value<0.0001 
F-statistic: 2.03 
p-value=0.0004 
 
 
Hausman-test ∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
 
Chi-square statistic: 50.65 
p-value <0.0001 
Chi-square statistic: 46.51 
P=value: 0.0001 
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Modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity 
∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
 
Chi-square: 241.47 
P-value<0.0001 
Chi-square: 658.6 
P-value<0.0001 
 
Pesaran test for cross-sectional 
dependence 
∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
 
CD-statistic: 4.815 
P-value <0.0001 
3.498 
P-value=0.0005 
Wooldridge (Langrange 
Multiplier) test for first-order 
serial correlation 
∆deficits 
 
∆expenditure 
 
F-statistic:0.091 
P-value: 0.7662 
F-statistic: 0.291 
P-value: 0.5952 
 
*Diagnostic tests were conducted based on the fully specified models 
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Essay II 
 
Rational Voters and the Keynesian Electorate? 
 
 
 
Evidence from the UK 
 
Abstract: 
This article contributes to economic voting research by drawing attention to an 
overlooked factor in the “clarity of responsibility” thesis. Rational voters’ responsibility 
attribution should be targeted at the macroeconomic policies pursued by incumbents 
rather than the economic outcomes themselves. Developing this idea in a rational 
choice framework in the United Kingdom, I demonstrate that business cycle 
fluctuations condition the electoral response to fiscal decisions taken by incumbents. 
First, relying on the British Election Studies’ post-election surveys on the individual 
level, I show that the median voter’s fiscal preferences realign with different income 
groups as business cycle conditions change. Second, by using time-series analysis on 
the aggregate-level, I argue that this re-alignment gives rise to a counter-cyclical voting 
pattern in response to fiscal decisions taken by incumbent governments. This counter-
cyclical voting helps our understanding of why the simple “reward-punishment thesis” 
in economic voting research has produced mixed and unstable results in past research. 
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III.1. Introduction 
 
 
The broad relationship between economic performance and government accountability 
is one of the most studied research areas in political economy. The highly intuitive and 
seemingly uncontroversial observation that support for incumbents and re-election 
prospects depend on economic conditions has triggered a rich literature with different 
strands from the 1970s onwards: partisan theory, political business cycle research and 
economic voting. The point of departure of this article is the third strand or the 
“demand-side” of the economics-incumbency nexus: Is the electoral response 
adequately captured by the reward-punishment hypothesis?28  Alternatively, do voters 
distinguish between macroeconomic outcomes and the policy choices leading up to 
these outcomes? In other words, are voters fundamentally outcome-oriented or are they 
able to hold incumbents accountable for the specific policies they pursue? Moreover, to 
the extent voters do assess economic policy-making when casting their vote, is the 
electoral response uniform over time or is it conditioned by underlying macroeconomic 
conditions? 
 
These questions should be understood against the backdrop of more than forty years of 
research on the “demand-side” of our conceptual equation, generating 500+ articles and 
books in the field (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). Economic voting, as it came to be 
known, postulated one of the most robust “iron laws” in political economy: incumbent 
governments tend to be punished by disappointing economic performance and rewarded 
by economic prosperity.  
 
However, when the pioneers of economic voting went beyond their turf (mostly the US 
and the UK) and began to undertake cross-country comparisons, the consistency of 
prior results seemed to buckle. As my literature review will show, not all electorates 
seemed to hold incumbents accountable equally and in some cases the relationship 
simply broke down. As a response to this conundrum, a new paradigm started to 
emerge: the simple reward-punishment hypothesis gave way to the “clarity of 
responsibility” thesis (Powell and Whitten, 1993): the domestic institutional context as 
                                                 
28
 For an extensive review of the early versions of the simple reward-punishment hypothesis, see 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) 
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well as changes in the world economy fundamentally alter the extent to which the 
electorate is able to credit/blame governments for their assumed impact on the macro-
economy. More concisely, where clarity of responsibility is high, economic voting 
remains strong. In contexts where the clarity of responsibility is weaker, economic 
voting dampens or disappears. The responsibility paradigm, as will be subsequently 
shown, has been able to account for a large part in the variation of economic voting 
across countries and elections. As one of the earliest extensive reviews captured the 
moral of the story in a nutshell, around one third of the change in vote share of 
governments can be explained by economics when these issues are accounted for 
(Nannested and Paldam, 1994).   
 
Such a sophisticated electoral assessment of incumbent competence admits a great 
degree of rationality to the economic voter. As this article will argue, however, this 
rationality sits uneasily with economic outcomes rather than the policies that lead up to 
these outcomes as the main object of responsibility attribution.  Rational voters should 
break the broad link between outcomes and electoral reward/punishment and bring 
accountability closer to where actual decisions are made: fiscal choices. This article will 
therefore push the responsibility paradigm to its substantive conclusion where the 
variable of interest for voters is one of means rather than ends. If governments use these 
means (fiscal policy) in an optimal fashion, they should be rewarded. Otherwise, they 
should be punished.  
 
To date, the link between fiscal policy and electoral fortunes has been surprisingly 
tenuous, according to most empirical studies in the field (Alesina et al, 1998, 2012; 
Brender and Drazen, 2008; Mulas-Granados, 2006). Neither pre-electoral fiscal stances 
in general nor more extended fiscal adjustment periods in particular have been found to 
be strong predictors of re-election prospects of incumbent governments. If the link 
between economic outcomes and electoral fortunes are robust, especially in the contexts 
of high policy-making responsibility, it is rather puzzling that the very policies that 
incumbents employ to achieve the desired economic outcome provide so little 
explanatory power for electoral success or failure. This article offers an explanation for 
this puzzle in a rational-choice framework. Individuals’ cost-benefit calculations on 
fiscal policy change across the business cycle. In particular, the preference alignment 
for expansionary/contractionary policies of different income groups depends on varying 
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labour market conditions along the business cycle. My findings offer evidence on 
counter-cyclical preference changes and vote intentions on incumbents among the 
British electorate. It is therefore not the fiscal stance per se that determines incumbents’ 
re-election prospects, but the interaction between the underlying economic conditions 
and fiscal policy that exerts a sizeable influence on incumbent popularity. 
 
The structure of this article runs as follows. Section II will offer a brief literature review 
on economic voting starting from the classics to the recent state of the responsibility 
paradigm. Section III introduces my theory in a rational choice framework leading up to 
my hypotheses on electoral behaviour in response to fiscal choices. Section IV will 
introduce my case study and my two-pronged empirical strategy on the individual- and 
the aggregate-level, respectively. Section V will present my findings. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
 
III.2. Literature review: from economic to fiscal voting 
 
 
Although sometimes credited to the “lost chapter”(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009) in 
Campbell et al’s path-breaking work, the American Voter(Campbell et al, 1960). 
economic voting research usually takes Goodhart and Bhansali’s (1970) and Kramer’s 
(1971) seminal contributions as its reference point. These early works were grounded in 
the neat two-party competition of the US and the UK, where voters had a clear choice 
between two candidates (parties) and their economic record. Research thus earnestly 
began on the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates and vote/popularity of 
incumbents. The so-called VP-function was thus born, wherein incumbent’s vote 
share/popularity was modelled as a function of economic and political determinants. 
While the choice of the right economic variable on the “right-hand side” triggered some 
debate, the political determinants were largely left to some variables capturing “events” 
–such as the Falkland’s war during the Thatcher government (Norpoth, 1987) –and 
some trend variable accounting for the natural effects of the electoral cycle: typically a 
honeymoon effect followed by gradual popularity erosion only to reverse in the 
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campaign period was chosen to pick up this near-universal fate of incumbents(Veiga 
and Veiga, 2004; Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 2011). 
 
In the early days, economic voting was studied on the aggregate level. After much 
empirical work on the US (Kramer, 1971) and the UK (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; 
Whiteley, 1980, 1986) European scholars ventured outside these safe two-party 
domains into multi-party contexts and continue to do so until the present day. This 
European literature is simply too voluminous to cite for our present purposes; it suffices 
to say that starting from the largest European countries – France, Germany (Lafay, 
1985; Frey and Schneider, 1980) – through the European periphery – Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland ( Lewis-Beck and Bellucci, 1982; Bravo, 1987; Veiga and Veiga, 
2004; Harrison and Marsh, 1998)  – VP functions were fit on single country data with 
largely consistent findings: the three most important economic variables, 
unemployment, inflation and income growth have had large, albeit varying, explanatory 
power in accounting for the fate of incumbents at the polls. More recently, pooled 
studies have also been performed for advanced economies with similar results (Bellucci 
and Lewis-Beck, 2011). Interestingly, the VP function also held up rather well in new 
democracies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008). 
 
While the aggregate-level relationship between vote/popularity of incumbents and the 
macro-economy has been impressive, it says little about individual considerations of the 
vote. It is tempting to fall in the trap of the ecological fallacy, whereby individual-level 
conclusions are prematurely drawn from aggregate-level evidence.  Only with the 
advent of regular election surveys (e.g. NES in the US and BES in the UK) did it 
become possible to look at the individual-level determinants of the vote choice. In an 
early work, Lewis-Beck provides comprehensive evidence of economic voting 
occurring at the individual level (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Taking data from various 
Eurobarometer surveys, the author regularly finds subjective economic evaluations as 
strong predictors of the vote choice for incumbents. More recently, Nadeau et al (2002) 
and Duch and Stevenson (2008) followed this approach by pooling electoral surveys 
across nations to gain insights into the determinants of the vote choice. In both cases, 
individual-level economic voting received substantial empirical support. 
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Notwithstanding these successes, individual-level studies have grappled with a number 
of issues for decades. Just like aggregate-level researchers long-debated the most 
appropriate macro-variable to use, individual-level studies fought hard to establish 
some sort of consensus on two particular dilemmas: 1) Do voters care mostly about 
their personal finances (pocketbook voting) or the broader state of the economy (socio-
tropic voting) when casting their votes? 2) Do voters judge the past performance of the 
economy (retrospective voting) or make their choice based on what they can expect 
(prospective voting)? While the jury is still largely out, the overall evidence seems to 
point towards retrospective, socio-tropic voting.   
 
Moreover, much thought has been devoted to the potential endogeneity bias in 
assessing the overall state of the economy; to the extent that a large number of voters 
are driven by partisan convictions, they will find it hard to make an ideologically 
unbiased assessment of the economy. This-so called partisan rationalization argument 
has often been ignored or trivialized as a nuisance. Promisingly, however, Duch and 
Stevenson (2008:4) explicitly address this possibility and show that individual-level 
economic voting still holds up. Moreover, in a subsequent article, the authors 
documented that subjective economic evaluations tend to track the real economy 
relatively closely, mitigating the potential bias from partisan rationalization (ibid, 
2011).  
 
The substantive and statistical significance for most economic voting coefficients in 
both aggregate-level and individual-level studies did not divert attention from an 
inconvenient fact, however. While the overall evidence was clear, when VP-functions 
or survey-based regressions were fit on the data, the estimated impact varied largely 
from country to country and across time. What Nannestad and Paldam referred to as the 
“predicament of instability” of the VP function (1994, p.214) was gradually resolved by 
the emerging responsibility paradigm. Although noted much earlier before them(Lewis-
Beck, 1988) Powell and Whitten’s (1993) seminal article offered the first concise 
theory on institutional and political determinants that condition the economic vote. 
Looking at factors like coalition governments, coalition cohesion, divided government 
(or cohabitation in the French case), upper chamber controlled by an opposition party, 
federalism etc., the authors demonstrated that where the responsibility for policymaking 
is blurred, economic voting weakens. Nadeau et al (2002) push this point further by 
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constructing an index of responsibility taking short-run, medium-run and long-run 
features of the political system into account and arrive at similar conclusions. Specific 
aspects of the responsibility paradigm were taken up by Pacek and Radcliff (1995) and 
Hellwig (2001) who demonstrate, respectively, that welfare state generosity, by 
dampening the effects of the business cycle on society and economic openness, by 
rendering economic outcomes at the mercy of the global economic conditions weaken 
economic voting. Most comprehensively, Duch and Stevenson (2008:5) run individual-
level regressions from 163 election surveys and use these individual estimates to 
explore the responsibility paradigm. Their approach rests on the assumption of 
instrumentally rational voters who are faced with a signal extraction problem from 
incumbents29. Their conclusions, in line with earlier studies, is that when the ratio of 
electorally accountable decision-makers (mostly government party leaders and 
ministers) to non-accountable ones (entrenched civil service, wage-bargainers, 
regulators, foreign decision-makers in the context of small and open economies etc.) 
grows, economic voting strengthens. Moreover, the signal-extraction also becomes 
difficult when responsibility is split among the electorally accountable decision-makers, 
so here again, we observe dampened economic voting. 
 
In sum, there is a lot be said for the responsibility paradigm in accounting for the 
instability of the VP function. That said, as this article will argue, the most obvious 
facet of government responsibility has not been adequately addressed thus far. Rational 
voters before observing economic outcomes (and hence faced with the difficult signal 
extraction problem from Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) model) observe economic 
policy variables under the government’s control. In particular, fiscal policy lies at the 
heart of so many political debates not only because of its impact on the economy but 
also because of its distributional impact on household income.. 
 
Studies recognizing the importance of fiscal policy as potentially important determinant 
of incumbent popularity, however, have reached   inconclusive results. The fiscal 
adjustment literature, in particular, has largely produced non-findings, ie. no systematic 
relationships between adjustment efforts and re-election prospects (Alesina et al, 1999, 
2012;  Mulas Granados, 2006; Ilera and Mulas-Granados, 2001; Von Hagen et al, 
                                                 
29
 See also Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for the original version of the signal extraction model. 
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2002). While the potential selection bias in the observed retrenchment episodes has 
been recognized and partly addressed30, the overall message remains: voters do not 
seem to punish contractionary fiscal policies at the polls. If anything, the opposite has 
been found by other studies that do not restrict their attention to periods of austerity. 
Brender and Drazen (2008) find statistical evidence in a cross-national analysis that the 
popularity of incumbents drops after loose fiscal policies. Similar evidence has been 
provided on sub-national levels in different country-case studies (Peltzman, 1992; 
Brender, 2003; Drazen and Eslava, 2007).  Most recently, Sattler et al (2010) employ a 
sophisticated VAR-analysis to evaluate the two-way causality between vote intentions 
and fiscal shocks and reach similar conclusions: fiscal stimuli lead to drops in vote 
intentions on incumbents. These findings seem to be hard to reconcile with the main 
story of economic voting: why do voters seem to be indifferent at best and outright 
hostile at worst to policies that aim to boost economic growth? Are voters inherently 
fiscally conservative or is there a more nuanced electoral calculus at play? 
 
One inherent difficulty of understanding the electoral logic of fiscal policy is voters’ 
heterogeneity in redistributive interests. A number of individual-level studies have 
incorporated voter heterogeneity in assessing the impact of economic perceptions on the 
vote choice (Lewis Beck and Stegmaier, 2011, Lewis-Beck et al, 2012; Palmer and 
Whitten, 2009). These studies, however, are silent on the dynamic nature of voters’ 
interests: in particular, changing economic conditions in general and labour-market 
conditions in particular present voters with different considerations when assessing the 
cost-benefit implications of fiscal stimuli31. The following section conceptualizes this 
idea and offers testable hypotheses on the interaction between economic conditions and 
the impact of fiscal policy on governments’ popularity rating. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 The selection bias results from the possibility that strong/popular governments are more likely to 
undertake fiscal adjustment, confounding the causal effect running from adjustment to re-election 
prospects (Alesina et al, 2012). 
31
 The best-known theory on dynamic preference formation has been postulated by thermostatic theory 
(Wlezien, 1995). However, thermostatic theory is largely silent on the micro-logic of cost-benefit 
calculation that my theory builds upon. 
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III.3. Theory and hypotheses: the cost-benefit calculation of the 
electoral space 
 
 
As indicated in the previous section, some of the questions regarding individual-level 
economic voting are still unresolved. In particular, retrospective vs. prospective and 
pocketbook vs. socio-tropic considerations have been largely left to empirical 
modelling by a “let the data speak” approach. Duch and Stevenson’s (2008) work is a 
welcome exception wherein they model voters making instrumentally rational choices 
by drawing retrospective inference to incumbent’s competence in running the economy. 
Instead of the complicated signal-extraction problem that their model assumes voters 
are facing, I will put forward a more simple model where voters on the one hand look at 
past fiscal decisions (retrospective motivations) and form expectations on the likely 
consequences of these decisions (debt and/or taxes). The cost-benefit calculations are 
primarily based on self-interested (pocketbook) motivations, as it is customary in 
rational-choice approaches. 
 
Moreover, my stylized model rests on a long tradition in political economy that views 
redistributive conflicts as an outcome of class-coalitions between different groups of 
voters. Instead of viewing redistributive pressures on governments as a function of 
inequality (Meltzer and Richards; 1981), the type of electoral systems (Iversen and 
Soskice, 2006) or a broad coalition between employers and workers (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Mares, 2003) in a long-term, static perspective, however, I argue that short-term 
swings in the business cycle present a dynamically changing preference alignment for 
more/less redistribution between different income groups. In particular, business cycle 
conditions affect the share of recipients of different public services and the distribution 
of costs to finance them. Also, a given fiscal decision may generate different kind of 
expectations on its economic effects when taking into account different business cycle 
conditions. I will therefore first take a status-quo situation, approximated by full 
employment (or some NAIRU-level32 unemployment) and compare the cost-benefit 
calculation of different voters to that after a positive unemployment shock.  
                                                 
32
 The NAIRU level of unemployment is one that is consistent with stable prices in an economy that is 
growing at or close to its potential rate. 
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Unemployment is chosen as my conditioning variable for three reasons. First, as the 
previous literature review indicated, it appeared as one of the most likely candidates in 
economic voting research for capturing the electoral effects of business cycle 
fluctuations. Secondly, unemployment generally receives privileged media focus and 
therefore is the one information cue – along with inflation – that most voters, 
presumably, can acquire at relatively little transaction costs. Thirdly, unemployment, as 
opposed to GDP growth for instance, is something that those affected (or are threatened 
by) can directly feel. 
 
More specifically, my theory takes a number of additional assumptions with the 
following rationales.   
 
1) Two major parties (The Conservatives and Labour in the British context) 
compete for votes in a median voter framework. One can think of the electoral 
space as the set of undecided, or swing voters that either haven’t decided 
whether to vote or abstain, or which major parties they would cast their vote for. 
More specifically, when the (expected) Marginal Benefit (MB) of a fiscal policy 
choice exceeds its (expected) Marginal Cost (MC) for a given voter, she will 
support the incumbent and abstain/vote for the opposition otherwise.  While the 
two-party system assumption admittedly limits the model’s generalizability, its 
advantage is that it presents a strong test against the simple reward-punishment 
hypothesis because it is exactly in such high clarity of responsibility contexts 
where one would expect macroeconomic outcomes to exert the strongest 
influence on the vote choice. 
2) Alternative voting motives, such as class loyalty (Evans 2000; Evans and Tilly; 
2012), issue-, valence-(Green and Hobolt, 2008) or value-based voting 
(Walczak et al, 2010) have been found to be important determinants of the vote 
choice. However, to the extent that certain segments of the electorate are swayed 
by these, rather than redistributive considerations, I will assume that these 
influences do not systematically co-vary with the electoral impact of 
redistributive policies. 
3) Voters can be ordered on an income scale by income deciles. 
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4) The government delivers public services in the political economy. While some 
of these services are universal (e.g. NHS), others are means-tested (such as 
housing benefits) and mainly benefit low-income voters. Moreover, to the extent 
that the monetary value of these services takes up a larger share of low-income 
voters’ budgets, any additional unit of service delivery entails higher marginal 
benefits for them. From these considerations it follows that the MB curve is 
downward sloping with income. 
5) The tax system is progressive with expected future taxes rising steadily with 
income. 
6) High-income voters are relatively debt- and hence inflation-sensitive because of 
higher savings (following from partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977)) 
7) From 5) and 6) it follows that the MC curve of public services is upward sloping 
with income. High-income voters are relatively averse to extra spending because 
their future tax burden will rise (Assumption 5) and/or the real value of their 
debt holding becomes riskier (through rising risk premia or inflation) hence lose 
in value (Assumption 6). 
 
Our conceptual electoral space is depicted on Figure III.1 
 
 
Figure III.1 
Changing cost-benefit calculation of the electoral space after a positive 
unemployment shock 
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The solid lines represent the cost-benefit calculation at a status-quo level of 
equilibrium-employment. Area I on the left includes the originally unemployed, 
approximated by the first income decile. Area II and III comprise the original set of net 
beneficiaries of the tax-benefit system who can be thought of as low-wage earners. 
Because of tax progressivity, low debt holdings and targeted/means-tested benefits, 
their marginal benefit from a given increase in spending exceeds the marginal cost. The 
MB curve is downward sloping as the relatively wealthy gain less from additional 
spending but never quite reaches 0 because they also benefit from some of the public 
services that the government delivers. However, since additional spending will have to 
be financed by taxes or debt, these high-income deciles (Area IV and V) will expect to 
be net contributors to government finances. A higher share of future taxes will fall onto 
them (assumption 5) and the real value of their debt holding will lose in value if the 
additional spending is inflationary or higher risk premia depress the value of 
outstanding bonds (assumption 6). Overall, therefore, those in area IV and V are 
spending-averse and get negative utility – the difference between MB and MC – from 
extra spending at the status quo. 
 
A positive unemployment shock, indicated by the arrows and the dashed lines shifts, 
increases the pool of unemployed on the one hand and raises the risk of unemployment 
across all income groups on the other. The larger pool of unemployed now captures 
area II in addition to area I. At the same time, the net beneficiaries of government 
finances now comprise area IV as voters towards the middle of the income scale are 
now threatened by unemployment and/or forced to accept lower-paying jobs. What this 
means for their cost-benefit assessment is that any additional spending stimulus delivers 
higher marginal benefit to them for two reasons. First, their lower income may qualify 
them for spending programmes that they had been excluded from before and universal 
programmes now serve as a more important complement to their lower income. Second, 
the additional aggregate demand brought about by the stimulus improves the job 
prospects of voters affected by the unemployment shock. Towards higher up on the 
income scale, the shifted MB curve delivers less and less additional marginal benefit 
(assumption 4) so it converges back towards the original curve.  
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Turning to the MC schedule, the counter-clockwise rotation depicted on the graph 
results from the following considerations. First, the tax-base shrinks as the new pool of 
unemployed pay no direct taxes. To close the gap brought about by the recession, the 
government can choose to tax this lower base, or issue more debt with the possible 
implication of sustainability concerns, higher risk premia and fall in bond prices. In 
either case, voters higher up on the income scale will be faced with higher marginal 
costs.  
 
On the balance, the following observation can be made. Originally, the median voter – 
whose position is indicated by the black vertical line – lies to the right of area III hence 
a net contributor to government finances. After the positive unemployment shock, 
however, the pool of net beneficiaries of extra spending shifts to the right and the 
median voter finds herself among them. To the extent that the location of the median 
voter drives aggregate-level support for incumbents, we can formulate two hypotheses 
to test the propositions above, one referring to the individual and one to the aggregate-
level, respectively. 
 
H1 (Individual-level hypothesis): The median voter’s relative spending preference will 
change along the business cycle. At times of low unemployment, it will be aligned with 
wealthier voters. In economic downturns, it will realign with the poor. 
 
H2 (Aggregate-level hypothesis): The electoral response to fiscal choices will follow a 
counter-cyclical pattern. At times of low unemployment, government support drops in 
response to extra spending. In economic downturns, however, it rises. 
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III.4. Case selection and methodology: the United Kingdom, the 
“Downsian laboratory” 
 
 
Case Selection 
 
It is important to point out here from the outset that in my case selection, I departed 
from the standard most-likely/least-likely case paradigm to disconfirm/confirm a 
running theme in the literature (for more detailed discussions, see George and Bennett, 
2005; Gerring, 2007). Instead, my proposed theory being of an exploratory nature, I 
sought a case that fully satisfies the scope conditions of the theory and hence maximizes 
the empirical plausibility of the argument. Although this potentially limits the 
generalizability of the findings to other cases, it is still a useful first step in casting a 
new light on the interaction between economic conditions and economic policies in the 
electorate’s voting calculus.  
 
Turning to the aforementioned scope conditions for my proposed theory, they require a 
number of contextual features for the appropriate case study to satisfy. Most 
importantly, my point of departure is the responsibility paradigm which posits that 
electoral accountability is stronger in instances of clear institutional/political 
responsibility. The following considerations suggest that the United Kingdom is an 
appropriate case to test my hypotheses. 
 
First, in terms of institutional responsibility, the British party scene with its first-past-
the-post electoral system is among the closest ones to the neat Downsian world of a 
median voter framework, with two major parties in constant competition for office: The 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Moreover, the majority party in Westminster 
has an unparalleled control over public finances33, avoiding complications in 
responsibility attribution that federalism (Germany, US, Spain), divided executives 
(US, France), strong bicameralism (US) can entail. Moreover, the number of non-
electorally accountable decision-makers (Duch and Stevenson, 2008:7) is 
                                                 
33
 Recent devolution measures to Scotland  and Wales did not fundamentally change the centralized 
nature of the British fiscal system 
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comparatively low: on both regulatory and corporatist grounds, the UK is remarkably 
thin; the general level of regulation is lower than in most Western European contexts 
and wage coordination is one of the lowest in the EU. 
 
Secondly, in terms of non-institutional factors that may condition responsibility 
attribution the UK likewise scores relatively well for our purposes. While economic 
openness, measured in terms of exports plus imports/GDP puts the UK in the middle 
ranks of the EU, its welfare state relies to a large extent on means-tested programmes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990:1), exposing large segments of the electorate to the vagaries of 
the business cycle. These considerations suggest that little will shelter British 
governments from the electorate’s responsibility attribution to the consequences of 
fiscal decisions. 
 
Thirdly, British public finances are among the most transparent to the public, bringing 
the cost of information acquiring down. Either through the media or their own efforts, 
British voters have all the means at their disposal to become informed about the 
government’s budgetary decisions. Not least, this transparency also goes hand in hand 
with reliable data, reducing measurement error and increasing the validity of findings. 
 
Fourthly, British governments, as if realizing that they must deliver if they are to get re-
elected, employed the budgetary firepower at great regularity before elections. In fact, it 
is among those EU member states where political budget cycles have been the most 
prominent (Schultz, 1995). Perhaps not coincidentally, this went hand in hand with high 
saliency of fiscal decisions in British election campaigns. Partisan alignment, as will be 
shown later, is a strong predictor of fiscal preferences among the British public. This 
makes it likely that the policy position that incumbents are choosing on this issue 
domain is likely to affect the vote choice. 
 
Lastly, British data allow a unique opportunity to look into the tax-benefit structure of 
public finances. As Figure III.2 shows, our conceptual model closely approximates the 
reality on the ground. 
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Figure III.2 
The impact of the tax-benefit system of the UK among income groups 
  
Source: Office of National Statistics (UK) 
 
The columns, for each income decile, illustrate the estimated impact of the tax-benefit 
system. The components above the 0 line (original income, cash benefits and benefits in 
kind) add to, while those below (direct and indirect taxes) subtract from an individual’s 
disposable income. The bubbles and triangles indicate the net position of individuals in 
given income deciles, ie. whether they are net beneficiaries from, or net contributors to 
the system. Admittedly, this does not take into account the effects of inflation and risk 
premia on outstanding bold holdings but still gives a reassuring first stab at the 
empirical task ahead: voters above the median voter appear to be net contributors to and 
those below net beneficiaries of the system. 
 
 
Empirical strategy 
 
The empirical sections that follow will test my two hypotheses on two different levels 
of analysis. In the first stage of my empirical strategy, the analysis will start from the 
individual level where the British Election Studies surveys helped me identify the 
spending preferences for different income groups. In the surveys, respondents were 
asked to report their household income on an annual basis. Using these responses, I 
constructed three categories – roughly equal in number of respondents – for lower 
income, higher income and middle income voters with the latter serving as my proxy 
group for the median voter. The dependent variable capturing spending preferences was 
based on a survey question asking the respondents to locate their preferences on a scale 
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ranging from “taxes and public services should be raised” to “taxes and public services 
should be cut”. The advantage of this survey question is to address potential problems 
arising from fiscal illusion by drawing respondents’ attention to the connection between 
taxes and spending. The disadvantage is that it doesn’t allow for the possibility of debt 
finance, a potentially important consideration in voters’ calculus. All in all, however, 
this survey question comes as close as one can get to obtain information on voters’ 
fiscal preferences.  
 
Ideally, one would like to track the change in each income group’s absolute level of 
fiscal preference over time across different unemployment contexts. However, changes 
in the scaling34 of the survey question across electoral surveys make the direct 
comparison of absolute preferences tricky. Therefore, my analysis was restricted to 
changes in the relative preference of the middle-income group compared to low-income 
and high-income voters, consistent with the re-alignment hypothesis (H1). Measuring 
changes in relative preferences is unproblematic as the scale of the response variable in 
any given survey is the same across individuals. 
 
Furthermore, standard control variables were used that individual-level economic 
voting research generally relies on (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Specifically, I 
controlled for age, gender, union membership, social class and partisanship. This latter 
control is especially important because it is both highly correlated with income and has 
a large and significant impact on tax-spending preferences. The exact wording for 
survey questions for the individual-level analysis is found in Appendix 1. 
 
The individual-level analysis will be conducted by running OLS regressions in a 
number of cross-section studies taken after elections by the British Election Studies.  
The general formula will take the form of: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Both the range of possible response categories and the ordering of the variable from more to less 
taxes/services as well as the minimum and maximum values for the variable changed from survey to 
survey, complicating direct comparison of mean responses over time. 
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'( = β0 + 1 ∗ )*(+  2 ∗ +*( +∑ - ∗ .-(/0 + εi  , where 
 
FP=Fiscal Preference 
LI=Dummy variable for lower income voters 
HI=Dummy variable for higher income voters 
C= Vector of control variables 
 
With middle income voters omitted as the reference category, the estimated coefficients 
for β1 and β2 will tell us where the median voter’s fiscal preferences lie in relation to the 
lower and higher income segments of the electorate. If my hypothesis holds, one would 
expect a negatively signed significant coefficient on β1 and an insignificant coefficient 
for β2 in times of low unemployment. In times of high unemployment, one would 
expect the opposite: β2 should be positively signed and significant, whereas β1 should 
show up as non-significant in the results.  To test the conditioning effect of 
unemployment, one would ideally like to pool the BES surveys and test cross-level 
interactions between level 1 (income group) and level-2 (unemployment) variables. 
However, an issue that has been long noted by multi-level researchers is the low 
statistical power of sample designs where the number of level-2 units (electoral surveys 
for our purposes) is not sufficiently large. In our case, the number of available electoral 
surveys in the British context – see a more detailed discussion later – is nowhere near 
the recommended minimum of 20 level-2 units that is often used as a rule of thumb in 
the literature units (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998). For this reason, I opted to conduct the 
analysis in repeated cross-sectional designs across the various electoral contexts. 
 
In the second stage of the analysis, the aggregate-level hypothesis on counter-cyclical 
voting will shift to the aggregate level in a time-series framework under the following 
reduced-form equation35: 
 
 
                                                 
35
 The often demanding assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity in reduced-form time-series models 
is relatively unproblematic for our purposes. While it is true that fiscal choices can be endogenous to 
government popularity, there are important lags (decision, implementation etc.) before the government 
can change track when faced with declining popularity. Moreover, the main explanatory variables are 
included with lags, further mitigating endogeneity concerns.  
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1* = 0 + 1 ∗ 1* − 1 + 	2 ∗ 3 + 3 ∗ 32 + 	4 ∗ 5 − 1 + 	5 ∗ 7 − 1		 + 6
∗ (5 − 1 ∗ 7 − 1) + 	7 ∗ . − 1 
 
where, 
 
VIt  = vote intentions at time t (on a quarterly average basis), as a % of respondents 
intending to vote for the incumbent party36 
 
VIt-1 = is the autoregressive term for the AR(1) model. Test statistics from an 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test allowed me to reject the presence of unit-roots in the 
dependent variable at the 5% level. Having stationary series, running the model on 
levels was thus appropriate. Of the various forms of ARMA specifications tried, a 
simple (AR1) model provided the best fit based on the Bayesian and Akaike 
information criteria (Enders, 2004:2, p. 97)37.   
 
Et and Et2 = a linear and a quadratic term to capture the effects of the electoral cycle on 
government popularity, measured by the number of quarters that have passed since the 
last election, 
 
Ut-1 = the unemployment rate at time t-1 (on a quarterly average basis) 
 
Gt-1 = government spending on goods and services at time t-1 (on a quarterly basis as 
a % of GDP),  
 
Ut-1*Gt-1 = an interactive term capturing the conditioning effect of unemployment on the 
effect of spending on vote intentions, 
 
                                                 
36
 The choice of vote-intention rather than other popularity measures – such as government approval – is 
a conservative test for my argument because it is less likely to respond to economic and political 
developments (Pickup, 2010). 
37
 Having fitted the model, diagnostics were applied for the residuals to test for remaining autocorrelation 
and conditional heteroskedasticity. These tests showed that residuals were “white noise” hence the OLS 
estimates for the coefficients and their standard errors are valid. Results for the ADF test and diagnostics 
are available in Appendix 3 
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Ct-1 = control terms for economic growth (since the spending variable is expressed as 
a % of GDP) and partisanship because of its potentially confounding effect on 
popularity. 
 
While the net impact of fiscal policy results from the combination of tax and spending 
changes, this analysis focuses on the spending side of budgetary decisions for two main 
reasons. First, many items on the expenditure side of the budget have clearer 
redistributive consequences across income groups than broad-based tax measures do. 
Second, as the unit of analysis is quarters, we require a measure that is amenable to 
swift within year discretionary changes38. This condition is more likely to be satisfied 
by spending categories that fall under the Departmental Expenditure Limits39 as 
opposed to broad-based transfer programmes or effective tax rates that automatically 
respond to business cycle fluctuations and require prior legislation to change their 
parameters.  
 
Regarding the specific type of the spending variable used, two further considerations 
are important. First, it is necessary to use comparable data for the two levels of analysis; 
if respondents in the survey (see Appendix 1) have a different understanding of the 
variable of interest than what we measure on the aggregate-level, our aggregate-level 
findings will find little external validity. Since respondents are asked about the trade-off 
between taxes and services, I made sure to specify those expenditures where these 
services (health, education, housing etc.) mostly fall: government consumption of goods 
and services. Second, when governments undertake fiscal stimuli in the face of high 
unemployment, this is presumably where most of their efforts are concentrated as they 
represent a direct component of aggregate demand. Note that some items, most 
importantly cash transfers, are excluded from this measure due to their non-
discretionary nature. To mitigate this potential problem, I reran my time-series models 
for general government current expenditures where most government spending items 
(cash transfers, production subsidies, etc.) are included. 
 
                                                 
38
 The discretionary nature of the fiscal variable is also important because responsibility attribution 
requires voters to link budgetary outcomes to government action. 
39
 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk, last accessed on: 27/04/2013. 
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The lagged form of the main independent variables reflects the lag of information 
processing and preference change among the electorate. For sake of illustration, 
suppose that unemployment rises at time t. Two processes need to occur before an 
individual changes her vote choice: first, the information on unemployment has to 
become public. Second, a cognitive process requires the individual to attribute 
responsibility to the government which may go against her own partisan convictions. 
These two lags, information lag and cognitive lag, are captured by introducing the main 
independent variables in a lagged form. 
 
The main coefficient of interest for our analysis is β6, the one that stands for the 
interactive term.  A statistically significant positive estimate on this coefficient would 
provide corroborative evidence on the counter-cyclical hypothesis: as unemployment 
increases the marginal effect of spending on popularity increases as well. Robustness 
check was applied by introducing a control variable for partisanship (a dummy term 
taking the value 1 when the incumbent is a Labour government and 0 otherwise) both in 
a linear and in an interactive form with spending. To the extent that partisanship is 
highly correlated with unemployment, the estimates for β5 and β6 could suffer from 
omitted variable bias. While we have no clear theoretical expectations on which 
partisan governments would be more (less) rewarded (penalized) by extra spending, it is 
nevertheless a potentially important factor to control for. 
      
In the following section, I will discuss the findings on both levels of analysis. 
 
 
III.5. Empirical results: re-alignment of the median voter and counter-
cyclical voting 
 
 
Overview 
 
Before turning to the discussion of the empirical results, an overview of economic and 
fiscal developments throughout the sample period is in order. Figure III.3 shows the 
evolution of unemployment, public consumption as a share of GDP as well as the 
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elections marked by the solid black vertical lines (with the boxes at the bottom showing 
whether re-election was successful (+) or failed (-). 
 
 
Figure III.3 
Overview of economic and fiscal developments over the sample period 
 
Source: OECD i.library; Office of National Statistics (UK) 
 
The first observation that is clear from the graph is that unemployment, by itself, seems 
a very poor indicator of re-election prospects. Of the eight elections in our sample 
period, only four conform well to pure economic voting theory. The last three elections 
during New Labour were well predicted by low unemployment levels in 2001 and 2005 
and economic distress in the wake of the recent credit crunch (2010). Similarly, the 
1979 election heralding the Thatcher-era saw the end of the post-war Keynesian 
consensus when virtually full employment (unemployment rates still hovered between 2 
and 4% in the early 1970s) had been the norm.  However, the remaining four elections 
are problematic for our analysis. While Norpoth (1987) convincingly demonstrated that 
unemployment hurt the first Thatcher government’s popularity and her re-election in 
1983 was largely due to her management of the Falkland conflict, the remaining three 
elections (1987, 1992 and 1997) are genuinely problematic for pure unemployment-
based economic voting. In 1987, unemployment had been trapped on a high plateau of 
11-12% for four years as a consequence of the determination of the Conservative 
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government to put a lid on the wage-price spiral (Grant, 2002). Yet, the Thatcher 
government was resoundingly re-elected. The contexts for the 1992 and the 1997 
elections show equally surprising patterns: rising unemployment preceded the 
successful re-election bid of the Tories in 1992 and improving labour-market conditions 
did not save them from the New Labour landslide in 1997. Whether this was due to 
fiscal policy choices under different business cycle conditions is the subject of the 
analysis below. 
 
 
Individual-level analysis 
 
Testing the first hypothesis requires looking at several election-surveys, since 
unemployment, for any given point in time when surveys are taken, is constant across 
individuals. The comparison across different surveys, however, presents a number of 
difficulties. Most importantly, the availability of the relevant survey question confined 
my analysis to seven electoral contexts: 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010.  
However, while most surveys inquired about weakly/annual income of households in 
nominal (absolute) terms allowing me to construct income categories, the 1983 survey 
asked respondents to place themselves relative to others in society. This introduces 
measurement errors at all sorts of dimensions with unpredictable consequences. I thus 
opted to exclude 1983 from my analysis.  My analysis thus covers the last six elections 
in the United Kingdom, three under Conservative (1987, 1992, 1997) and three under 
Labour (2001, 2005, 2010) incumbency.  
 
Secondly, as indicated above, the ordering of the dependent variable (more vs. less 
services and taxes) changed from 2001, so I multiplied the dependent variable by -1 for 
the most recent elections to make the coefficient estimates directly comparable. In the 
analysis below, the dependent variable is thus measured on a 10-unit scale – with the 
exception of 1997 where the scale consisted of only 7 units - of respondents’ 
preferences between lower taxes and services vs. higher taxes and service provision. 
Higher values in the dependent variable indicate preferences for more service provision 
and taxes to finance them. 
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Thirdly, comparing models requires consistency in specification and model selection by 
using similar control variables. As listed in the previous section, I used a narrow set of 
controls that were deemed important by the economic voting literature.   The standard 
ideological control of self-placement on a left-right axis proved problematic because it 
was not included uniformly across the surveys. I thus chose a party identification 
variable instead as a proxy for ideology and derived a dummy variable from it taking on 
value 1 if the respondent is a conservative identifier and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, both 
working-class identification and union membership were not included in one of the 
surveys (2001 and 1987, respectively) so I had to omit them from the respective 
surveys. The estimated coefficients from OLS regressions40 for each of the six post-
election surveys are given below in table III.1 in a chronologically descending order. 
 
Table III.1 
Individual-level predictions of tax-spending preferences for six elections (level of 
unemployment in brackets below the years) † 
Year  
Unemployment   
2010   
(7.9%) 
2005  
(4.7%) 
2001   
(5%) 
1997   
(7.2%) 
1992       
(9.3%) 
1987  
(11%) 
low-income 0.262 0.271 0.372 0.366 0.307 0.141
 (1.78)* (2.76)*** (3.25)*** (3.30)*** (1.72)* (1.28)
high-income 0.110 -0.004 0.034 0.057 -0.179 0.104
 (0.83) (0.05) (0.30) (0.56) (1.14) (1.03)
male -0.446 -0.177 -0.250 0.090 -0.343 -0.284
 (4.06)*** (2.31)** (2.81)*** (0.94) (2.61)*** (3.36)***
age -0.015 0.087 0.085 0.065 0.052 0.034
 (0.90) (6.56)*** (5.61)*** (4.67)*** (2.30)** (2.48)**
age2 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
 (2.00)** (4.93)*** (4.58)*** (3.13)*** (2.31)** (1.99)**
workingclass 0.046 0.054  0.115 0.541 0.419
 (0.35) (0.50)  (1.30) (3.76)*** (4.34)***
unionmember 0.283 0.278 0.288 0.144 0.308
 (2.15)** (2.84)*** (2.74)*** (1.48) (2.02)**
conservative -0.884 -0.670 -0.534 -1.071 0.643 -1.176
 (6.37)*** (5.23)*** (4.92)*** (11.11)*** (0.38) (12.90)***
_cons 6.148 3.774 4.202 -5.565 -5.298 -4.962
 (14.41)*** (11.78)*** (11.17)*** (16.59)*** (10.15)*** (15.84)***
R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.07
N 1,935 2,914 2,216 2,996 1,483 3,238
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
† OLS estimates with robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses 
                                                 
40
 Since the dependent variable has a fairly wide range, I opted for a linear model instead of ordinal 
logic/probit estimation to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. Both a White test and a Breusch-
Pagan test indicated severe heteroskedasticity in the models (the H0 of homoscedastic errors were 
rejected at the 1% level in both tests) so I estimated robust standard errors to correct for it. The 
corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses
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The levels of unemployment at the time of the different surveys (elections) should be 
put in the context of the range of unemployment levels in the UK over the sample 
period: 4.6% to 11.3%.  Accordingly, the 2001 and the 2005 elections can be clearly 
regarded as low-unemployment contexts and the 1987 election as a high-unemployment 
context. Regarding the three remaining elections, in 1997 the job-market had been on 
an improving path with unemployment dropping for almost 20 consecutive quarters. In 
2010, the reverse was the case; while the level of unemployment was not dramatically 
high, it had been on a rising trend with no economic recovery in sight. Finally, in 1992, 
again the trend had been one of increasing unemployment for several quarters. 
 
Starting with the low-unemployment contexts, the preference alignment between the 
middle-income group and the high-income group is clearly borne out by the data. In 
both cases, the low-income dummy is highly significant (p<0.01) and positive whereas 
no statistically significant difference is found for the high-income group compared to 
the middle-income group. It seems, therefore that in solid economic conditions (low 
unemployment) the fiscal preference alignment between high earners and the middle-
income group against the expansionary preferences of the low-income group is 
supported by the data. 
 
Turning to the ambiguous (intermediate) settings, 1992, 1997 and 2010 – when 
unemployment stood at 9.2, 7.2% and 7.9%, respectively, the expectations for alliance 
formation are more nuanced.  Findings from these surveys broadly conform to our 
expectations, however: first, in 1997, when the job-market trends pointed towards 
improving conditions the preference-alignment between the middle-income group and 
high-earners remains;  the low-income dummy is still positively signed and strongly 
significant at the 1% level. By contrast, under less promising job-market conditions and 
prospects, in 1992 and 2010, the relationship disappears as neither low-earners nor 
high-earners appear to form significantly different fiscal preferences from the middle-
income group (p>0.05 in both cases). 
 
Finally, 1987 was an election year uniquely accompanied by double-digit 
unemployment rate (11%) in our sample. Here, the expectations are clear based on the 
theoretical model: the middle-income group should “switch sides” and form a 
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preference-coalition with the low-income group. Only partial support for this prediction 
is found in the 1987 sample, however: the dummy for the high-income group is 
statistically insignificant and it is signed opposite to expectations (positive). That said, 
we also obtain the smallest (non-significant) point estimate for the low-income dummy 
among all the samples, indicating that this high-unemployment context did blur the 
difference in fiscal preferences between the low-income group and the median voter as 
the theory predicted. 
 
While the individual level-analysis does not allow us a rigorous control for partisan 
incumbency, there are reasons to be optimistic about the findings not being driven by 
which party occupied government at the time. Among the low unemployment contexts, 
two took place under Labour (2001 and 2005) and one under Conservative (1997) 
incumbency. Similarly, among the intermediate contexts, one election occurred under 
Labour (2010) and one under Conservative (1992) incumbency. It seems therefore, that 
the relative fiscal preference alignment across income groups was not driven by partisan 
considerations. 
 
In sum, the evidence offered on the individual-level hypothesis is quite robust. While 
1987 is a (partially) problematic case for our purposes, the remaining five elections fit 
nicely with the theory. On the balance, it seems that under different business cycle 
conditions, fiscal preferences undergo important changes; in particular and most 
importantly, to the extent that the median-voter’s preference-alignment drives the 
electoral response to fiscal policy, the individual-level findings suggest a counter-
cyclical electoral response on the aggregate level. This hypothesis (H2) is tested in the 
next empirical section. 
 
 
Aggregate-level analysis 
 
To motivate the findings and the interpretation from the interactive specifications 
between the fiscal variable (government consumption) and economic conditions 
(unemployment) I start out by including these terms separately to investigate for 
average additive effects over time. As the first column in Table III.2 shows below, 
neither the lagged unemployment variable nor the lagged public consumption variable 
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achieve significance at conventional levels. In line with the prior expectations following 
from Figure 3, unemployment, by itself is a poor predictor of voting intentions for the 
incumbent party among the British electorate. 
 
I continue my estimation with setting up a baseline interactive model where only the 
main variables of interest (unemployment and government spending as well as their 
interaction) were included41. The results are displayed in the regression output table 
(Table II.2) below. The estimated coefficients point to the expected direction with the 
interaction term having an opposite (positive) sign to the main spending term and is 
significant at the 1% level. When fitting the extended model (with year-on-year GDP 
growth and the partisanship dummy and its interaction with the spending variable added 
as a control), the main coefficients of interest remain stable. If anything, the estimated 
impact of the interaction term becomes larger and remains significant at the 1% level. 
Also, the estimates for partisanship do not suggest different partisan evaluations in 
terms of reward and punishment. Although the sign of the partisanship-spending 
interaction is positive (which would imply more favourable assessment of extra 
spending under Conservative governments relative to Labour), the standard errors are 
very large, rendering the coefficient statistically indistinguishable from 0.  Controls for 
the electoral cycle behave in line with what the literature suggests: the negative sign of 
the linear term and the positive sign of quadratic term (both significant at the 1% level) 
suggests that first popularity gradually erodes over the cycle but recovers some lost 
ground towards the end of the term (possibly due to campaign and mobilization effects). 
 
To interpret the substantive impact of our variables, it must be noted that spending is 
expressed as a fraction of GDP and popularity in % points. So interpreting the impact of 
the spending variables requires dividing the coefficient by 100 to get the marginal 
impact of 1% extra spending as a % of GDP on popularity levels. Moreover, because 
we specified an interactive model, the marginal effect of spending can only be 
interpreted for different values of unemployment. Figure III.4 illustrates the estimated 
coefficients for spending as a function of unemployment with 95% confidence intervals. 
The estimated impacts fit very nicely with my first hypothesis. At low levels of 
unemployment (between 4 and 7%) extra spending is punished by the electorate. 
                                                 
41
 I also included the standard controls for popularity patterns around the electoral cycle (counter) in a 
linear and a squared term to capture the cyclical evolution of popularity along electoral cycles. 
120 
 
However, when unemployment rises above 9-10%, the electoral verdict reverses. Note 
that these thresholds are broadly in line with findings from the individual-level analysis. 
 
Table III.2 
Models explaining the evolution of British vote intention † 
Variables Additive model Interactive Baseline 
Model 
Interactive Extended 
Model 
L.voteintion 0.817 0.660 0.652 
 (16.54)*** (11.16)*** (9.73)*** 
counter -0.764 -0.839 -0.855 
 (2.98)*** (3.51)*** (3.32)*** 
counter2 0.036 0.035 0.037 
 (2.82)*** (3.03)*** (2.83)*** 
L.publicconsumption -0.061 -636.954 -672.198 
 (0.23) (4.16)*** (3.23)*** 
L.unemployment -0.118 -15.572 -16.835 
 (0.67) (3.72)*** (3.27)*** 
L.publicconsumption*L.unemployment  74.602 80.673 
  (3.73)*** (3.29)*** 
L.growth   0.265 
   (1.37) 
L.partisanship   -4.278 
   (0.25) 
L.publicconsumption*L.partisanship   22.601 
   (0.28) 
Constant 10.232 148.904 155.756 
 (3.54)*** (4.44)*** (3.57)*** 
R2_Adjusted 0.79 0.81 0.80 
N 130 130 130 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
† ARMA(1;0) model with quarterly data 
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Figure III.4 
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the estimated impact of public 
consumption expenditure at different levels of unemployment 
 
 
It is important to note, however, that the estimated impact only provides the 
instantaneous effect on government popularity. It is highly plausible that fiscal shocks 
impact popularity in the long-run as voters’ assessment of incumbents responds 
dynamically to policy choices. The estimated autoregressive coefficient allows us to 
calculate the long-run effect through the impact of our main variable of interest (public 
consumption) on the partial adjustment process in the dependent variable (vote 
intentions) (Kittel and Winner, 2005, p.289). Figure II.5 captures this effect over time 
through the impulse response function at various levels of unemployment. In each case, 
following a sudden leap in the impact at t1 – at t0 the effect is 0 because of the lagged 
form of the independent variables in the models – the estimated impact gradually erodes 
over time and converges back very close to 0 after eight quarters. The long-run 
cumulative effect can be calculated by :; (Enders, 2004:1), where < stands for the 
estimated coefficient for the fiscal variable – at different levels of unemployment – and 
= is the autoregressive coefficient in the model. Accordingly, at very low levels of 
unemployment (5%), the long-run impact of a 1% fiscal stimulus measured in % of 
GDP amounts to a 7.1 percentage point loss in vote intentions. Conversely, at very high 
levels of unemployment (11%) the estimated long-run cumulative effect of the same 
stimulus is a 6.4 percentage point gain. 
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Figure III.5 
Impulse Response Function to a 1% fiscal stimulus (in % of GDP) at various levels 
of unemployment 
 
 
As noted earlier, our chosen indicator for spending omits important items from the 
general government budget. Transfers, while non-discretionary in nature, may still have 
high political salience so I return to my time-series with an alternative spending 
indicator which is more inclusive: general government expenditures. Unfortunately, 
consolidated general government expenditures are available only from 1990 onwards on 
a quarterly basis so an important episode of British economic history, the Thatcher 
period, would be excluded. Therefore, I chose total current expenditures instead where 
longer-time series are available and include net cash transfers. The exclusion of capital 
expenditure is probably a minor issue since it represents a relatively small part of the 
overall budget (typically less than 5%). Our alternative dependent variable is thus total 
current expenditure of general government. The point estimates with the 95% interval, 
using the same set of controls as in our previous extended model are shown below on 
Figure III.642. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Regression output as well as the impulse response function for the long-run effects of this alternative 
dependent variable are available upon request. 
t (quarters) 
Marginal effect on vote intentions (%) 
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Figure III.6 
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the estimated impact of total 
current expenditure at different levels of unemployment 
 
 
With the alternative dependent variable as our fiscal indicator, the pattern is similar to 
the previous findings. However, here the punishment effect clearly dominates with the 
reward end of the curve never reaching statistical significance at the 5% level. When 
transfers are also considered, therefore, the electorate at large seems “spending-averse”. 
A tentative explanation would be that most cash-transfers in the UK have a relatively 
narrow group of targeted (means-tested) beneficiaries from which most voters do not 
directly benefit but they have to finance them in terms of higher taxes in the future or 
debt. Importantly, however, the interactive pattern still holds with the punishment effect 
getting larger as unemployment drops. In line with the aggregate-level hypothesis, 
therefore, for both specifications of our dependent variable under the appropriate 
controls, counter-cyclical voting does seem to occur. 
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III.6. Conclusions 
 
 
The main motivation of this article lies in two separate considerations. On the one hand, 
as I argued, the responsibility paradigm of economic voting has failed to reach its 
substantive conclusion of looking at the link between economic policy and electoral 
behaviour; the primary focus remained instead on economic outcomes. While these 
outcomes surely rank high on voters’ agenda, the ability of government to steer the 
economy towards full-employment has been much questioned since the 1980s, as 
exogenous economic shocks, structural changes in the global economy and the 
inevitable consequences of the business cycle have become enduring facts of British 
economic reality. Rational voters, therefore, are likely to have a more nuanced 
understanding of the government’s responsibility for macroeconomic outcomes and 
credit/blame governments for the redistributive impact of economic policy in general 
and fiscal policy in particular instead. On the other hand, I also argued that the 
generally inconclusive findings on the effects of fiscal policy on re-election prospects 
are puzzling in the light of the generally robust results of economic voting research. 
This article offered a dynamic explanation on the interaction between fiscal policy and 
economic conditions. It is not the fiscal stance per se that matters, but the economic 
conditions under which incumbents undertake fiscal stimuli/adjustment that exert a 
sizeable influence on government’s popularity ratings. 
 
The theory I put forward to investigate the relationship between fiscal decisions and 
incumbent popularity rested on the assumption of rational voters making cost-benefit 
calculation on the expected impact of these decisions on their finances. As changing 
labour-market conditions alter these calculations for different income groups, my theory 
predicted that the median voter (middle-income voters) will change their preferences 
over the business cycle, giving rise to a counter-cyclical electoral response to fiscal 
policy on the aggregate level. 
 
In line with these expectations, this article has first demonstrated that the preference-
alignment of middle-income voters does indeed change at different levels of 
unemployment.  Secondly, on the aggregate level, I showed that when conditioning on 
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business cycle conditions – again, measured by the level of unemployment in our 
framework – fiscal policy variables do indeed explain a great deal of variation in 
incumbent popularity. In particular, in times of economic hardship (high 
unemployment), the electorate at large seems supportive of expansionary fiscal policy. 
In times of prosperity, however, they seem to prefer the Treasury taking a more 
contractionary policy stance. Widespread perceptions of the popular “Iron-Chancellor” 
may as well result from these preferences in boom years. 
 
That said, this new angle of looking at economic voting from a policy-based perspective 
raises a number of questions. Importantly, future research should take more seriously 
some of the electoral contexts that sit uneasily with the data. For our purposes, a closer 
look at the 1987 elections would be a most welcome research effort. While it is easy tell 
stories about why some incumbents failed or won despite what economic voting would 
predict, further refining existing theories may also have the potential for systematically 
explaining these “odd cases”. One particular idea that could be used to bridge the gap 
between idiosyncratic considerations (e.g. the transformation of Old Labour) and these 
“odd elections” is to take the credibility of the challenger into account. When 
considered against the expected alternatives (e.g. a non-credible policy alternative), 
rational voters may not have any incentives to “throw the rascals out” even when they 
go against their fiscal preferences. To return to our previous example, despite 
stubbornly high unemployment and a tight policy stance, Margaret Thatcher handily 
won the 1987 elections. Also, individual-level data suggest that the middle-class did not 
form a clear-cut electoral coalition with the poor to protest against the spending cuts. 
Perhaps then, taking into account the credibility of the opposition Labour Party at the 
time would point to a promising direction. 
 
Moreover, the fact that partisanship did not seem to influence the counter-cyclical 
voting pattern may strike many as surprising. After all, partisan theory has long 
predicted that different partisan governments run on different policy platforms and 
therefore should be affected by a given policy stance (e.g. spending cuts) differently. 
Margaret Thatcher always ran as an inflation-hawk and never promised “garden roses” 
to those looking for them. Reconciling this theoretical ambiguity between different 
policy platforms and similar electoral judgement on partisan incumbents is therefore 
another important question to address. 
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Finally, my findings give rise to a degree of optimism. Many have lamented democratic 
accountability for the increasing “technocratization” of economic management, first in 
the monetary and more recently in the fiscal domain. The main rationale given for these 
technocratic institutions or governments was their insulation from electoral pressure 
when painful policies need to be implemented. To the extent that economic-voting 
research has contributed to this view of the economic voter as a relatively 
unsophisticated agent of reward or punishment, evidence from this article suggests that 
this is largely a myth. Voters, the British ones at least, do seem to get it right. Out of 
individual considerations, a sufficient part of them seem to prefer spending increases 
when the times call for them. Whether fiscal policy-making responds to the logic of this 
counter-cyclical preference formation of the electorate is a whole new story.  
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Appendix 1 
 
British Election Studies survey questions for the individual-level analysis 
 
Dependent variable (tax-spending preferences): 
 
Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that 
government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and 
the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much 
more on health and social services, where would you place yourself?  
 
Independent variable (household income): 
 
Which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from 
all sources before tax - including benefits, saving and so on? Please just tell me the 
letter (with each letter standing for an income category in increasing/decreasing 
order). 
 
Control variables: 
 
Union membership:  
Are you now a member of a trade union or staff association? 
 
Gender:  
(observed by interviewer) 
 
Age:  
Now, a few questions about yourself and your background. What was your age last 
birthday? 
 
Class: 
Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to any particular class? 
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Party support: 
 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative,          Liberal 
Democrat, (Scottish National/Plaid Cymru)1 or what? 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table III.3 
Data Sources for the aggregate-level analysis 
 
Vote intention Ipsos-Mori 
Public consumption as a % of GDP 
Unemployment 
GDP growth 
OECD i. Library 
Office of National Statistics 
Total current expenditures of general 
government 
Office of National Statistics 
Partisanship, election dates European Journal of Economic Research 
data yearbook, ParlGov database 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table III.4 
Diagnostics test-results for individual-level analysis 
White-test for heteroskedasticity 1987 Chi-square statistic: 77.18 
            P-value<0.0001 
1992 Chi-square statistic: 47.65 
            P-value=0.0215 
1997 Chi-square statistic: 47.13 
            P-value=0.1015 
2001 Chi-square statistic: 60.57 
            P-value<0.0001 
2005 Chi-square statistic: 72 
            P-value<0.0001 
2010 Chi-square statistic: 67.72 
            P-value=0.0011 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 1987 Chi-square statistic: 77.14 
            P-value<0.0001 
1992 Chi-square statistic: 23.71 
            P-value=0.0026 
1997 Chi-square statistic: 26.28 
            P-value<0.0001 
2001 Chi-square statistic: 47.18 
            P-value<0.0001 
2005 Chi-square statistic: 42.22 
            P-value<0.0001 
2010 Chi-square statistic: 19.69 
            P-value=0.0116 
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Table III.5 
Diagnostics test-results for aggregate-level analysis 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Lag (5): p-value=0.0228 
Lag (4):  p-value=0.041 
Lag (3):  p-value=0.042 
Lag (2):  p-value=0.086 
Lag (1):  p-value=0.04 
Akaike and Bayesian Information criteria ARIMA (1,0,0): AIC: 736.55 
                            BIC: 745.18 
ARIMA (0,0,1): AIC: 818.77 
                            BIC: 827.4 
ARIMA (1,0,1): AIC: 738.54 
                            BIC: 750.04 
ARIMA (2,0,0): AIC: 738.54 
                            BIC: 750.04 
ARIMA (2,0,1):AIC: 734 
                            BIC: 748.36 
 
Diagnostic autoregressive tests for remaining 
autocorrelation and conditional heteroskedasticity 
p-values on autoregressive coefficients: 
(0.36;0.68) 
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Essay III 
 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
 
 
Reconsidering Partisanship in an Age of Permanent Austerity 
 
 
Abstract: 
The New Politics of the welfare state suggests that periods of welfare retrenchment 
present policy-makers with a qualitatively different set of challenges and electoral 
incentives compared to periods of welfare expansion. An unresolved puzzle for this 
literature is the relative electoral success of retrenching governments in recent decades, 
as evidenced by various studies on fiscal consolidations. This article points to the 
importance of partisan biases as the main explanatory factor. I argue that partisan biases 
of certain constituencies can create incentives for incumbent governments to depart 
from their representative function and push the burden of retrenchment on the very 
constituencies that they owe their electoral mandate to (”Nixon-goes-to-China”). After 
offering a simple model on the logic of partisan biases, the article proceeds by testing 
the unexpected partisan hypotheses that the model generates. My findings from a cross-
section-time-series analysis in a set of 25 OECD countries provide corrobarative 
evidence for this Nixon-goes-to-China logic of welfare retrenchment: governments 
systematically inflict pain on their core constituencies. Some of the losses that the core 
constituencies suffer during austerity, however, are recouped during fiscal expansions 
when traditional partisan patterns take hold. 
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IV.1. Introduction 
 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis and the Great Recession, governments across the 
industrialized world have accumulated unprecedented peace-time debt levels. The size 
of their debt liabilities as well as the fact that many governments have already 
undertaken ambitious consolidation programmes in a sluggish growth environment 
(IMF Fiscal Monitor, 2012) indicate that sizeable cuts have to be made in some of the 
most politically sensitive items in their public budgets. It is highly unlikely that the 
most mature economies in the world can find an easy cure to their fiscal problems by 
shifting on a high-growth and/or high-inflation path overnight to grow out of or inflate 
away their debt burden. The more realistic scenario appears to be an arduous road 
towards fiscal sustainability through austerity and retrenchment. Welfare budgets, 
across the board, are coming under intense pressure, creating a politically treacherous 
terrain for any government to tread. We may thus enter another era of “permanent 
austerity”, where scholarly consensus (Pierson, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001) suggests a 
qualitatively different electoral logic of welfare policy from the era of welfare 
expansion. However, the vast empirical arsenal of electorally successful retrenchment 
episodes presents us with an empirical puzzle which has been largely unexplored by the 
welfare state literature. This article seeks to account for the relative electoral viability of 
welfare retrenchment by reconceptualising our understanding of partisanship in hard 
times.  
 
The notion of “permanent austerity”, according to the logic of the New Politics 
literature (ibid), is a qualitatively different political game from the prior era of welfare-
state building because of entrenched constituencies, organized interests and the general 
popularity of welfare programmes. Outright assaults on the welfare state, even under 
ideologically highly committed conservative opponents – the Reagan-Thatcher era in 
the 1980s is an important reference point here – are thus unlikely. What one can expect, 
at best, is hidden adjustment whereby policy-makers attempt to introduce cost-saving 
measures in less visible welfare items – such as tax expenditures, indexation rules, etc. 
– to obfuscate the true impact of their policies (Howard, 1997; Hacker 2002, 2004). 
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Open retrenchment, on the other hand, is likely to trigger electoral backlash and will 
thus be widely perceived to be a politically suicidal strategy. 
 
While the New Politics literature provided valuable insights on the apparent timidity of 
many conservative governments, a central piece in the electoral logic behind 
retrenchment has been largely overlooked. The number of electorally succesful overt 
retrenchment episodes is simply too high to ignore as idiosyncracies of the political 
context of the time and place (Alesina et al, 1998, 2012; Mulas-Granados, 2006). This 
article seeks to revive the New Politics literature by building a bridge between the 
qualitatively different nature  and the apparent electoral viability of retrenchment. 
Specifically, a crucial factor that has been underemphasized, if not ignored, in welfare 
retrenchment debates is partisan loyalties. By incorporating the idea of  loyalties 
intothis debate, I point towards an important blame-avoidance strategy that re-election 
seeking incumbents can employ.I will argue that even highly visible adjustment is 
feasible when incumbent governments have a high level of electoral loyalty among 
certain constituencies. Relying on what I will call partisan bias, these governments will 
have an incentive to shift a large part of retrenchment efforts onto their core 
constituencies in an effort to broaden their electoral appeal by sheltering tradtionally 
more hostile constituencies. The notion of partisan bias, in times of austerity, can thus 
create a Nixon-goes-to-China environment where the axe falls on those welfare 
programmes where one would least expect. 
 
I will proceed with my argument in the following structure. After reviewing the current 
state of the partisanship-welfare state nexus, section II will offer a more formal 
conceptualization of partisan bias in times of austerity leading up to my hypotheses to 
test. I will operationalize my data and measurement in section III. Section IV will offer 
an empirical analysis in a time-series-cross-section framework in an (unbalanced) set of 
25 OECD countries over  three decades. Section V concludes. 
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IV.2. The partisanship-welfare state nexus in an era of “permanent 
austerity” 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The role of partisanship in shaping the post-war consensus in economic and social 
policymaking has been long recognized. Left-wing governments have been widely 
acknowledged as chiefly responsible for ensuring full employment in face of adverse 
economic shocks, providing decommodification to workers, or expanding social 
programmes to the socially weak in an attempt to protect against various sources of 
social risks along the life-cycle (Hibbs, 1977; Cusack, 2001 ; Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Korpi, 1983). As slowing growth, structural unemployment, deindustrialization (Iversen 
and Cusack, 2000), increased pace of globalization(Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Jahn, 
2006)43, population aging and other concomitant social processes put an end to a period 
of welfare expansion in the 1970s, the importance of partisanship came under closer 
scrutiny(Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
 
In his seminal work on welfare-state resilience in the face of an international surge in 
conservative power44, Pierson (1994) provides a comprehensive analysis of how 
welfare-recipients managed to block retrenchment efforts by this ideological wave. The 
channels of this logic were twofold. On the one hand, mature welfare states created 
their own constituencies with vast organizational capacity (e.g. the Association of 
American Pensioners in the US) that survived the much diminished power of trade 
unions. These groups managed to garner sufficient popular support to block reform 
efforts. Secondly, as Pierson’s subsequent works emphasize, governments also 
recognized the “tremendous electoral risks” of retrenchment policies (Pierson, 1996, p. 
178). Even though their electoral mandate pointed towards welfare cuts, conservatives 
simply could not disregard such mobilization capacity of interest groups and the 
ensuing electoral verdict if they launched a radical assault on welfare programmes. The 
                                                 
43
 The so-called efficiency, or “race-to-the bottom” hypothesis, however, has been challenged from 
different angles (Rodrik 1997; Garrett 1998). 
44
 During the time of Pierson’s analysis, conservative governments reigned supreme in the US (Reagan 
administration), the UK (Thatcher-Major premierships), Germany (coalition governments led by Helmut 
Kohl) and a number of other countries. 
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New Politics literature thus generated two important research agendas to pursue for 
political economists. First, would permanent austerity really render partisanship 
irrelevant on the economic policy-making domain? Second, when governments 
occasionally do engage in retrenchment politics, are they doomed to suffer electoral 
punishment? 
 
In the decade following Pierson’s theorizing, the answer to the first question was a 
qualified no. Soon after the publication of the New Politics of the Welfare State 
(Pierson, 2001) some of the “Old Politics” factors have staged a spectacular revival. 
Kwon and Pontusson (2005), Bradley et al (2003) , Korpi and Palme (2003), Allan and 
Scruggs (2004), Swank (2005) have all provided evidence that partisanship continues to 
operate in the conventional way. Although a few critiques pointed to the instability of 
the effect of partisanship over time (Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Huber and Stephens, 
2001), the bias induced by neglecting the influential role of agrarian parties in 
Scandinavia (Manow, 2009), the pressure on social-democratic governments in 
corporatist settings to rely on regressive consumption taxation (Beramendi and Rueda, 
2007), the main thrust of the partisanship debate can be largely summarized as 
“partisanship still matters”. The welfare-state may have survived its conservative 
assault, but on the margin, left-wing governments have appeared its more reliable 
defendant nevertheless. 
 
There are doubts, however, about the validity of these “politics as usual” conclusions of 
welfare research. Political sociology has long recognized the rather dated 
conceptualization of what right-wing and left-wing constituencies are. Since Hibb’s 
(1977) influential theory on partisan cycles changing partisan constituencies have cast 
doubt on the neat alignment of partisan governments with issue-priorities. More 
specifically, the “decline of class voting” thesis is of paramount importance for 
partisanship debates. In Hobolt’s (2012) summary of “bottom-up” versus “top-down” 
accounts of changing class-voting in industrial democracies, the consensus that emerges 
is that due to different sources, class-voting has indeed declined in most countries over 
time. Whether due to ideological convergence by parties (Evans, 2000; Evans and Tilly, 
2011), or to changes in underlying policy preferences across the electoral space(Clark 
and Lipset, 1991; Kitschelt, 1994), the implication for contemporary party politics is 
one of discontinuity. If traditional party systems structured by historical cleavages 
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(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) give way to growing partisan fluidity, the politics as usual 
view of the “Old Politics” accounts on the welfare state is on a rather weak theoretical 
footing. Why should one expect the same partisan determinants to matter as they used 
to when the nature of constituencies underlying “Old Politics” accounts has undergone 
such dramatic changes?  
 
Regarding the expected electoral punishment, the fiscal adjustment literature has 
produced surprisingly inconclusive findings. Electoral constraints, as mentioned above, 
have been widely posited to act as an ultimate brake on governments to engage in 
welfare retrenchment. In line with the political budget cycle theories45, these 
expectations implicitly assume a fundamentally spending and/or deficit-prone median 
voter with a de-facto veto power over retrenchment policies. Yet, Alesina et al (1998; 
2012) convincingly show that fiscal adjustments episodes had little, if any, predictive 
power on the re-election prospects and within-cycle popularity of incumbent 
governments. In a similar vein, Brender and Drazen (2008) find no direct evidence for 
deficits – partly induced by social spending – helping incumbent popularity. Moreover, 
as subsequent contributions to this debate have confirmed (Ilera and Mulas-Granados, 
2001; Mulas-Granados, 2006; Von Hagen et al, 2002), the composition of adjustments 
has been a strong predictor of the duration and hence the political viability of 
adjustment efforts: cuts in transfer programmes and public wages, in contrast to public 
investment cuts and tax hikes, have led to more permanent debt stabilization 
programmes. While these contributions are largely silent on partisan dynamics driving 
the adjustment efforts, a related study by Alesina et al (2006) shows that when faced 
with fiscal crises, left-party governments tend to undertake adjustment earlier than their 
conservative counterparts. Not only do these findings suggest that elections may not 
necessarily spell the death knell of retrenching governments, but they also potentially 
shed light on an unexpected partisan dynamics at play.  
 
In fact, when one takes a closer look at these retrenchment periods, the frequency of   
consolidation efforts initiated by the left is striking. While a detailed analysis of 
retrenchment periods lies beyond the scope of this paper, a few well-known cases bring 
the point home. The Swedish Social Democrats long-tenure in power under the 
                                                 
45
 This literature is too voluminous to cite here at detail but see Drazen (2008) for a relatively recent 
review 
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premiership of Goran Persson following its banking and fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, 
New Zealand’s Labour governments under Helen Clark in the years preceding the Great 
Recession, Britain’s New Labour’s first term in office between 1997 and 2002, 
Denmark’s Social Democrat-led coalition governments in the second half of the 1990s 
all saw a significant reduction of social expenditure as a % of GDP even when the 
cyclical position of the economy is accounted for(OECD economic outlook database 
92, 2012). Not only were these and other episodes successful in stabilizing public 
finances but they also resonated well with the electorate who returned these 
governments to power in a number of consecutive occasions. 
 
In accounting for unexpected partisan policy-making in a rational-choice framework, a 
number of scholars pointed to the role of expectations and credibility deficits for parties 
of the left. Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) set up a formal model relying on imperfect 
information and credibility deficit to explain a number of empirical examples provided 
by the authors on different policy domains46. Adams (2001) explicitly invokes the idea 
of partisan biases to account for the highly volatile nature of policy stances by different 
political parties47. The underlying idea that governments want to appear distinguishable 
from their rivals because of voters’ partisan biases is again, rooted in the expectation 
that the same policies will trigger different electoral responses when implemented by 
different partisan governments. Kitschelt (2001) brings in the credibility of opposition 
parties as guardians of the welfare state to predict whether and how the left can deal 
with welfare pressures. Perhaps closest to the main thrust of this paper, Ross (2000, p. 
164) argues that the left has a credibility advantage in welfare reform because of its 
issue-association with welfare programmes that has been accumulated over more than 
half a century:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 The examples include stabilization and pro-market policies conducted by Latin American presidents 
elected on a populist platform as well as land for peace policies undertaken by hawkish Israeli leaders. 
47The author, however, does not predict “policy leapfrogging”, ie the left adopting more right-wing 
stances than the right, or vice versa. 
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“According to this logic, rightist parties should be more vulnerable in their 
retrenchment efforts than parties of the left—and especially so on explosive issues like 
welfare reform. The principal psychological mechanism conditioning voters’ response 
to issue-associations appears to be trust—specifically the opportunities trust provides 
for framing retrenchment initiatives in a manner that voters find acceptable if not 
compelling” 
 
As these insights suggest, credibility, partisan biases and trust seem to be crucial factors 
in welfare retrenchment debates. It also resonates well with the qualitatively different 
nature of welfare retrenchment, as Pierson (1998) himself recognized at the time that 
the first signs of Nixon-goes-to-China type of policy-action by social democrats began 
to materialize. The theory in the following section builds on this insight by allowing 
partisan biases to impact upon how far partisan governments can go in selling 
retrenchment policies to the electorate. 
 
 
Theory: preference polarization under partisan - biased constituencies 
 
Before incorporating the idea of partisan biases in parties’ strategic positions on a 
policy space, a basic conceptualization of permanent austerity with regards to welfare 
preferences of the electorate is in order. Importantly, I assume endogenous preferences 
by the electorate whereby their preferred welfare provision takes into account the 
possibility frontier defined by permanent austerity. Specifically, I make the assumption 
that in times of “normal” or “old” politics, electoral preferences will point toward an 
expansion of multiple welfare programmes. In times of retrenchment politics, however, 
recognizing the trade-off nature of welfare provision, electoral preferences will reflect 
the defence of one’s favoured program at the expense of the other(s).This assumption 
chimes in well with the seminal piece by Alesina and Drazen (1991) who elegantly 
model a war of attrition game where two constituencies attempt to shift the burden of 
adjustment onto the other side. Furthermore, this rather “selfish” characterization of 
voters stuck in a redistributive battle for scarce resources have been borne out by a 
number of different scholars in the social policy literature (see Busemeyer, 2012 and 
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Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009 with regards to education policy and public pensions, 
respectively)48. 
 
More specifically, assume government provides two public services (or two welfare 
programmes) in the political economy: X and Y49 with two distinct constituencies 
(group 1 and group 2) benefiting from them. Figure IV.1 is a stylized illustration of the 
pre-retrenchment period (left panel) compared to “permanent austerity” (right panel). In 
the first period, as high growth and low debt levels allowed the expansion of the welfare 
state without running into financial constraints, the two groups are expected to forge an 
alliance for the parallel expansion of the programmes: their preferences are relatively 
proximate. One can conceptualize this idea by regular (circular) indifference curves for 
two groups of voters: group 1 preferring higher provision in good X and group 2 
preferring higher level of provision in Y. Both groups, however, are willing to trade-off 
X for Y at similar rates at any given combination of X and Y. As a result, given the 
budget constraint of the welfare state, ideal points A and B are relatively close to each 
other.    
 
 
Once permanent austerity hits, the mutual expansion of spending programmes gives 
way to a distributional conflict between the two groups under a tighter budget 
constraint. Translating this into visual representation on the right-hand panel, 
indifference curves for the two groups are now very different. The most intuitive way to 
understand the new scenario is that for group 1 (2), a higher level of Y (X) is required 
to leave it at the same level of utility compared to the pre-retrenchment scenario. 
Alternatively, at any given combination of X and Y, the terms of trading off X for Y for 
the two groups will be sharply different. As a result, given the new budget constraint of 
the welfare state, the ideal points A’ and B’ will be further apart compared to the pre-  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 That said, some contending views argue that programme-specific support for welfare policies is far 
from automatic (Lynch and Myrskala, 2009) 
49
 For illustration’s sake, the two goods can be thought of as unemployment programmes for the working 
age and pension programmes for the retired population. 
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Figure IV.1 
Indifference curves and ideal points for two groups of voters during welfare-state 
building (left) and retrenchment (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next step in the analysis is translating this distributional conflict to a single-issue 
space for good X. The incumbent party – labelled S for social-democratic – tries to 
optimize its vote share among two groups, its traditional core constituency and a target 
group that it tries to sway over.  The groups are caught in a conflict on the provision of 
good X, as the core is interested in the good’s maintenance/expansion while the target is 
interested in its reduction in order to free up resources for its own preferred program. I 
assume the distribution of the two groups along the single-issue space is approximating 
a bimodal distribution with the two peaks located at the two groups’ “ideal points” of 
provision level50. Therefore, in Figure IV.2, the core constituency for party S has an 
ideal preference point Pc. The target constituency51 of party S has an ideal preference 
point Pt. The core constituency is the one with preferences towards the bottom-right 
corner of Figures IV.1 and IV.2 (point B, B*), in other words who benefit more from 
the provision of good Y. The target constituency is the one with preferences towards the 
upper-left corner in Figures IV.1 and IV.2 (point A, A*), in other words who prefer less 
provision of good Y to allow for increased provision in good X. 
                                                 
50
 The assumption of bimodal distribution follows from a stylized restriction of the electoral space to the 
two groups under analysis; since each group has a favoured program to defend, their preference 
distribution, following from Graph IV.1, will be polarized around the two ideal points. 
51
 I use the notion of target constituency to emphasize the idea that in order to increase its electoral 
support, the incumbent must make policy concessions to traditionally antagonistic groups. 
B’ 
Y, € 
X, € 
B 
A 
A’ 
X, € 
Y, € 
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Figure IV.2 
The preference distribution of two groups of voters on a single-issue space 
 
 
 
 
 
The incumbent government party’s vote-maximizing strategy is to find an ideal location 
along the issue space (ranging from less to more provision of good X). The farther it 
locates from the ideal preference point of its core (target) constituency the more votes it 
will lose among the respective constituencies. Specifically, I adopt a quadratic loss 
function for the vote share the government faces with a minor, but crucial modification. 
Building on the logic of  partisan bias, I assume that party S, the natural guardian of 
good X, enjoys positive (negative) partisan bias among the core (target) constituency 
because of its historical commitment (or ideology) to  the core group and its preferred 
program, X. In political terms, this idea can be expressed by an asymmetric evaluation 
of a policy shift by the core and the target group: if the government reduces the 
provision of good X, the core can expect that due to party S’s ties to the core, this shift 
doesn’t fully reflect S’s true preferences and it will thus revert back to more provision 
in the future. In a similar vein, being distrustful of S’s true preferences, the target group 
will reward S’s shift by a smaller vote gain compared to a similar shift undertaken by a 
traditionally less hostile party. The vote loss function of S can thus be expressed as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pc Pt S Pt’ 
+
 
- 
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F(V) = −	('> − S)2α −(
 − '?)2β 
 
where 0<α<1 and 2>β>1 are two partisan bias parameters to reflect the idea above52. 
The constraints of these parameters reflect the idea that the vote loss function can be 
either amplified (by β) or dampened (by α) as a function of the relative partisan biases 
of the ruling party among the two constituencies. By minimizing the loss function with 
respect to S, the first-order condition gives 
 
@A
@B = 2 (Pcα + Ptβ)  −	2(Sα + Sβ) = 0 
 
Which solves to: 
 
1) S =		CDE!CF	GE!G  
 
Comparing this result to a party with no partisan bias among the electorate (ie.	α =
1;,	β = 1) the vote loss function simplifies to: 
 
F(V) = −	('> − S)2−(
 − '?)2 
 
Which results in the solution of: 
 
2) S = CD!CF  
 
 
Which leads party S to locate exactly half-way between the two groups’ ideal points. 
To the extent permanent austerity sharpens the trade-off between the provision of two 
public goods, one can expect that austerity shocks trigger into redistributive preferences 
by moving Pt to the left towards Pt* on Figure IV.3, reflecting the target group’s 
attempt to safeguard its own preferred programme, Y. What happens to S’s vote 
                                                 
52
 The range of parameters α and β are constrained between 0 and 1 and 1 and 2, respectively as a matter 
of convenience to allow for a symmetric range around 1, a scenario with no partisan bias among either of 
the constituencies. 
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maximization location in response to a one-unit leftward shift of Pt? Under a 
government with no partisan bias among either of the constituencies, the result is 
straightforward from 2): S follows Pt by half a unit. However, once partisan bias is 
introduced, the impact on S’s new location is given by taking the first derivative of 1) 
with respect to Pt, resulting in:		 GE!G. It is easy to see that given the constraints of the 
partisan bias parameters, this fraction is strictly >			  and asymptotically converges to 1 
with β going to 2 and α going to 0. In other words, the austerity shock is expected to 
result in the greatest move against the core constituency when the incumbent 
government has high partisan bias (low α) among them. 
 
The result of this simple model suggests two hypotheses to test in the empirical section 
of this paper. The two hypotheses offer two different conceptualizations of permanent 
austerity. According to the first (baseline) hypothesis, austerity implies a permanent 
preference shift for voters (from Figure IV.1 to Figure IV.2) as they recognize the 
inevitable trade-off between the goods that the government delivers – in the present and 
the future. Put differently, voters will permanently abandon their prior expectation of 
welfare consensus on the mutual expansion of welfare programmes and will sharpen 
their defence of their preferred programmes. Alternatively, according to the second 
(conditional) hypothesis, voters’ preference change will follow the short-term 
exigencies of austerity politics. In other words, periods of retrenchment will reflect the 
preference alignment of Figure IV.2, but in times of relative prosperity, regular 
preferences will dictate no polarization between the two groups’ ideal points (Figure I) 
and hence no Nixon-goes-to-China effect. Stated more concisely, therefore: 
 
Hb: Since the mid-1970s, welfare retrenchment is guided by a Nixon-goes-to-China 
logic. Parties enjoying high degree of partisan bias among certain social groups are 
more likely to inflict pain on these groups when structuring their welfare budgets. 
 
Hc: Since the mid-1970s, governments occasionally had to surrender their 
commitments to welfare programmes in their effort to stabilize debt levels. Only in 
times of retrenchment do we observe a Nixon-goes-to-China logic, but when budgetary 
exigencies are absent traditional partisan effects dominate. 
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Operationalizing the partisan bias parameter and different fiscal periods as well as 
introducing our data and measurement will be the subject of the next section. 
 
 
IV.3. Partisan bias in times of “permanent austerity”: data and 
measurement 
 
 
As our literature review and theoretical propositions indicated, partisan biases could be 
crucial modifying factors in providing room for manoeuvre for certain political parties 
to engage in austerity politics when in government. The problem of course is that 
partisan biases are hard to observe. The simplest approach would be to rely on 
traditional party policy labels as the bulk of partisanship debate in welfare state research 
has done (Huber and Stephens, 2001, Alan and Scruggs, 2004). The obvious limitation 
of this approach is that as changing partisan constituencies have become of paramount 
concern in electoral research, so should our understanding of party families. It is not all 
that clear, for instance, that today’s social democratic parties still represent the same 
social interests as partisan models assumed (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). An alternative 
solution would be to look at policy stances of political parties based on electoral 
manifestos as a number of welfare scholars have done so(Kim and Fording, 2002; 
Haupt 2010;Ward et al;2011; Finseraas and Vernby, 2011 etc.). However, it is a highly 
dubious assumption whether occasional (written) emphases on certain issue priorities 
automatically translate into partisan loyalties that my argument requires for empirical 
testing. 
 
I therefore opt for yet another approach which relies on revealed preferences of voters. I 
argue that partisan biases should be reflected by the relative appeal of given parties to 
social groups. This relative appeal is measured by the vote share parties can expect to 
obtain among members of a given social group relative to the overall vote share in the 
population, based on annual opinion data from Eurobarometer and ISSP (details in 
Appendix 1).   
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More specifically, I constructed a group-specific relative support measure53 (RSP from 
here on), which is defined as follows: 
 
RSPgp=
KLMK?M
K?M  
 
Where Vgp and Vtp are the vote (intention) share of party P among social group G and 
and its total vote (intention) share, respectively. The logic behind this measure is that 
the deviation of group-specific support from overall support (numerator) is divided 
(standardized) by the overall strength of the party (denominator). A 5% vote share 
deviation from its overall support share is surely more important for a fringe party in a 
multiparty system than for a catch-all party in a two-party system. Standardizing by 
party strength thus ensures that group-specific deviation from overall support is 
measured relatively to the party’s overall strength. Accordingly, the obtained measure 
takes on the value 0 when the group-specific support share equals the overall support 
for the party. It takes on the value -1 when no member of the given group votes for the 
party. If the group-specific support is double that of the overall support, RSP will equal 
154. Therefore, an alternative reading of partisan bias is the extent to which parties are 
beholden to certain constituencies measured by the relative electoral support among 
them. 
 
With RSP thus defined, the next task is to pin down the social groups of interest. One 
concern was finding groups with clearly identifiable interest towards welfare 
programmes. Another was size: overly small groups’ (less than 5% of the electorate) 
electoral support is notoriously hard to reliably measure in electoral surveys. Moreover, 
including small groups in the analysis is also problematic for their likely limited 
electoral influence. My choice thus fell on three important voting constituencies that are 
comparable in size (each comprising around 20% of the voting population): pensioners, 
                                                 
53
 This is a modification of a popular measure in the class voting literature called the Alford Index, 
defined by the % of manual occupations voting left minus the % of non-manual occupations voting left 
(Alford, 1963).  While the Alfold Index could be modified to allow for more meaningful post-industrial 
occupational categories than the crude “manual” vs. “non-manual”  distinction, I argue that there are two 
other advantages of this new measure: first, it is party-specific, which is crucial for multiparty systems 
with more than one left parties. Second, it is standardized, ie. it takes into account the size of party in 
question. 
54
 While in theory RSP can exceed 1 (when the group-specific support is more than twice of the overall 
support) in the empirical distribution of the cases it is very seldom above 1. Therefore, it is practical and 
convenient to think of -1 and 1 as the lower and upper bounds of RSP. 
153 
 
low-/semi-skilled workers and the working-age middle and upper classes. The 
identification of pensioners was unproblematic as both survey series ask respondents 
about their current job status. Identifying the latter two groups was based on occupation 
categorizations in the two survey series (see Appendix 1 for details). 
 
According to traditional partisan approaches, the second and third of these groups 
should display more or less homogenous party preferences. More specifically the 
second group should be affiliated with social democratic parties while the third group 
should overwhelmingly support the conservatives and liberals. Figure IV.4 depicts the 
average RSP for workers and the middle-class for these three party-types over the time-
span of our analysis. 
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Figure IV.4 
Average RSP for workers (top row) and the  middle classes (middle and bottom 
rows) across their traditional party families* 
 
 
 
 
*Horizontal red lines indicate averages over the sample period 
Source: Eurobarometer, ISSP 55,  author’s calculation 
                                                 
55
 Accessed through Zacat-Gesis Online Study Catalogue ( http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ ), last 
accessed: 03/09/2013. 
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While the general pattern confirms partisan theory, the variation among parties in 
different countries is far from trivial. Average social-democratic/labour RSP for 
workers ranges from 0.58 in Luxemburg to -0.3 in Slovenia. Regarding the middle 
class’s alignment with conservative parties, their RSP ranges from 0.84 in Finland to  -
0.31 in New Zealand’s smaller conservative party. Liberal parties’ middle class RSP is 
in the positive territory with no exception, but the range is still remarkable: from 0.94 in 
Belgium to 0.03 for the Canadian liberals. This wide variation calls into doubt the 
analytical value of party family labels and suggests that even historically similar party 
types owe their mandate to a fundamentally different composition of electoral blocs 
today. 
 
Turning to the main dependent variable of our study, welfare retrenchment, a lively 
debate has emerged in empirical scholarship on how to best measure it. Allan and 
Scruggs (2004) cogently argue that looking at the policy parameters of welfare 
programmes (replacement rates, eligibility criteria etc.) is a superior measure of welfare 
retrenchment to conventional expenditure data, because as Esping-Andersen famously 
remarked, “it is hard to imagine that anyone struggled for spending per se” (1990, p.21). 
Green-Pedersen (2004), by contrast argues that what has become known as the 
“dependent variable problem” should be resolved by conceptualization rather than rules 
of thumb. Moreover, critics of spending measures (see Starke’s (2006) excellent review 
in this regard) often make the valid point that spending is driven by a number of 
structural developments in welfare states, such as aging, structural unemployment and 
deindustrialization (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Iversen and Cusack, 2000).  
 
 An appropriate choice of our dependent variable and the estimation strategy must take 
these considerations seriously. For our purposes, however, a number of other 
considerations weigh against these arguments. First, as the welfare regime literature 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, Iversen and Wren, 1998) has long emphasized, welfare 
services constitute a significant part of “welfare effort” in a number of welfare states, 
especially among the Nordic/Social-democratic types. Since spending data on cash and 
in-kind captures these services (elderly care facilities for instance) which the welfare 
entitlement measures relying on replace rates do not, the former constitutes a more 
encompassing and thus more appropriate measurement to use. Secondly, much of the 
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welfare retrenchment debate revolves around the goal of cost-containment (Pierson, 
2001; Starke, 2006) which, in contrast to Esping-Andersen’s famous remark above, is 
primarily a spending-related issue and hence not epiphenomenal to the study of interest 
as he argued (1990, p.19). In other words, if our primary object of interest is welfare 
retrenchment in the context of (permanent) austerity, expenditure outcomes per se are 
of high conceptual relevance for this study. On a related note, a lot of retrenchment 
reforms do not directly impact on the welfare of current beneficiaries (a rise in the 
retirement age would be a typical example) and hence do not show in current 
expenditure outcomes. However, since my constituency-based partisanship measure 
(see the foregoing discussion) relies on current beneficiaries of welfare programmes, it 
is important to prioritize those reforms in my empirical measures that actually affect 
these groups (e.g. changed pension indexation formula). Expenditure measures go a 
long way in taking this consideration into account. Thirdly, in response to the valid 
concern on demand- as opposed to policy-driven spending outcomes, careful control 
variables (see a more detailed discussion below) on these structural drivers (the 
population share of the elderly group with regards to pension spending for instance) are 
easily available and applicable for quantitative analysis, allowing the researcher to clean 
the estimate of theoretical interest of the confounding effect of these structural driving 
forces.  Last but not least, expenditure data is widely available, expanding the empirical 
horizon to countries and time periods that are not covered by the commonly used 
entitlement datasets. 
 
Accordingly, I chose programme-specific expenditure data as the dependent variable of 
interest. As previously mentioned, one of the main considerations in defining social 
groups was to clearly align them with welfare programmes where they have a vested 
interest. For the first group, the pensioner population, old age pension expenditure is an 
obvious program that satisfies this criterion. Workers face a number of risks along the 
life-cycle so it less obvious which program they are most prepared to defend. I argue 
that given the occupation categories that constitute this group in this study, 
unemployment is probably the most prominent of these risks: a shrinking 
manufacturing base in advanced economies, global competition, structural employment, 
dualized labour markets (Rueda, 2005) etc. all expose this low-skilled group to the risk 
of job loss (Rehm, 2011). I thus chose unemployment benefits as the core program of 
workers. The middle and upper classes’ welfare interests is by itself a problematic 
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notion, because being located at the upper end of the income echelon, they are 
predominantly net contributors to redistributive programmes56. The main reason for 
their inclusion in the study is to see whether the theoretical expectations can be 
extended to the financing side of the welfare state. Hence I included total tax revenues 
as the middle class’s main redistributive interest.  
 
In addition to these core measures, I also adopt a broader measure for the first two 
groups that take into account other welfare programmes that are potentially relevant for 
their interest. For pensioners, the broader measure includes health expenditure and 
survivor benefits. The elderly are frequent users of healthcare facilities, regular 
consumers of subsidized drugs as well as the main beneficiaries of survivor 
programmes. For workers, these complementary programmes largely address what the 
welfare state literature identifies as “new social risks” in the post-industrial economy 
(Hauserman, 2010; Bonoli, 2005): measures to fight structural unemployment by 
activation policies, family policies to ease women’s entry and re-entry in the labour 
force after child-bearing and so on. I thus included active labour market policies, 
incapacity and family benefits because these policies primarily target working age 
individuals. Given their relatively low-income status, family and incapacity benefits are 
probably important complements to workers’ income especially when faced with 
temporary income loss due to sickness, maternity/paternity leave, etc. Active labour 
market policies in turn can increase reemployment opportunities for workers faced with 
a high risk of job loss and a generally higher risk profile in their sector of employment 
(Cusack et al, 2006).  
 
To summarize, the core dependent variables of interest are old age pensions, 
unemployment benefits and tax revenues for pensioners, workers and the middle-class, 
respectively. The broader measure for the first two groups will additionally include 
health care expenditure and survivor benefits for pensioners and incapacity, family 
benefits and active labour market policies for workers. 
 
                                                 
56
 Some authors, however, drew attention to the insurance rather than the redistributive functions of 
welfare programmes to highlight the fact that the two functions offer different expectations on the 
distribution of welfare interests (Moene and Wallterstein, 2001; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008) 
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The final variable of main interest to discuss is the fiscal consolidation variable. The 
second hypothesis addresses the possibility that the era of “permanent austerity” should 
not be taken as a coherent whole but rather as extended efforts to stabilize/bring down 
debt levels interspersed with times with less pressure on public budgets. There is, of 
course, considerable cross-national variation as well in the extent to which 
characterizing the last three to four decades as permanent austerity is appropriate. 
Recognizing this heterogeneity I followed Alesina and Ardagna’s (2009) approach who 
identify large fiscal efforts by changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of the 
general government (capb). Specifically, they separate their empirical sample into three 
periods: 1) consolidation periods, where the capb increases by more than 1.5% of 
potential GDP; 2) expansion periods, where the capb drops by at least 1.5% of potential 
GDP 3) “neutral” periods in between. While the 1.5% threshold, as any other, is 
admittedly arbitrary, the advantage of this relatively high threshold is to rule out 
idiosyncratic and one-off changes in the fiscal stance. Setting the threshold high allows 
the researcher to pin down periods where changes in the fiscal stance most probably 
result from well-designed and adequately prepared policy actions of the government. In 
addition to measuring adjustment periods through these consolidation and expansion 
dummies, I also introduce the capb variable in a continuous form to test my second 
hypothesis in a linear form. 
 
In addition to the main variables of theoretical interests, a number of control variables 
will be essential for the analysis. Most importantly, structural developments driving 
program-specific expenditure outcomes have to be correctly specified. First, as 
expenditure data is expressed as a % of GDP, GDP growth has to be accounted for to 
take into account the denominator effect. Moreover, growth has an indirect effect on 
expenditure data as the cyclical position of the economy affects the pool of 
beneficiaries of welfare claimants. For the financing side, it is well known that much of 
the tax intake (both direct and indirect taxes) is highly sensitive to cyclical swings in 
economic growth. Secondly, unemployment will be taken into account for the worker-
related specifications because it increases the pool of unemployed, directly impacting 
unemployment benefits and indirectly other welfare expenditure for the working age. 
Unemployment can also exert a detrimental effect on public revenues, in addition to the 
effects of growth, by shrinking the direct tax base. Hence I also included the 
unemployment variable for the tax specifications. For pensioners-related expenditure, in 
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turn, aging will be controlled for in the form of the % of elderly (people aged above 60) 
in the population. In addition to these structural developments, a political party family 
control will be used to disentangle the effects of partisan biases (RSP) from the 
traditional effects of ideology (party families). Although the descriptive analysis above 
has shown that RSP is by no means just an equivalent measure for party family labels, I 
nevertheless control for party families to purge the estimates from the possibly 
confounding effects of ideology.  
 
In addition to these controls, a number of further variables could be of potential 
theoretical interest. One  a common theme in the welfare retrenchment literature is the 
varying degree of leeway different incumbent governments have in enacting policy 
change (Obinger, 2002; Tsebelis, 2002, Bonoli, 2001). A large number of veto players – 
coalition partners, second chambers, presidential veto etc. – can create policy deadlock 
even when the government’s partisan leaning (ie. its constituency composition) is 
otherwise favourable towards welfare retrenchment. Hence I included a political 
constraint index (POLCON III) index (Henisz, 2006), a popular composite index 
ranging between 0 and 1 to capture the political constraint that a government faces at 
any point in time. Furthermore, another important theme in the welfare retrenchment 
literature is the impact economic integration and globalization have on welfare state 
stability. To adjudicate between two competing claims on the directional effect of 
globalization in the empirical literature57, I included a sub-component of the popularly 
used Dreher index that captures economics flows and restrictions on movements of 
goods, services and capital (Dreher, 2006). Finally, I included an EMU dummy to pick 
up the potentially constraining effect of the currency union on public budgets and hence 
on welfare programmes. However, none of these additional control variables were 
remotely close to achieving statistical significance in any of the models so I discarded 
them from the final analysis. 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of this article, a final note on the partisan 
variables is in order. The welfare state literature, as a rule, measured incumbency by 
incorporating all parties holding cabinet portfolios. This is warranted on the grounds 
that government portfolios offer the primary tools for parties to affect policy. It is not 
                                                 
57
 See Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) for an excellent summary, literature review and empirical re-
examination of the so-called “efficiency” and “compensation” hypotheses. 
160 
 
all that clear, however, that a numerical (%) measure of junior coalition parties is 
appropriate to determine their influence on welfare decisions: a small coalition partner 
controlling the environmental and the transport ministry, for instance may have 
considerably less policy-making power than one controlling welfare-related portfolios. 
Focusing on the leading government party is thus arguably a safer choice because the 
control over the premiership and the finance ministry58 (typically the case for large 
senior coalition members) gives the leading party considerable, if not predominant 
leverage in acting according to its own welfare preferences. Moreover, the clarity-of-
responsibility thesis in electoral research (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Duch and 
Stevenson, 2008) has consistently shown that senior parties are held more responsible 
for electoral outcomes, hence their strategic incentives for Nixon-goes-to-China policy-
making should be also sharper. Finally, reliably measuring group-specific RSP from 
electoral surveys is extremely difficult for small parties due to the limited (sub)sample 
size. Although the omission of coalition partners should be kept in mind as a possible 
limitation, these considerations suggest that focusing on leading parties is a reasonable 
choice. 
 
 
 
IV.4. Empirical analysis: Nixon-goes-to-China in times of welfare 
retrenchment 
 
 
To begin the discussion on specification issues for the empirical analysis, I lay out the 
general time series-cross section model to be estimated, taking the general form of: 
 
 
Yit = β0 +∑ - ∗ N-/   + αi+ µ t + eit 
 
                                                 
58
 Although traditional models on portfolio allocation (Laver and Shepsle, 1990) assumed a great degree 
of ministerial autonomy, a large number of countries have taken radical steps towards strengthening the 
role of finance ministers in the allocation of public funds (Hallerberg et al, 2009) 
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Where Yit is the endogenous (dependent) variable of the model,		∑ - ∗ N-/   is a vector 
of k regressors (may or may not including lagged dependent variable(s) to account for 
dynamics), αi, µ t are unit- and time-specific intercepts and eit is an observation-specific 
error term. The observations are taken from a sample of 25 OECD countries – including 
5 new member states of the European Union – over more than 3 decades (1975-2007)59 
that largely covers the period of “permanent austerity”. 
 
The first concern that immediately arises is to what extent the main variable of our 
interest, RSP can be regarded as exogenous so that the weak exogeneity assumption – 
E(Xiteit) = 0 – holds. If that assumption is violated, the estimated parameters of interest 
will be biased. Theoretically, we have strong expectation to assume that the 
contemporaneous RSP and expenditure data are mutually endogenous, as the relative 
party support among different constituencies may very well depend on welfare 
spending decisions. To circumvent this possibly severe endogeneity bias, I “fixed” my 
RSP measure to the year that a new government comes to power. For the entire term of 
the incoming government, the group-specific RSP will reflect the preceding four years’ 
average of the RSP measure at the beginning of the term60. This static RSP measure 
along the government term can thus be understood to reflect the constellation of relative 
support levels by groups that the government owes its mandate to. It may still be 
questionable whether the prior RSP observations are exogenous (if a party’s rhetoric in 
opposition, for instance, turns against a spending program, the beneficiaries may turn 
against the party even before coming to power), but measuring RSP from the pre-
incumbency period is a theoretically informed way to capture the notion of a 
government’s “electoral mandate” and goes a long way in addressing endogeneity 
concerns61. 
 
                                                 
59
 In practice, program-specific expenditure data is available from 1980 only, so that serves the starting 
point for all panels. Moreover, for some of the countries in the sample have different availabilities for 
expenditure data and electoral surveys, resulting in an unbalanced panel for the analysis. 
60
 Taking a four-year average as opposed to just the annual observation when the government comes to 
power helps to reduce sampling error which would pose serious problems if RSP was measured based on 
a single electoral survey. The four-year moving average RSP series are thus considerably smoother than 
the very noisy “base” series. The window of four rather than some other moving average window was 
chosen to reflect the length of a typical electoral cycle. 
61Moreover, to the extent that a positive endogeneity bias may still be present in the estimates 
(expectations of program-specific cuts resulting in lower relative group-specific RSP), the estimated 
negative coefficients will understate the true effect, rather than inflate it. 
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A second important theoretical consideration is the functional form of the dependent 
variables. While level specifications are usually interpreted as models predicting “long-
run” effects, first-difference specifications are better suited to capture “short-run” 
dynamics. For our purposes, it is the latter aspect that we mostly care about: to what 
extent do incumbent governments adopt retrenchment policies – often in the face of 
financial pressures to take urgent decisions – as a function of their electoral 
constituencies. Moreover, as Kittel and Winner (2005) discussed in their re-analysis of 
Garrett and Mitchell’s (2001) public expenditure data, the level form of these series can 
be often non-stationary with a coefficient of the autoregressive term being very close to 
unity. First differencing the dependent variable thus also has a technical advantage 
wherein the risk of running spurious regressions is minimized. As for the structural 
predictors (old age ratio, unemployment and growth) the first two of these entered with 
a first-differenced format in the specifications, but I left growth – which is theoretically 
speaking a “change variable” itself – in its level form to control for the denominator 
effect. The political variables (RSP and party types) were introduced in levels62. 
 
The first step of my estimation strategy was to investigate unit (and time) heterogeneity 
by testing for inclusion of fixed effects (αi and µ t) in the models. If unobserved unit-
/time-specific characteristics – and hence the error terms – are correlated with our 
regressors, the estimated coefficients will suffer from omitted variable bias. However, 
in the absence of this source of bias, a random-effects model is preferable as it allows 
for more precise (more efficient) estimates. First, I began with the inclusion of time-
dummies because of well-known periods of time-specific shocks (e.g. Maastricht 
process) that simultaneously affected many countries in the sample. Predictably, an F-
test on the joint significance of these time dummies (p<0.001 in all cases) allows us to 
convincingly reject the null hypothesis of no time-specific effects. As for unit-
heterogeneity, F tests for different dependent variables and models provided mixed 
results: for unemployment benefit programmes, for instance, there is no evidence for 
unit-specific effects; for tax revenues, the joint effect of country dummies is marginally 
significant; for old age spending, the effect is highly significant. I thus proceeded to a 
set of Hausman tests to check whether the more efficient random effects estimator is 
                                                 
62
 Unlike with the structural variables where it is theoretically justified to expect that “changes drive 
changes”, political variables have a different logic: government continuity – hence non-changing RSP 
and party family variables – is very well compatible with changing expenditure outcomes. 
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also consistent63 (the H0 of the test). These tests unambiguously indicated that where 
unit-specific effects are present (e.g. for old-age spending), these effects are not 
correlated with the regressors, hence the omission of fixed effects to gain a more 
efficient random effects estimator is warranted. That said, I will provide fixed effects 
specifications as robustness check in section 5 to examine the stability of the findings. 
 
With these random effects specifications – with time dummies – as our benchmark, I 
proceeded to test for violations of the standard Gauss-Markov conditions(Beck, 2001) 
under which regular standard errors of individual coefficients may be severely inflated, 
yielding invalid test results. The first possible source of these violations is panel 
heteroskedasticity whereby residuals from different panels have unequal variances. This 
is a highly plausible scenario because countries with higher levels of program-specific 
spending are expected to display higher fluctuations (annual changes) around the mean. 
These expectations were confirmed both by a visual inspection of residuals (large 
differences across units) and a modified Wald-test which strongly rejected the null 
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors across units (p<0.001). Proceeding to the 
covariances of the residuals, valid standard error estimates require independence across 
the rows in the variance-covariance matrix of the errors (no contemporaneous 
correlation) as well as in the columns (no autocorrelation in panels). Based on a Pesaran 
test, most of the models appear to be contaminated by contemporaneous correlation 
(test results are provided in Appendix 4). First order serial correlation64, on the other 
hand was detected only in the unemployment benefit series, indicating that changes in 
unemployment benefit programmes have a high degree of “stickiness”. In other words, 
a given change in unemployment benefit schemes is likely to entail a similar change in 
the next period. To model this feature of the unemployment benefit data, I included a 
lagged dependent variable in the specifications. Regressing residuals on past residuals 
after this LDV specification showed no remaining serial correlation in the data.  
 
                                                 
63
 The more technical null hypothesis that the Hausman specification test tests against is whether the unit- 
(country-) specific effects are correlated with the regressors, which would render the random effects or 
fully pooled OLS estimates biased (Bartels, 2008). 
64
 A Wooldridge (Lagrange Multiplier) test was used to test against the null hypothesis of no first order 
serial correlation in the data. 
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Equipped with these diagnostic results65, I estimated the random effects models 
correcting for panel-heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation, using panel-
corrected standard errors as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) as a superior alternative 
to the FGLS-based Parks method. 
 
 
 
Table IV.1 
Models explaining old-age spending in OECD countries† 
 Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
RSP_pensioners -0.215 -0.249 -0.343 -0.204 
 (2.79)*** (4.37)*** (4.71)*** (5.23)*** 
growth -0.042 -0.038 -0.045 -0.043 
 (3.32)*** (3.39)*** (3.82)*** (3.67)*** 
∆oldage 39.712 39.261 36.847 37.266 
 (5.57)*** (4.19)*** (4.21)*** (4.79)*** 
conservative  -0.061 -0.046 -0.048 
  (1.49) (1.10) (1.27) 
christdem  0.044 0.049 0.041 
  (1.44) (1.50) (1.27) 
liberal  -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) 
other  -0.100 -0.083 -0.077 
  (2.34)** (2.15)** (1.91)* 
Consolidation   -0.072  
   (1.68)*  
Expansion   -0.011  
   (0.25)  
RSP_pensioners*Consolidation   0.238  
   (2.19)**  
RSP_pensioners*Expansion    0.854  
   (4.50)***  
∆capb    -0.020 
    (2.45)** 
RSP_pensioners* ∆capb    -0.091 
    (2.54)** 
R2 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.25 
N 489 415 392 392 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are  random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
 
Table IV.1 summarizes the main findings on old-age spending (time dummies 
suppressed from this and all subsequent outputs). The baseline model shows that 
structural variables are important determinants of spending outcomes: higher growth 
and a larger increase in the ratio of the elderly decreases and increases the share of 
output devoted to old age expenditure, respectively. By contrast, the Henisz index, our 
                                                 
65
 All diagnostic test results are provided in Appendix 4 
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proxy for veto players in the political systems,  did not achieve statistical significance in 
any of the models hence I omitted it from the final analysis.  
 
The main variable of interest, pensioner-specific RSP is highly significant in the 
expected (negative) direction. Looking at the extended model with party family 
controls, the only noteworthy finding is the non-significance of most party family 
variables66. Only the “other” category (comprising very few cases where the leading 
party did not belong to any of the four major party families) displays significant 
differences compared to the benchmark, social-democratic category. Introducing the 
interactive models, the estimates largely lend support to the second hypothesis. 
Regarding Alesina and Ardagna’s (2009) approach, the RSP variable’s marginal effect 
in different time periods are depicted on Figure IV.5. The point estimates of the RSP 
variable are negative in both neutral and consolidation periods, consistent with the 
conditional hypothesis, but turn positive in times of fiscal expansion. In other words, 
only in times of relative prosperity do incumbents reward their own constituencies 
while in more austere periods, the Nixon-goes-to-China effect holds. 
 
Figure IV.5 
Marginal effects with point estimates and 95% confidence interval for the 
RSP_pensioner variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model I  
 
                                                 
66
 Social democratic parties were omitted as the reference category in all models. 
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The same pattern emerges from the second interactive model where the capb variable is 
interacted with the RSP measure in a continuous form. Point estimates and confidence 
intervals for different annual changes in the capb are shown on Figure IV.6.   Once the 
annual change in the capb is greater than -1 of potential GDP, incumbents with higher 
relative support among pensioners cut old-age spending more (expand it less) than 
incumbents with lower relative support among pensioners. 
 
Figure IV.6 
Marginal effects with point estimates and 95 % confidence interval for the 
RSP_pensioner variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model II 
 
 
 
Proceeding to unemployment benefits programmes, Table IV.2 presents the main 
findings. Since we are including the lagged dependent variable among the set of 
regressors to take into account autocorrelation and dynamics, the coefficient estimates 
now have a slightly different reading. The estimates for the exogenous variables only 
provide the instantaneous effect; to understand the long-run effect, one has to take into 
account the effect of the regressors on the partial adjustment process in the dependent 
variable via the autoregressive term (Kittel and Winner, 2005). The long-run 
relationship between X and Y will be given by:  where β2 and β1 are the estimated 
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coefficients on the exogenous and the autoregressive term, respectively (Beck and Katz, 
2011). 
 
 
Table IV.2 
Models explaining unemployment-benefit spending in OECD countries† 
 Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.∆unemploymentbenefits 0.303 0.337 0.292 0.295 
 (7.43)*** (11.09)*** (9.79)*** (9.59)*** 
RSP_workers -0.046 -0.062 -0.127 -0.063 
 (1.79)* (6.02)*** (8.03)*** (4.41)*** 
growth -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
 (2.07)** (0.60) (1.11) (0.99) 
∆unemployment 0.055 0.054 0.057 0.058 
 (6.41)*** (9.91)*** (9.41)*** (9.32)*** 
conservative  0.037 0.032 0.033 
  (3.73)*** (3.32)*** (3.21)*** 
christdem  0.029 0.033 0.031 
  (2.82)*** (3.45)*** (3.01)*** 
liberal  0.064 0.065 0.064 
  (4.66)*** (4.64)*** (4.56)*** 
other  -0.044 0.037 0.032 
  (1.46) (1.14) (0.88) 
Consolidation   -0.011  
   (0.80)  
Expansion   0.041  
   (2.26)**  
RSP_workers*Consolidation   0.124  
   (2.66)***  
RSP_workers*Expansion   0.281  
   (3.05)***  
∆capb    -0.003 
    (0.68) 
RSP_workers* ∆capb    -0.007 
    (0.44) 
R2 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.53 
N 472 397 375 375 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
 
As it can be seen from table IV.2, in all three models the effect of worker-specific RSP 
is statistically significant in the expected direction (albeit only marginally so in the 
baseline model).  The long-run relationship between RSP and the dependent variable, 
however is considerably greater than the point estimates. Calculating from the extended 
model, for instance,   implies a long-run effect of -0.09% of GDP, augmenting the 
short-run (instant) effect by a factor of 1/3. In other words, while moving from an 
incumbent with -0.5 RSP among workers to one with 0.5 among them implies an 
instantaneous cut in unemployment benefits amounting to 0.06% GDP, the full effect 
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felt over the years (assuming unchanged incumbency and values of other variables in 
the model) increases to 0.09%. In contrast to the pension models, the party family 
variables are significant at the 1% level with the surprising finding that christian-
democrats, liberals and conservatives all cut the program less (or expand it more) than 
their social-democratic rivals. That said, the Nixon-goes-to-China phenomenon holds 
even after controlling for these party families: the RSP coefficient, if anything, 
increases in size and significance when party families are taken into account. Similar to 
the pensioner models, while structural variables – growth and the change in 
unemployment rates – are highly significant in the expected direction, the political 
constraints index as a proxy for the political opportunity space to enact retrenchment is 
non-significant and therefore I omitted it from the final specifications. 
 
Turning to the interactive models, a qualitatively similar pattern emerges to the 
pensioner models. Figure IV.7 shows the point estimates and 95% confidence interval 
for the RSP_worker variable under different fiscal stances. Again, the point estimates 
suggest that only during times of fiscal expansion do incumbents reward their low-
skilled working age constituency when they enjoy high relative support among them. 
That said, the estimate marginally falls short of significance at the 5% level. The point 
estimate is slightly below 0 during times of consolidation and is both substantially and 
statistically highly significant in neutral times. On the other hand, no interactive effect 
is found in the second interactive specification: while the interaction between the capb 
and the RSP variable is signed in the expected (negative) direction, the point estimate is 
very close to 0 and non-significant. 
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Figure IV.7 
Marginal effects with point estimates and 95 % confidence interval for the 
RSP_worker variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model I  
  
 
Turning to the financing side of the welfare state, the third set of models tests the 
middle class’s affiliation with the leading incumbent party as a possible determinant of 
tax changes. Here we are reverting back to a static specification as no autocorrelation 
was detected with the diagnostic tests. Table IV.3 shows the model estimates. 
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Table IV.3 
Models explaining tax revenues in OECD countries† 
 
Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
RSP_middleclass 0.075 0.049 -0.105 0.030 
 (0.79) (0.37) (1.12) (0.45) 
growth -0.133 -0.148 -0.080 -0.091 
 (5.12)*** (5.73)*** (3.61)*** (4.17)*** 
∆unemployment -0.276 -0.292 -0.235 -0.239 
 (7.07)*** (9.40)*** (9.03)*** (8.42)*** 
conservative  -0.083 -0.122 -0.132 
  (1.14) (1.65)* (1.84)* 
christdem  -0.086 -0.112 -0.130 
  (1.06) (1.60) (2.07)** 
liberal  -0.164 -0.169 -0.185 
  (1.76)* (2.03)** (2.34)** 
other  -0.227 -0.271 -0.301 
  (1.32) (2.69)*** (3.09)*** 
Consolidation   0.772  
   (8.78)***  
Expansion   -0.806  
   (8.90)***  
RSP_middleclass*Consolidation   -0.109  
   (0.50)  
RSP_middleclass*Expansion   1.051  
   (3.82)***  
∆capb    0.212 
    (13.67)*** 
RSP_middleclass*∆capb    -0.151 
    (2.89)*** 
     
R2 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.32 
N 601 514 474 475 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
 
Compared to the two welfare programmes, the Nixon-goes-to-China hypothesis 
receives much weaker support on the revenue side. The estimated sign of the middle 
class-specific RSP is positive (larger increases in the tax burden under middle-class 
parties) as predicted but the effect is substantively small and non-significant. The 
structural variables, as in the previous models, behave according to expectations: higher 
growth and lower unemployment increase tax revenues. The coefficients for the party 
family variables from the extended model do not achieve significance with the 
exception of liberal parties that seem to cut taxes more (raise them less) compared to 
social-democrats. Even this coefficient, however, is just marginally significant at the 
10% level. Turning to the interactive model, we receive opposite patterns to what we 
have estimated for core welfare state recipients (pensioners and workers). From both 
interactive models, it seems that middle class parties shelter their constituency from tax 
hikes compared to other parties in times of consolidation, albeit the point estimate is not 
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significant. Moreover, in times of fiscal expansion, incumbents with high relative 
support among the middle classes increase the tax burden more (cut it less) than 
incumbents with less support among this group (Figure IV.8). In other words, in 
contrast to our conditional hypothesis, it is times of fiscal expansions, rather than 
austerity, when middle-class parties seem to enact policies that are less favourable to 
their core constituencies. The same conclusion results from the second interactive 
model when the capb variable is introduced in a continuous form (Figure IV.9). 
 
 
Figure IV.8 
Marginal effects with point estimates and 95 % confidence interval for the 
RSP_middleclass variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model I* 
 
*Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are depicted for the three episodes separately 
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Figure IV.9 
Marginal effects (in % of GDP) with point estimates and 95 % confidence interval 
for the RSP_middleclass variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive 
model II 
 
 
  
 
To sum up our findings thus far, plenty of evidence for the baseline Nixon-goes-to-
China hypothesis (Hb) has been found. Most importantly, in all our models on the two 
core welfare programmes, high relative support among the main beneficiaries is 
associated with deeper cuts (smaller expansions) in the respective programmes. For the 
financing side of the welfare state, however, while the estimated signs do point in the 
right direction, the statistical evidence has been weak. As far as the conditional version 
of the Nixon-goes-to-China hypothesis (Hc) is concerned, the evidence holds, albeit in 
varying degrees, for the core welfare clienteles: pensioners and workers. By contrast, 
the middle-classes seem to fare worse during incumbents that are popular among them 
in times of relative prosperity (fiscal expansions) only, contrary to what the conditional 
hypothesis predicted. 
 
Do these findings extend to a broader understanding of group-specific interests? As a 
first robustness check of our prior results, the same models have been re-estimated for 
the broader welfare categories for pensioners and workers, respectively. For welfare 
programmes representing a broader set of pensioners’ interest – including health and 
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survivor benefits – the results (shown in Appendix 2)67 are not qualitatively different 
from the core models68. The size of the estimated coefficients is larger (probably 
reflecting the larger size of this broader set of programmes) and they are significant at 
the 5% level in all the models. Moreover, both interactive models indicate an almost 
identical pattern on the conditioning impact of the fiscal stance to the core models. 
Turning to workers-related programmes, the baseline model provides similarly strong 
evidence for the first hypothesis as the core models did. In the extended model, when 
party family labels are included, the estimated coefficient for workers’ RSP now falls 
short of significance at the 5% level (however it is still significant at the 10% level). 
The interactive models, on the other hand lend little support to the conditional 
hypothesis:  the point estimates are below 0 in all three types of fiscal episodes. 
Similarly, in the second interactive model, while the point estimate of the interaction 
turn is in the expected (negative) direction, it fails to achieve statistical significance. 
 
Returning to our core models, a further round of robustness check examined the 
stability of the estimated coefficients after fixed-effect estimations. As the tables in 
Appendix 2show, the substantive results hold after restricting the analysis to within-
country variation under the fixed-effect estimates. The estimated size of the RSP 
coefficient is halved in the pension models but still achieves significance at the 5% 
level in the extended model. The worker-specific RSP is practically the same in size 
and significance terms compared to the random-effects estimates for unemployment 
benefits. Finally, the tax models’ RSP coefficient for the middle class even increases 
compared to the random-effects specifications but still falls short of statistical 
significance with the partial exception of the baseline model where the middle class’s 
RSP is marginally significant at the 10% level. As far as the interactive specifications 
are concerned, the general patterns and the strength of the statistical evidence are 
broadly similar to the random effects models. It seems, therefore, that our main results 
obtained earlier are unlikely to be driven by omitted country-specific characteristics that 
the random-effects models failed to capture. 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Marginal effects plot for models on the broader spending items are available upon request 
68
 Contrary to the core models, I was now unable to reject no first-order serial correlation with this new 
dependent variable (p<0.05). I thus included a lagged dependent variable which, however, did not 
substantively change the coefficients of interest. 
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IV.5. Conclusions 
 
 
How partisanship shapes welfare preferences of different incumbent governments has 
long been one of the primary interests of welfare state scholars. Electoral considerations 
in most of these accounts have been implicit at best with highly pessimistic 
expectations: welfare state retrenchment should be inherently unpopular so even 
conservative governments with a clear electoral mandate often shy away from it. My 
paper has offered an alternative view which attempts to bridge the gap between these 
expectations and contrary findings of the fiscal adjustment literature. Building on the 
qualitatively different nature of retrenchment politics inspired by the New Politics 
literature, I argued that once partisan biases behind different governments are taken into 
account, one can make sense of high re-election probabilities of retrenching 
governments. Specifically, I set out to test the hypothesis that high relative support 
propensity among certain social groups leads to deeper cuts (more limited expansions) 
of welfare programmes that primarily serve the interests of these groups. My analysis 
extended the same logic to the financing side of the welfare state as well to test whether 
middle-class parties are better positioned to raise taxes in times of “permanent 
austerity”. 
 
Our findings from a set of 25 OECD countries provided strong support for the baseline 
hypothesis (Hb). Over recent decades, high relative support among pensioners have, on 
average, been associated with deeper cuts (more limited expansions) in public pension 
programmes on the one hand and in a broader set of welfare entitlements – health care 
and survivor benefits – on the other. A similar pattern has been found for welfare 
programmes that primarily benefit low-status working age individuals. A high relative 
support propensity among them has been associated, on average, with deeper cuts (more 
limited expansions) in unemployment programmes on the one hand, and in a broader set 
of welfare programmes – family benefits, incapacity benefits and active labour market 
policies – on the other. Much weaker evidence has been found on the financing side of 
the welfare state: although high relative support among the middle classes is, on 
average, associated with larger increases in tax revenue in our sample, the statistical 
evidence for it has been too weak to infer anything conclusive about it.  
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A second hypothesis (Hc) investigated whether this effect is uniform over time or 
whether it holds only in periods when retrenchment pressure is perceived particularly 
acute. On the balance, the evidence have been mixed in this regard: for our core welfare 
measures – unemployment benefits, and old age pension expenditure  - during fiscal 
expansions incumbents appear to compensate their core constituencies for painful 
policies they inflict on them in hard times. If anything, however, the opposite pattern 
seems to hold for the financing side of the welfare state, which presents new and 
intriguing research agendas ahead. 
 
In addition to these main findings, one important contribution to the welfare state 
debate that this paper had to offer was a reconsideration of partisanship. In the models 
that controlled for party family labels, the estimated impact of group-specific support 
propensity has been at least as strong as in the baseline models. Taken together with the 
descriptive patterns offered in an earlier section of this paper, we can confidently state 
that traditional party family labels lump together a highly diverse set of parties as far as 
their underlying electoral constituencies are concerned. It would be thus fruitful for 
future empirical investigations of partisanship to take into account this electoral 
heterogeneity both across and within party families. 
 
A second conclusion – in the footsteps of Schelkle (2012), among others - that follows 
from this is the need for a more disaggregated view of the welfare state than has been 
often the case in many empirical works. Highly aggregate variables, such as social 
spending or general government expenditures give us little guidance for times of severe 
budgetary trade-offs when the expansion/maintenance of a given social program may 
inevitably entail cuts in another one. The evolution of program-specific spending (or the 
institutional parameters – eligibility criteria, replacement rates etc. – that define the 
functioning of the program) is therefore more conducive to gaining a fine-grained 
understanding of welfare state politics. 
 
Finally, the obvious next step that my argument calls for is the investigation of the 
micro-level dynamics of welfare programmes. Specifically, the individual-level 
determinants of vote-switching between elections during retrenchment would offer 
valuable insights into the understanding of partisan biases among the electorate. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Construction of RSP series 
 
 
As indicated in the text, RSP for the three social groups for a given party for a 
given year was defined by RSPgp= 
APQ-AFQ
AFQ . The categorization of respondents into the 
three social groups of interest were based on the survey questions on respondents’ 
occupation/and or job status. From the Eurobarometer series I classified respondents 
into pensioners (answering “retired” to the survey questions), workers (answering 
“manual skilled worker”, “manual unskilled worker” and “other unskilled worker”) and 
middle-class (answering “employed professionals”, “professional”, “general or middle 
manager”, “business owner” and “shop owner”). The ISSP series allowed a more 
systematic classification of respondents relying on ILO-ISCO (4 digit) categories where 
higher categories indicate lower “status”. This was cross-validated by comparing self-
reported family income across the major occupational groups.  
Accordingly, workers comprised the last 3 of the 9 main categories. 
 
7) Craft and related trades workers,  
8) Plant and machine operators,  
9) Elementary occupations. 
 
 I classified the first 3 of the main categories into middle class respondents:  
 
1) Legislators, senior officials and managers 
2) Professionals  
3) Technicians and associate professionals 
 
Finally, pensioners were classified by another survey question on occupation status. 
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The general rule I followed to ensure as much consistency as possible is to use 
the Eurobarometer trend file from its beginning until its end in 2002 (vote intention 
questions were interrupted in that year and subsequent Eurobarometer surveys did not 
include that question). Following 2002 I switched to the ISSP files. For countries that 
had little or no Eurobarometer coverage I extended the ISSP series further back in time 
until the earliest observation (generally in the early 90s). 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Output of robustness checks 
 
Table IV.4 
Models explaining a broader measure of spending representing pensioners’ 
interest in OECD countries† 
 Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.∆.pensionerrisk 0.114 0.115 0.103 
 (1.31) (1.27) (1.21) 
RSP_pensioners -0.299 -0.482 -0.242 
 (2.28)** (3.15)*** (2.48)** 
growth -0.054 -0.064 -0.060 
 (3.32)*** (3.77)*** (3.51)*** 
∆oldageratio 17.989 17.876 17.554 
 (0.88) (0.89) (0.94) 
liberal 0.020 0.009 0.010 
 (0.30) (0.15) (0.20) 
christdem 0.083 0.089 0.073 
 (1.77)* (1.75)* (1.45) 
conservative -0.013 -0.031 -0.033 
 (0.20) (0.45) (0.54) 
other -0.250 -0.222 -0.197 
 (1.77)* (1.62) (1.36) 
Consolidation  -0.192  
  (2.50)**  
RSP_pensioners*Consolidation  0.423  
  (1.98)**  
Expansion  -0.118  
  (1.24)  
RSP_pensioners*Expansion  1.437  
  (3.08)***  
∆capb   -0.028 
   (1.49) 
RSP_pensioners* ∆capb   -0.158 
   (1.83)* 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.30 
N 403 382 382 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are random-effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
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Table IV.5 
Models explaining a broader measure of spending representing workers’ interest 
in OECD countries† 
 Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.∆workerrisk 0.216 0.245 0.235 
 (2.02)** (2.00)** (2.04)** 
RSP_workers -0.215 -0.223 -0.171 
 (1.73)* (1.69)* (1.58) 
growth -0.014 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.90) (1.53) (1.51) 
∆unemployment 0.042 0.011 0.012 
 (0.69) (0.17) (0.17) 
liberal 0.086 0.077 0.071 
 (1.10) (0.92) (0.84) 
christdem 0.049 0.025 0.025 
 (0.75) (0.36) (0.37) 
conservative 0.087 0.057 0.062 
 (1.47) (0.89) (1.00) 
other -0.153 -0.163 -0.150 
 (1.13) (1.10) (1.03) 
Consolidation  -0.063  
  (1.22)  
Expansion  0.139  
  (1.80)*  
RSP_workers*Consolidation  0.086  
  (0.51)  
RSP_workers*Expansion  0.152  
  (0.64)  
∆capb   -0.040 
   (3.68)*** 
RSP_workers* ∆capb   -0.025 
   (0.69) 
R2 0.39 0.43 0.43 
N 360 343 343 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
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Table IV.6 
Models explaining old-age spending in OECD countries under fixed-effects 
estimation† 
 Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive 
II 
RSP_pensioners -0.100 -0.116 -0.173 -0.042 
 (1.36) (2.24)** (2.79)*** (0.78) 
growth -0.053 -0.052 -0.055 -0.051 
 (3.78)*** (7.25)*** (7.12)*** (6.39)*** 
∆oldageratio 42.272 44.959 35.027 34.168 
 (4.29)*** (3.11)*** (2.55)** (2.84)*** 
liberals  -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 
  (0.26) (0.19) (0.33) 
conservatives  -0.063 -0.041 -0.040 
  (1.57) (1.02) (1.11) 
christiandemocrats  0.052 0.066 0.058 
  (1.84)* (2.14)** (1.99)** 
others  -0.107 -0.083 -0.083 
  (2.19)** (2.07)** (1.96)** 
Consolidation   -0.074  
   (2.22)**  
Expansion   -0.046  
   (1.34)  
RSP_pensioners*Consolidation   0.264  
   (2.97)***  
RSP_pensioners*Expansion   1.011  
   (6.90)***  
∆capb    -0.017 
    (2.13)** 
RSP_pensioners* ∆capb    -0.100 
    (2.77)*** 
R2 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.32 
N 489 415 392 392 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are fixed-effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
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Table IV.7 
Models explaining unemployment-benefit spending in OECD countries under 
fixed-effects estimation† 
 Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.∆unemploymentbenefits 0.281 0.324 0.283 0.283 
 (6.78)*** (10.94)*** (9.24)*** (8.88)*** 
RSP_workers -0.019 -0.043 -0.101 -0.043 
 (0.78) (2.57)** (5.57)*** (2.68)*** 
growth -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 
 (2.54)** (1.51) (2.00)** (1.86)* 
∆unemployment 0.051 0.050 0.052 0.052 
 (5.81)*** (9.95)*** (7.15)*** (7.76)*** 
liberals  0.068 0.061 0.062 
  (5.11)*** (4.39)*** (4.28)*** 
conservatives  0.030 0.025 0.025 
  (2.84)*** (2.36)** (2.22)** 
christiandemocrats  0.029 0.034 0.031 
  (2.71)*** (3.22)*** (2.75)*** 
others  -0.037 0.035 0.031 
  (1.10) (1.04) (0.80) 
Expansion   0.038  
   (2.02)**  
Consolidation   -0.011  
   (0.86)  
RSP_workers*Expansion   0.300  
   (3.40)***  
RSP_workers*Consolidation   0.123  
   (2.65)***  
∆capb    -0.003 
    (0.66) 
RSP_workers* ∆capb    -0.008 
    (0.51) 
R2 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.55 
N 472 397 375 375 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are fixed -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
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Table IV.8 
Models explaining tax revenues in OECD countries under fixed-effects estimation† 
 Baseline
ene 
Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
RSP_middleclass 0.171 0.108 -0.058 0.109 
 (1.76)* (0.74) (0.46) (1.17) 
growth -0.132 -0.154 -0.082 -0.100 
 (4.32)*** (5.27)*** (3.80)*** (4.61)*** 
∆unemployment -0.281 -0.302 -0.245 -0.253 
 (6.77)*** (8.77)*** (9.19)*** (8.83)*** 
liberals  -0.171 -0.158 -0.173 
  (1.71)* (1.73)* (1.97)** 
conservatives  -0.089 -0.140 -0.154 
  (1.15) (1.95)* (2.12)** 
christiandemocrats  -0.075 -0.105 -0.123 
  (0.95) (1.40) (1.89)* 
others  -0.277 -0.286 -0.312 
  (1.38) (2.02)** (2.10)** 
Expansion   -0.792  
   (9.07)***  
Consolidation   0.840  
   (8.98)***  
RSP_middleclass*Expansion   1.268  
   (4.43)***  
RSP_middleclass*Consolidation   -0.098  
   (0.37)  
∆capb    0.221 
    (13.35)*** 
RSP_middleclass* ∆capb    -0.165 
    (2.66)*** 
     
R2 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.36 
N 601 514 474 475 
p<0.01* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are  fixed -effects estimates with a set of time dummies (panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses). 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table IV.9 
Data Sources 
Variables Source 
Programme-Specific Spending OECD Social Expenditure Database 
Tax Revenues OECD i.library 
RSP Eurobarometer Trend-File, ISSP 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance of General 
Government 
OECD Economic Outlook database no. 84, no. 92 
Economic and Structural Control variables (growth, 
unemployment, old-age ratio) 
OECD i.library, Eurostat 
Party Family Labels Comparative Political Dataset, University of Bern 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table III.10 
Diagnostic test-results* 
 
     Test           Dependent Variable              Test-statistic, p-value 
F-test for unit-specific effects Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
F-statistic=0.97 
P-value= 0.5084 
F-statistic=1.46 
P-value=0.0767 
F-statistic=0.97 
P-value=0.5052 
F-test for time-specific effects Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
F-statistic: 2.91 
P-value<0.0001 
F-statistic: 1.79 
P-value=0.0109 
F-statistic: 3.66 
P-value<0.0001 
Hausman-test Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
F-statistic=8.05 
P-value=0.3279 
Chi-square statistic=4.8 
P-value=0.6841 
Chi-square statistic=7.66 
P-value=0.3631 
 
Modified Wald-test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity 
Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
Chi-square statistic=21435.48 
P-value<0.0001 
Chi-square statistic=1700.08 
P-value<0.0001 
Chi-square statistic=851.25 
P-value<0.0001 
 
Pesaran-test for cross-sectional 
dependence 
Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
CD-statistic=2.671 
P-value=0.0076 
CD-statistic=1.199 
P-value=0.2307 
CD-statistic=6.752 
P-value<0.0001 
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Wooldridge (Lagrange Multiplier) 
test for first-order serial correlation 
Unemployment benefits 
 
Old-age spending 
 
Tax revenues 
F-statistic=27.572 
P-value<0.0001 
F-statistic=0.656 
P-value=0.426 
F-statistic=0.007 
P-value=0.9350 
*Diagnostic tests were conducted based on the extended models 
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Conclusion 
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The main theme of this thesis has been the complex interaction between the electorate 
and fiscal policy-making in the post-Golden Age era. I have argued that a number of 
strongly held views should be nuanced at best and discarded at worst to refine our 
understanding of this interaction. Moreover, all three essays in this thesis have built on 
the notion of context-conditionalities (Franzese 2007; Franzese and Jusko, 2005), 
whereby propensities to electioneer before elections, electoral assessment of fiscal 
policy choices and partisan patterns behind welfare retrenchment were conditioned by 
political structures, underlying economic conditions and the degree of fiscal strain, 
respectively. In particular, this conclusion will first recap the three main arguments of 
this thesis along with their contributions to wider debates in political economy. In 
addition, I will address a few considerations based on what we have learnt and what we 
can accordingly expect in the current, post-crisis environment. 
 
First, in essay I, I have shown that policy-making fragmentation can moderate election-
induced manipulation of public budgets despite the common pool nature of fiscal 
resources of the state. The logic behind this moderation lies in the (partly) opposing 
electoral interests between coalition members. To the extent that the electoral race for 
votes has a zero-sum nature because the number of voters to sway over by pre-electoral 
benefits is limited, coalition partners can find themselves caught in a conflict of interest 
in whom to target with spending plans. When the junior party in a coalition can exercise 
– or threatens to exercise – its veto-power over the aggregate budget, pre-electoral 
spending expansions will be more limited compared to single-party settings. 
Empirically, the essay has confirmed that coalition governments have in fact displayed 
smaller political budget cycles, especially so when the two key political figures – the 
prime minister and the finance minister – are delegated by separate parties in the 
coalition. 
 
These findings should be understood against the backdrop of highly influential research 
contributions on the harmful influence of policy-making fragmentation in governments 
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Drazen, 1991). The implicit consensus in these 
accounts is the notion that overly fragmented settings impose large burdens on society 
by hindering/delaying necessary reforms or stabilization programmes that governments 
must undertake. Veto points have thus been conceptualized as a price that democracy 
pays for representing multiple preferences and constituencies in the decision-making 
196 
 
process. What I have shown in this essay is that this pessimistic assessment is not 
necessarily warranted. To the extent that veto points – coalition partners in my account 
– exert influence by moderating opportunistic incentives of leading incumbent parties, 
they can actually improve the economic record of the democratic process. 
 
Secondly, essay II shifted the focus of inquiry on the “demand-side” of the budgeting-
electoral dynamics nexus in a clear “clarity-of-responsibility” context, such as the 
United Kingdom. I have argued that the electoral response to fiscal decisions does not 
follow from the simple reward-punishment mechanism postulated by the pioneers of 
economic voting research in a straightforward manner. More specifically, I have posited 
that different income groups have different redistributive interests along the business 
cycle giving rise to a counter-cyclical voting pattern on the aggregate level: in business 
cycle downturns, the electorate at large favors fiscal expansions; in booms, it opposes 
them. These aggregate level dynamics have been shown to be driven by the changing 
preferences of middle-income groups when labour-market conditions change. 
 
Similar to the previous essay, essay II also challenges a wide-spread conceptualization 
of how democracy works: voters who suffer from fiscal illusion and/or myopia (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1994) may be easily fooled by loose fiscal policies as they deliver 
instantaneous benefits in the form of increased spending or lower taxes. Admittedly, the 
idea of the “fiscally conservative” voter (Eslava, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008) has 
recently gained ground as an alternative understanding of this electoral calculus. What 
my essay sought to achieve is to bridge the gap between these opposing accounts by 
arguing that the electoral reaction to fiscal changes is more dynamic than these accounts 
suggest. In particular, voters were shown to change their relative preference alignment 
as business cycle conditions change, giving rise to a counter-cyclical electoral response; 
while economic policy-making in the post-Golden Age era may have done away with 
activist demand-management, the much less understood electoral consequences of 
budgeting decisions remained “Keynesian” in nature. 
 
Finally, essay III has narrowed down on arguably the most salient aspect of fiscal 
decisions: welfare state reform/retrenchment. Building on the New Politics literature, I 
argued that the partisan patterns shaping welfare retrenchment are in fact qualitatively 
different from the Golden-Age era of welfare expansion. Departing from various 
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findings on the surprising resilience of the welfare state even in the face of conservative 
governments, I have argued that it is exactly the most likely defenders of welfare 
programmes that are electorally the best positioned to inflict pain on their natural (core) 
constituencies. The logic behind welfare retrenchment is thus guided by a “Nixon-goes-
to-China” mechanism whereby governments that enjoy a high degree of partisan 
attachment (partisan bias) among certain groups can impose a large part of the burdens 
of fiscal adjustment on them. These patterns, however, are observed only in hard times 
when the fiscal space does not allow for mutual expansions of welfare programs. In 
times of fiscal expansions, traditional partisan patterns dominate. 
 
The main contribution of this essay lies in the reconsideration of conventional 
understandings of partisanship. Since the seminal contribution of Douglas Hibbs 
(1977), different partisan governments’ preferences have been widely assumed to 
follow the representative function of democracy: as different partisan governments 
alternate in power, they will attempt to maximize the welfare of the constituencies, 
albeit subject to various constraints, that they primarily represent. Building on earlier 
insights that challenged such views – most prominently Fiona Ross’s Nixon-goes-to-
China logic (2000) – I have shown that re-election seeking incumbents may have a very 
different set of incentives in hard times. Partisan alternations give rise to unexpected 
programmatic changes in the welfare budget as incumbents attempt to broaden the 
scope of their support coalitions by sheltering traditionally hostile constituencies from 
the pains of fiscal adjustments. 
 
The analyses spanned the time-frame that is conventionally referred to as the 
“neoliberal era”, beginning from the slowdown in economic growth in the early 1970s, 
ending with the recent financial crisis followed by the Great Recession. While it is 
clearly too early to tell whether these dramatic events that lie outside the empirical 
scope of this thesis will mark a watershed in the evolution of economic thought and 
policy-making akin to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s/1990s, there are reasons to 
suspect that a new era has dawned with potentially important implications for the 
findings in my essays.  The rest of this concluding chapter will thus offer a number of 
tentative remarks on the future of the incumbency-electoral dynamics nexus in the post-
crisis world characterized by extremely tight budget constraints. I will start by 
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observations that more or less directly follow from the empirical findings of this thesis 
and proceed with more general considerations in the post-crisis environment. 
 
First and foremost, since the fiscal stimuli that governments undertook in response to 
the Great Recession, simultaneous debt reduction efforts, albeit in varying degrees, 
have been initiated regardless of the sub-potential growth and/or protracted recessions 
in the European periphery. Figure V.1 illustrates the annual evolution of the general 
government balance (left-hand side) and the cyclically adjusted primary balance (right-
hand side) since 2008, the year of the financial crisis, for the seven economies that I 
selected in the introduction of this thesis. The latest forecasts available at the time of 
writing (August, 2013) by the European Commission/OECD for 2013 and 2014 were 
also included to provide a snapshot for the near-future.  
 
Figure V. I 
The post-crisis evolution of the general government balance (left-panel) and the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (right-panel) in seven selected economies (as a 
% of GDP) 
  
 
 
Source: ECOFIN-General Government Database, OECD-Economic Outlook Database no.93 
 
The general pattern, with the notable exception of Sweden, is a continuous fiscal 
tightening which has been carried out despite intervening elections during this seven 
year window (Germany: 2009, 2013, France: 2012, Spain: 2011, Italy: 2013, Sweden: 
2010, UK: 2010, US: 2012). To the extent that the main aggregate-level finding from 
Essay II can be extended to cases beyond the United Kingdom, electoral punishments 
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for these adjustment efforts are likely to be a major theme in political developments 
across the developed world. It is no coincidence that austerity riots and protests have 
made headlines across democracies ever since the simultaneous debt stabilization 
programmes started to bite.  Moreover, when one looks at the electoral fate of 
mainstream parties at the first post-crisis elections, such punishment was manifest in a 
number of places. Not only were ruling parties severely punished, but many voters also 
deserted large centrist parties altogether and voiced their discontent by voting for small, 
protest parties that had comparatively little responsibility over the economic 
management of these economies in the run-up to the crisis. To illustrate these 
developments, Figure V.2 shows the aggregate seat change in national parliaments for 
the largest parties following the first post-crisis elections69. 
 
Figure V. 2 
Aggregate seat change for the major parties70 following the first post-crisis 
parliamentary elections among OECD countries 
 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parline database 
 
 
                                                 
69
 The aggregate seat changes indicate the gains/losses of the two – or three in such multi-party contexts 
as Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands – major parties that led governments either by themselves or as 
senior parties in coalitions during the focus period of this thesis. 
70
 These major parties, grouped by country in order of seat losses in line with the graph, are: Greece – 
New Democracy, PASOK; Czech Republic – ODS, CSSD; Poland – PO, PIS; Ireland – Fianna Fail, Fine 
Gael; Germany – SDP, CDU/CSU; Hungary – MSZP, FIDESZ; Austria – SPO; OVP; Spain – PP, PSOE; 
Finland – SDP, KOK, KESK; France – UMP, PS; Italy – PD, PDL; Australia – Labour, Liberal Party; 
Canada – CPC, LP; Portugal – PS, PSD; Netherlands – Labour, VVD, CDA; Denmark – SD, Venstre, 
KrF; New Zealand – National, Labour; Sweden – SD, Moderate Party; Norway – Labour, Hoyre; UK – 
Labour, Conservatives 
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The electoral fortunes of these “mainstream” parties following the first post-crisis 
elections were clearly on the wane. Most dramatically, the two perennial ruling parties 
in Greece, PASOK and New Democracy lost more than 100 parliamentary seats among 
their ranks, largely due to the collapse of the Greek mainstream-left. In other contexts 
the losses were less dramatic but with the exception of the UK and Norway71 
mainstream parties lost between 8 and 46 parliamentary seats. 
 
One direct consequence of the weakening of the party-political core is increasing 
difficulties to form parliamentary majorities. Illustratively, for the first time since the 
1970s, British politics is now run by coalition rule. Similarly, single-party cabinets that 
had been the default form of government in Greek politics since democratization now 
gave way to coalition politics. Other instances abound where coalition formation has 
become increasingly difficult as a result of parliamentary losses of traditional 
government parties. To the extent that such fragmentation of the party scene will 
increasingly necessitate coalition governments, this has clear implications with regards 
to the findings from Essay I. Specifically, very few political parties will be able to form 
governments by themselves, forcing them to give concessions to coalition partners 
when it comes to pre-electoral budgeting. While it is unlikely that political budget 
cycles will be completely eliminated in the post-crisis environment, their frequency and 
size may decrease compared to the past. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that cuts in public programmes are deeper than in previous 
consolidation periods, it is highly unlikely that governments will be able to shelter the 
most politically salient aspects of the welfare state. In fact, since the crisis, a number of 
countries have already designed and implemented a number of significant welfare 
reforms that will negatively affect current and future beneficiaries alike. Most 
significantly, public pension programmes have come under the greatest scrutiny, as they 
make up by far the largest part of the welfare budget. Table V.1 provides a summary of 
post-crisis welfare reforms with all OECD countries included that implemented 
significant reforms in the post-crisis environment with clearly negative effects for 
programme-beneficiaries. 
                                                 
71
 While the major British parties were sheltered by the first-past-the-post electoral system, Norwegian 
politics was arguably less affected by the relatively moderate impact of the crisis. That said, the recent 
rise in UKIP may very well challenge the two/three-party domination of the British party-political 
landscape. 
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Table V.I 
Summary of post-crisis welfare reforms among OECD countries 
Country Year Area Summary of reform elements 
Austria 2012 Old-age pensions Encouraging employees to participate in funded pensions to relieve burden on pay-as-
you-go scheme 
Belgium 2010 Early retirement Discouraging early retirement by increasing contribution rates on employers 
Canada 2012 Old-age pensions Increasing retirement age, encouraging workers to delay claiming benefits in exchange 
for higher benefits in the future 
Czech 
Republic 
2013 Old-age pensions Changing indexation rules 
  2011 Old-age pensions Partial pension-privatization by creating individual accounts 
  2010 Old-age pensions Raising retirement age, lengthening contribution periods, raising contribution ceilings 
Denmark 2012 Early-retirement Early retirement scaled down by encouraging older workers to remain in labour force 
  2012 Administration Centralizing control over benefit disbursements to cut costs 
France 2010 Old-age pensions Gradual increase in retirement age, only to be partly reversed by the new government 
Germany 2011 Health care Raising contributions on all actors to close the health insurance deficit 
Greece 2013 Old-age pensions Increasing retirement age, capping/cutting pension payments 
  2011 Old-age pensions Freezing pension payments 
   Incapacity More rigorous checks on abuses 
  2010 Old-age pensions Raising retirement ages, increasing contribution periods, cutting benefits 
Hungary 2012 Incapacity Disability benefits restructured, encouraging return to work, stricter monitoring 
   Early-retirement Stricter eligibility criteria for early retirement 
Italy 2012 Old-age pensions Increasing retirement age, postponing payouts to public sector pensioners 
Netherlands 2013 Old-age pensions Increasing retirement age 
New Zealand 2011 Old-age pensions Reduction of government subsidies to KiwiSaver plans 
Norway 2012 Incapacity 
benefits 
Stricter monitoring and stricter eligibility criteria for sick pay 
  2011 Old-age pensions Lower benefits for high earners, more flexible retirement age, modified indexation rules 
Poland 2012 Old-age pensions Retirement age raised 
  2009 Early-retirement A number of early-retirement schemes abolished 
Portugal 2012 Unemployment 
insurance 
Replacement rates cut, eligibility period reduced 
   Early-retirement Early retirement temporarily suspended for employees covered by public pension 
insurance 
   Old-age pensions Freezing pensions, eliminating 13th and 14th month benefits for high earners 
Slovenia 2013 Old-age pensions Raising retirement-ages, changing benefit-calculation rules 
Spain 2013 Early-retirement Discouraging early retirement 
   Old-age pensions Raising retirement ages and contribution periods 
UK 2013 Incapacity 
benefits 
Reform of existing disability benefits with stricter monitoring and qualifying criteria 
   Family benefits Introducing means-testing for child benefits 
  2011 Old-age pensions Raising retirement ages for the state pension, changing indexation and revaluation rules 
for occupational pensions 
Source: International Social Security Association 
 
The resilience of the welfare state that the New Politics literature had suggested has 
clearly given way to austerity pressure and welfare cuts in the post-crisis environment. 
Partisanship is also a weak predictor of these retrenchment efforts as governing parties 
across the political spectrum have implemented welfare cuts in tandem: while the 
British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Canadian reforms were implemented by 
conservative governments, the Norwegian, Danish and some of the Greek reforms were 
undertaken by social democrats, the Dutch pension reforms were carried out by the 
liberals and the German health-care measures were implemented by a Christian-
democratic-liberal coalition. Most importantly, to relate these developments to the 
findings from essay III, it is unlikely that all these listed reforms were helped by welfare 
credibility that the respective parties had built up in recent decades. In fact, what will 
likely distinguish the post-crisis era from previous episodes of welfare retrenchment is 
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vanishing credibility of any political party with regards to their commitment to the 
welfare state. To the extent that partisan biases do arise from programmatic credibility 
for political parties – with regards to welfare programmes for our purposes – even 
traditionally pro-welfarist parties will struggle to maintain that image after a series of 
welfare reforms they had to implement. Voters with interest- or value-based attachment 
to the welfare state will find it increasingly hard to find a political home among 
traditional political parties that presided over austerity policies over the previous 
decades and the current debt-crisis. In this regard, welfare retrenchment will become a 
politically even more difficult task to undertake, if it has ever been easy in the first 
place. 
 
Beyond these likely consequences of the crisis that affected most developed economies, 
a number of more general observations can be tentatively made in the post-crisis 
environment. First and perhaps most importantly, contrary to the passive role of fiscal 
policy with regards to business cycle fluctuations that characterized the neoliberal era, 
governments across the board have undertaken aggressive counter-cyclical measures in 
2008/2009 to counter what turned out to be the most severe economic crisis since the 
Great Depression in the interwar period. These fiscal stimuli, although varying in scope 
and length, have been widely acknowledged to push developed economies towards a 
tepid recovery, which central banks hitting the 0-bound interest rate level were unable 
to ensure by themselves even with unconventional monetary stimuli (quantitative 
easing). However, as mentioned above, after debt levels sky-rocketed to unprecedented 
peace-time levels as a result (IMF, 2012 - see graph I.1 from the Introduction), indebted 
governments – US, UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece  etc. – laid out long-term 
plans to stabilize their debt ratios, largely relying on severe austerity measures to cut 
expenditures and raise revenues. Again, while the scope and composition of austerity 
efforts vary across contexts, the imperative of debt reduction is likely to set an anchor 
for fiscal policy in the foreseeable future.  
 
Both the counter-cyclical stimuli in response to the Great Recession and the subsequent 
stabilization efforts indicate that the politicization of fiscal policy which lies at the 
conceptual core of this thesis will be constrained at best. This is not to say that fiscal 
policy will become politically less relevant in the post-crisis environment; what it 
merely implies is  that the paradoxical implication of the neoliberal paradigm that freed 
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fiscal policy from managing aggregate demand and allowed governments to deploy it 
for political/redistributive purposes has arguably come to an end; governments, in the 
near future at least, will have to surrender it to the imperative of debt stabilization even 
if it entails significant political costs on the streets or in the ballot box. In addition to 
increasing difficulties in forming single-party majorities in legislatures, these 
constraints cast further doubts on the future of political budget cycles. 
 
Second, to the extent that public debt reduction coincides with the deleveraging of the 
private sector in many countries, the very concept of debt may take on new meanings 
and connotations in the political struggles between competing political parties. Under 
one plausible scenario, if incumbent governments succeed to frame their debt-reduction 
efforts as a “war on debt”72 , it may resonate well with many indebted voters who can 
draw a link between their household’s fortunes and those of their governments. 
Alternatively, a new cleavage may emerge between voters whose purchasing power and 
living standards have been severely impaired by deleveraging – and hence welcome 
government efforts to ease their burden – and non-indebted taxpayers who oppose their 
governments bailing out banks and households responsible for the pre-crisis credit 
binge. Either way, whether these developments reinforce previous findings on the 
“fiscally conservative voter” or structure fiscal preferences along new cleavage lines73, 
it is likely that current developments in public finances will mark a turning point in the 
electoral assessment of debt-financed electioneering efforts. In fact, in recent waves of 
Eurobaromater surveys, around 20% of the European electorate identified public debt as 
the most pressing concern for their country; this issue had been hardly mentioned in the 
spring wave of 2008, just a couple of years before the sovereign-debt-crisis struck with 
full force74.  
 
Third, electoral dynamics are also likely to change as new cohorts replace older ones 
among the electorate. Much has been said about the retirement of the baby-boom 
generation for their sheer size and the consequent burden on pay-as-you-go pension 
systems in the developed world. Also, a number of political studies have examined the 
                                                 
72
 Such crisis-rhetoric was particularly common by the right-wing governments of Hungary and the UK 
that came to power at the onset of the debt-crisis in 2010. 
73
 The impact of different socioeconomic positions on the electoral evaluation of economic conditions 
and policies has been documented in a wide range of contexts (see Weatherford, 1978, Palmer and 
Whitten, 2011 and Lindvall, 2013 for relevant examples) 
74
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm, last accessed: 15/08/2013 
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impact of generational replacement on turnout patterns and partisan choices (Lyons and 
Alexander, 2000; Leigh, 2005; Wass, 2007). In this regard, the fact that the generation 
that came of voting age in the 1970s, the beginning of the neoliberal era, is nearing 
retirement may have potentially important consequences. To the extent that political 
socialization during the post-Golden Age era implied a greater awareness of rising 
deficits and indebtedness, the zero-sum nature of redistributive politics in a low growth 
environment may become more and more the norm rather than the occasional exigency 
of fiscal strain. In other words, as older cohorts with direct memories from the Golden 
Age era of welfare consensus are outnumbered among the electorates, the collective 
perception of public budgeting may undergo a profound transformation, sharpening the 
competition for the limited fiscal resources of the state, as tentatively illustrated by 
Essay III. Whether this will manifest itself in more modest electoral demands on 
funding for social programmes, or a more hostile political battle between constituencies 
– between working-age taxpayers or typically non-taxpaying pensioners for instance –  
may turn out to be one of the most interesting questions for the generations to come. 
 
To wrap up these tentative remarks on the future of the public budgeting-electoral 
dynamics nexus, one final conclusion seems fairly clear. Adding to the context-
conditionalities that formed the backbone of this thesis, a new one may be emerging on 
the research horizon. For future generations, the experience with the recent financial 
crisis and the Great Recession and sovereign debt-crisis that followed will be an 
important reference point to governments, opposition parties and voters alike. How 
public budgeting and electorates will interact in the future will certainly depend, among 
other factors, on the extent to which the country in question has been exposed to, 
suffered from or managed to deal with the crisis. Future comparativists working in the 
field of the political economy of public budgeting would greatly benefit from 
integrating this particular source of path dependence in their research. 
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